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The models are divided into two different categories:
(a) Models in which the attacker must find optimal
sequencing of missiles which are either anti-
primary or -anti-secondary missiles.
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sequencing of missiles which are either real
(anti-primary) missiles or decoys. Two mechanisms
by which decoys may enhance effectiveness, namely,
exhaustion and saturation of the defense, are
quantitatively explored.
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Various combat duels between an attacker, who owns a
stockpile of long range precision-guided missiles, and a de-
fender are addressed. The defender must defend a valued tar-
get, or several valued targets (called primary targets) by a
group of defending targets (called secondary targets, and are
usually understood to be surface-to-air missile batteries)
.
The problem of the attacker is to allocate his missiles be-
tween the primary and the secondary targets so as to optimize
various measures of effectiveness. The models are divided
into two different categories:
(a) Models in which the attacker must find optimal
sequencing of missiles which are either anti-
primary or anti-secondary missiles.
(b) Models in which the attacker must find optimal se-
quencing of missiles which are either real (anti-
primary) missiles or decoys. Two mechanisms by
which decoys may enhance effectiveness, namely,
exhaustion and saturation of the defense, are
quantitatively explored.
Various cases are examined in the thesis, which makes a
heavy use of stochastic dynamic programming and sequential
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A. MOTIVATION AND CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND
This work contains an analysis of various tactical deci-
sion processes involving the use of long range conventional
tactical missiles. It is written with a view towards the
future of tactical missiles warfare, which only recently has
begun to concern many people (military planners, tacticians)
throughout the military world. In this thesis we describe
some of the anticipated operational contingencies of (tacti-
cal) missile warfare. We then formulate them as dynamic deci-
sion models solvable by techniques of operations research, and
solve them. Before presenting the kind of problems which are
to be analyzed in this thesis, we briefly explain what there
is in air warfare trends today that causes conventional missile
warfare to emerge as a major concern.
The principal weapon system in today's Air-to-Ground (A/G)
warfare is still, undoubtedly, the aircraft. However, some
significant technological achievements of the last decade
(mainly in the field of Radar Technology and Electronic War-
fare) raised a new generation of Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM)
systems. These systems are becoming serious obstacles to a
full and effective utilization of the aircraft in the A/G
warfare. The existence of such Ground-to-Air (G/A) defense
systems can sometimes prohibit the use of the aircraft, at
least at the initial phase of an armed conflict. The reason
16

for that is that the attrition rates expected as a result of
the presence of these systems stands at such a high level that
it would be very hard, due to psychological factors, to launch
manned vehicles into such effectively defended areas.
Among the main properties which make some of the modern
SAM systems very hard to overcome are:
(1) They are operationally autonomous. The operability
of a battery does not depend on any other units of
the defense system, since each unit, or battery,
includes all components necessary for detection and
acquisition of targets, and for controlling and firing
missiles.
(2) The batteries are small, compact, hardly detectable.
(3) The batteries are very highly mobile.
(4) Very sophisticated detection sensors and avanced
acquisition, control and. ECM devices make the SAM
batteries highly effective in a very high kill
envelope
.
These developments in defense technology are very likely
to intensify trends, which can already be noticed to exist
today in the U.S. and in Europe, to develop long range, tac-
tical, conventional missiles for massive uses, at least at
the initial phase of conventional armed conflicts.
A brief description of the characteristics of tactical
missiles follows. We emphasize that we refer here to missiles
used for attacking ground targets, which are considered
mainly as alternatives for the aircrfat, in a specific,
tactical mission.
*
Examples for systems which can be characterized by (1)-
(4) above are: Soviet SA-8, SA-6 systems; the German "Roland"
SAM system; the French "Crotale" system.
17

(1) The missile is directed to point targets by highly
sophisticated guidance and control systems (these
systems may be passive, active, semi-active laser
guided, or they may be of a Man-In-The-Loop type).
(2) The accuracy of the missiles is very high: Circular
Probable Errors (CEP) of a few feet are quite
typical, i.e., the missiles have almost pinpoint
accuracy.
(3) The warhead is conventional.
(4) The maximum ranges of the missiles are long enough to
make it possible to position the launchers (of the
attacking missiles) at a considerable distance from
any intercepting system for which the defender might
call. In other words, the launchers (of the attacker)
are assumed to be safe and practically invulnerable.
(5) The operations with the tactical missile are heavily
supported by an advanced tactical intelligence system.
Such networks, which are very likely to play a dominant
role in future air warfare will enable the attacker to
receive and use information on (almost) a real time
basis.
Our main concern in this thesis is the following scenario:
Suppose a group of targets of high military value is defended
by a local system, consisting of a group of independent SAM
batteries. We assume that the defense system is sufficiently
solid so as to force the attacker to avoid deploying aircrafts
as long as the defense remains highly effective. To carry out
missions which are urgent, as the attack of the group of tar-
gets mentioned above may be, the attacker may decide to use
long range tactical missiles. These missiles may be aimed at
the defending targets (i.e., SAM batteries) as well as at the
defended ones. They can be intercepted by defensive missiles,
which can be launched by the SAM batteries. Thus we consider
here a pure tactical missile warfare. The main questions
18

which this thesis is dealing with are questions of optimal
allocation of the tactical missiles between the value targets
and the defending targets. (We discuss criteria of opti-
mality later.)
Our terminology thus distinguishes between two categories
of targets: We use the term "primary" to describe targets,
the destruction of which is considered as the ultimate goal
of the attacker's mission. We define as "secondary" targets
those targets which defend the primary ones. As connoted by
their name, the "secondary" targets do not have inherent value,
so that the question whether a given secondary target was
destroyed or not is not weighed in the overall rating of mission
success. This means that the objective functions taken for the
allocation processes presented in this thesis, are always
defined in terms of destroyed primary targets only, the number
of destroyed secondary targets never being a factor. The only
reason for the attacker to be sometimes willing to attack
secondary targets is that by killing secondary targets the
attacker improves the probability of missile survival, and so
indirectly increases the effectiveness of missiles aimed at
the primary targets.
It should be noted that the identification of a specific
military target as 'primary' or 'secondary' is not a matter
of a pure, factual judgment on the nature of a target. Rather,
the categorization of a target should be derived from the
specific tactical situation and from the goals defined by
the decision maker in each specific case. It is clearly a
19

matter of subjective perspective. To give an example, con-
sider a case in which the tactical missiles command is re-
3
quired to support ground forces by attacking some C (control,
command and communication) centers of the enemy. Suppose
these centers are defended by SAM batteries. In that case, the
C centers are naturally the primary targets, and the SAM
batteries are the secondary ones (since the judgment of mis-
sion success should be made from the perspective of the sup-
ported forces only, who quite expectedly will judge by
evaluating damages to the C centers only) . On the other
hand, there may be a case where the goal is to destroy a
group of SAM batteries of one type, defended by SAM batteries
of another type. Then the batteries of the first type will
themselves be the primary targets
.
The general optimal allocation problem with which we deal
in Part I of this thesis is the following: The attacker has
a given number of missiles. The defender defends a primary
target with one or with several secondary targets. Probabili-
ties of hitting the primary and secondary targets with one
missile (assumed unintercepted by the defense) are given along
with a probability of surviving an interception attempt made
by the defense. The attacker launches his missiles sequen-
tially, each missile aimed at either the primary target or
a secondary target, according to the attacker's decision.
The problem of the attacker is to find decision rules which
maximize probability of killing the primary target (or, alter-
nately, maximize the number of missiles penetrating into the
20

primary target) . The important question is , under what
conditions should he spend some of his missiles engaging secon-
dary targets for the hoped-for benefit of improving the sur-
vivability (hence, the effectiveness) of the rest, which are
to be aimed at the primary target? To deal with this kind
of problem, we define two types of missiles:
(1) Anti-primary (AP) type: a type of missile which is
designed to use against primary targets.
(2) Anti -secondary (AS) type: a type of missile which j
is designed to use against secondary targets.
We have made this distinction between AP and AS missiles be-
cause primary and secondary targets usually differ in their
physical properties (hardness, size, shape, detectability by
missile seeker, etc.), so that AP and AS missiles may differ
in technical design (for example, they may have different
warheads) . It should be emphasized however that they are not
necessarily different. It is possible that the two types will,
in fact, be technically identical.
In Part II of the thesis we analyze a different concept
of missile warfare— the concept of deceiving the secondary
targets by decoys. We think of AS missiles as representing
one concept of upgrading the survival rate of AP missiles
(i.e., killing the defending targets) and of decoys as repre-
senting another concept of doing that (i.e., denying the
secondary targets their ability to function effectively)
.
Decoys are "dummy" missiles which are designed to appear
on the radar monitors of the secondary targets as real missiles.
Decoys do not have warheads nor guidance heads. Some other
21

components of a real missile are either missing or technically
simplified and less sophisticated in decoys. The decoy has an
engine and some navigation devices to allow it to fly in a
path similar to that of a real missile. Its physical signa-
tures (RCS, Optical and IR signature) are very much the same
as those of a real missile. Presumably, the decoy is much
less expensive than a real missile, otherwise there is no
reason to consider it.
The idea behind using decoys is that by prudently com-
bining them with real missiles one can sometimes considerably
save in mission cost while not losing much operational effec-
tiveness (some effectiveness should however be lost, of course,
whenever a real missile is replaced by a decoy) . To put it
differently, it is expected that decoys will improve the cost-
effectiveness ratio. The goal of Part II of this thesis is
to analyze situations in which such an improvement is indeed
achieved.
B . METHODOLOGY
In this work we propose and solve models, to describe
engagement processes, or duels, which take place between an
attacker and a defender. The attacker owns a mixed stockpile
of tactical missiles. The defender is defending one primary
target with one or more secondary targets. Assumptions are
set forth about the character of the duel, and especially
about the defensive operational policy, the available informa-
tion, the number of missiles the attacker may launch etc.
22

These assumptions lead to a formulation of mathematical models
that are believed to reflect particular tactical situations
which are of interest.
The above mathematical models are solved using recursive
analytic methods such as stochastic dynamic programming , sto-
chastic game theory and some notions from general decision
theory.
Although the mathematical solving techniques are often
essential to making our models usable, it is not the techni-
cal aspects which are of main concern, but rather the applica-
bility of the models. Therefore, the general theories under-
lying the techniques are only briefly sketched wherever they
are in use in this thesis. The. literature relevant to each
subject treated in this thesis is reviewed separately within
the chapter in which the specific subject is presented.
It is important to emphasize here that the duels which
are modeled in this work have to be regarded as processes
belonging to the "microscopic" analysis of tactical missile
warfare. Large operations with tactical missiles could ade-
quately described as aggregates of many such duels. The
method of this work is to isolate events or to focus on "atomic"
conflicts. We pretend that in each such event an initial
state is determined and both sides act to optimize some objec-




C. STRUCTURE AND CONTENTS OF THE THESIS
The general structure of the thesis is depicted in the
following scheme (see Fig. 1.1) . Part I of the thesis is
dedicated to problems in which the choice presented to the
attacker at each stage is between launching an anti-primary
and launching an anti-secondary missile. In Chapters II and
III, one-sided models are presented. In these models, it is
assumed that each missile the attacker launches has a known
and constant probability of survival, which depends on the
number of secondary targets still alive. Probabilities of
hit (conditioned on survival) are also given, and the problem
is to find optimal decisions as a function of the number of
secondary targets present and the number of missiles the
attacker is allowed to launch. Three different objective
functions are considered: (1) Probability of hitting the
primary target; (2) Expected number of AP missiles hitting
the primary target; and (3) Expected cost of hitting the pri-
mary target. (When using this last criterion, the attacker is
assumed to have no limit on the number of missiles he has.)
Some theorems concerned with the general structures of optimal
policies are given, and detailed algorithms to find the param-
eters defining the optimal policies are given, along with some
numerical examples.
Chater IV introduces a new element to the problems dis-
cussed in Chapters II and III. We add the assumption that the
operator of the secondary target has the option of using a































Figure 1.1. Structure of the Thesis
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mode in that it renders the secondary target invulnerable
to AS-missile, and at the same time less effective against
any threatening missile. The attacker and the defender, both
aware of the options open to each other, are thus involved in
a duel which is quite naturally modeled as a two person, zero-
sum stochastic game. This game is fully analyzed and solved
for the payoff functions mentioned above. A review of litera-
ture on stochastic game theory and its applications is given
in Chapter IV.
Part II of the thesis is dedicated to problems in which
a choice between launching a real missile and launching a de-
coy is made by the attacker in each stage of the process.
Chapter V gives a short introduction to the concept of decoys,
review of literature, and some presentation of the models which
are treated in detail in the subsequent chapters. In Chapter
VI we consider situations in which the mechanism by which de-
coys contribute to the operational effectiveness is exhaustion.
A stochastic game is formulated where at each state the at-
tacker may use a real missile or a decoy, and the defender
may decide to fire one missile (from his limited stockpile)
or to avoid firing. Costs are associated with the real missile
and the decoy and the problems are to find min-max policies for
various payoff functions
.
In Chapter VII a different mechanism of decoy support is
examined, which is the saturation mechanism. Here we assume
that the attacker has the option of launching several missiles
26

(reals and decoys) simultaneously/ where the defense can
handle only one (or even more, but less than the number of
missiles launched simultaneously) at a time. We find what
should be the optimal number of decoys to accompany a real
missile, and what is the optimal "mixture" of real missiles
and decoys, so that the expected cost of killing the primary
target is minimized. The technique used is that of stochastic
dynamic programming.
D. SOME REMARKS ON THE USE AND APPLICABILITY OF THE MODELS
PRESENTED IN THE THESIS
The models presented in this thesis are intended to aid a
decision making process concerning the acquisition and deploy-
ment of conventional tactical missiles. In general, Operations
Research models constitute only one block of a wider process
of analysis, i.e., the "systems analysis" process. The term
"systems analysis" usually describes a grand-optimization pro-
cess, conducted at many levels of the defense organizational
hierarchy of a nation, the goal of which is to suggest optimal
courses of behavior. This process combines and weighs a
broad scope of considerations, among them economic factors,
political impacts, technological uncertainties, etc. One of
the more important factors is of course the expected operational
effectiveness of the system in various combat situations. The
exploration of this must be done through operational models
,
models which attempt to foresee likely combat contingencies,
and which are intended to become vehicles with which various
quantitative questions (related to operational needs) are answered
27

It is this last category of considerations within which
this thesis is applicable. Our goal was to propose and solve
models which seem adequate to various scenarios, and to sug-
gest ways in which the results obtained through them can feed
that broader process called "systems analysis." Our thesis
is a pure "Operations Research" kind of work, and since much
more should be considered at a "system" level, the reader can-
not make quick conclusions regarding the tactical missile
"system"
.
Some remarks are necessary here on the relation between
the models we propose in this thesis and the "real world"
problems. Since we deal with future situations and make
predictions—conjectures sometimes—of them, the term "real
world" really deserves some clarification. We should bear in
mind that we explore here processes that have not yet been
experienced in the battlefield, and rely on some, perhaps
optimistic, assumptions about future technological systems.
It is noteworthy that although a formal distinction be-
tween the disciplines of "Operations Research" and "System
Analysis" hardly exists and is subject to many vague, ad-hoc
interpretations, it is widely accepted that "Operations Re-
search" represents the low level of analysis, whereas "systems
analysis" represents the higher level. As Quade [6, p. 23]
points out:
"...when Operations Research came to be applied out-
side the military forces, the term was interpreted
in its narrow sense, being confined to studies of
low level problems where the decision maker had a
clear objective in mind. The term systems analysis
then began to be applied to broad "higher level"
studies that looked into aspects that OR workers had
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Hence, no certain facts about what can be viewed as "real
world" and what can only be considered as an illusive or sim-
plistic imagination, can be decided. The future reality may
deviate from what we predict, and this deviation may be of
such a degree so as to render some of our models inapplicable.
This is, however, an inevitable deficiency of all operations
research models related to future use of newly deployed weapon
systems . This is precisely the same dilemma which exists in
the analysis of anti-ballistic-missiles, or anti-submarine
warfare, both of which have never been experienced before but
have been extensively treated in the O.R. literature.
Using methodical terms, we can say that we lack here tools
for validation of our models. With regard to the problem of
validation, we quote from Fawcett [3, p. 13]. This reference
is an excellent example of a work written with the same philosophy
of research guiding this thesis. It deals with rational selec-
tion of tactics for A/G attacks in various situations. On
the validation problem, Fawcett writes:
. . .A model would be accepted as valid if its struc-
ture parallels the real world situation of interest
sufficiently accurately to allow useful conclusions
to be drawn. The decision maker must decide whether
or not this is true for a given model in a given
decision situation. Accordingly, the validity of an
operations research model is meaningful only when
usually considered 'given' (the objective, for
instance) and accepted models that seemed to some
hardly scientific..."
"...To avoid confusion, it is suggested (as we
do here) that the term "Operations Research" be
confined to efficiency problems, and "system
analysis" to problems of optimal choice."
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a specific decision is to be made; otherwise, there
is no basis for judging whether or not the model
constitutes a satisfactory representation and the
concept of validity has no meaning."
Our approach therefore was to propose and analyze models that,
as anticipated today, grasp the essential relevant factors
of tactical missile allocation processes.
Finally, it should be noted that although our interests
lie in the area of tactical conventional missiles, much of
the material here can be quite adequate to describe attack
processes involving intercontinental ballistic missiles. In
some models, only minor modifications should be made to make
th€:in adoptable for use in ballistic missile warfare research.
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PART ONE: OPTIMAL ALLOCATION PROBLEMS INVOLVING
ANTI -PRIMARY AND ANTI -SECONDARY MISSILES
II. THE OPTIMAL ALLOCATION PROBLEM WITH
A SINGLE SECONDARY TARGET
In this chapter we present a basic allocation problem
which, although simplified in many aspects, is still helpful
in gaining insight into the military operational questions
which are the theme of this thesis. Besides, the model pre-
sented in this chapter can very well be useful by itself as
it fits directly some real tactical scenario.
In the model analyzed here we assume that one primary
target is defended by a single secondary target. It is also
assumed that the defender (who operates the secondary target)
responds to all missile attacks with an attempt to intercept
the offensive missile. In Chapters III and IV we elaborate
on this model by considering the case in which several secon-
dary targets defend the primary target (Chapter III) and by
allowing a more sophisticated defense policy (Chapter IV)
.
A. DESCRIPTIONS OF THE BASIC MODEL
1
. Assumptions
We assume that the attacker is allowed to make M attacks
against a primary target, which is defended by a single secon-
dary target. Due to some technical restrictions, or by command
decision, the attacker is restricted to launch his missiles one
by one. After every launch, the attacker is informed whether
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the target at which he aimed his last missile was hit or missed.
He uses this information (which he receives through the
intelligence system, which is assumed ideal) to make the
decision of which target (the primary or the secondary) should
be the next one to be engaged.
The secondary target is always thought of as a Surface-
to-Air Missile (SAM) battery of a technologically advanced
type. Such a system has only one component the killing of
which renders the whole system inoperable. This component
is the control unit, which is usually a small vehicle or van,
with the radar installed at the outside and the operators
and control panels located inside. This control vehicle
operates 3-6 launchers which are located aroung it.* There
is no purpose in attempting to kill launchers because of their
high redundancy.
The secondary target is therefore a 'point target 1
actually. In military terminology, a 'point target' is one
with characteristic dimension which is much smaller than the
radius of effectiveness of the weapon used against the target.
(Thus being a 'point target' is not a physical feature of
the target alone; it is determined by both the target and the
weapon.
)
We shall also assume that the primary target is a point
target, although this assumption is not always necessary, as
will be discussed later.
*
The Russian SA-6 system, or the French "Crotale" are
examples for that type of defense system.
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The practical significance of the assumption that a
target is a point target is that the attack of the target by
a missile can result either in a hit, and consequently in a
complete destruction of the target, or in a miss, which means
that no damage is inflicted upon the target. No result of
intermediate significance is assumed to be possible (partial
damage, for instance) . Hence each attempt to destory the tar-
get with one missile is considered a Bernoulli trial, with a
given probability of success (discussed below)
.
Another assumption which has to be explicitly stated,
is that the primary and secondary targets are located suffi-
ciently distant from each other so that it is impossible for
a single missile to damage both- of them. The distance is not
so large, however, as to enable the defender, who uses the
radar of the secondary target for detection of offensive
missiles, to distinguish between missiles which are aimed at
the primary target and missiles which are aimed at the secon-
dary target.
The missiles to which we refer in this thesis are
guided missiles of a very high accuracy of hit (Circular Proba-
ble Error [CEP] of 3-6 feet are considered typical) . There
is no need in this thesis to refer to specific features of
the guidance system or of any other component of the missiles.
All the parameters needed for the operations research analysis
are assumed known to the attacker, and will be discussed later
In real applications of the methods offered in this thesis one
should, of course, evaluate those parameters in order to apply
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the model, and this evaluation in itself usually amounts to
a very hard preliminary analysis.
It should be noted that the missile which the attacker
uses against the primary target may or may not be of the same
type of missile used to attack the secondary one. Different
missiles would normally be required due to differences in the
vulnerability and physical characteristics between the primary
and the secondary target. But this is not essential to the
models presented in this chapter. The missiles are launched
from an airborne launcher or from a ground launcher. In all
cases we assume that the missiles have ranges long enough so
as to enable the attacker to locate the launchers in a safe
place. In other words, all the. models in this thesis assume
that the launcher is practically invulnerable.
2 . The Parameters of the Problem
We denote by q the probability that a missile launched
at either the secondary or the primary target will survive
an interception attempt made by the secondary target. In
other words, the secondary target, so long as it is alive, has
probability 1-q of intercepting an offensive missile while
it is still flying to its target, thus preventing it from
reaching the vicinity of the target.
We denote by P the probability that a single offensive
missile, aimed at the primary target (AP-missile) , will hit
the target, given that it survives the secondary target. Thus,
the overall probability of killing the primary target by an
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AP-missile is P if the secondary target is already dead, and
p -q if it is still alive.
P
We define a parameter P in a similar way: it is the
probability of hitting the secondary target by an anti-
secondary missile (AS-missile) once it survives the secondary
missile.
The parameters P and P s are sometimes called— in mili-
tary terminology—the Single-Shot-Probabilities-Of-Kill (SSPK)
.
They are of course functions of many factors such as the
physical characteristics of the targets, technical features
of the missile, launch tactics, environmental factors (weather,
visibility), etc. As was explained before, the parameters should
be estimated prior to implementation of our model by properly
evaluating the effects of each of the above factors. It is
clear, however, that in reality there is no hope of getting
an "accurate" value of P , P and q. Therefore, a sensitivity
p s * 2
analysis of the results should be carried out when implementing
the models to be presented here.
3. Policies and Criteria of Effectiveness
As long as the secondary target is alive, the decision
problem faced by the attacker at every stage is at which tar-
get to launch the next missile. Each stage is defined by the
number of missiles left to be used (denote it by M) . We denote
by AP (AS) the decision to launch a missile at the primary
(secondary) target. Let f| be the set of positive integers.
A 'policy' is a function D(M), D: |V| + {AP,AS} which prescribes
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which target should be selected for attack at any number of
missiles left to be launched, assuming, of course, that the
secondary target has not yet been destroyed. When the secon-
dary target is dead, the decision problem is, of course,
trivial. We denote by D the set of all policies.
In order for optimality concepts to be meaningful, we
have to define a criterion of effectiveness of a policy. Two
criteria of effectiveness are analyzed in this chapter.
a) Maximum-Probability-Of-Hit (MPH) Criterion: a policy
|
determines the probability that the primary target
will eventually be hit (given the number M of killing,;
attempts left). We denote by P(M;D) the probability
of hitting the primary target by M attempts, given
that the policy D is used. The problem to solve is
to find the policy D* such that
P(M;D*) = Max P(M;D) = P (M)
DeD
b) Maximum-Expected-No.-Of-Penetrators (MENP) Criterion:
In this case the objective is to bring into the
primary targets as many missiles as possible. A
penetrator is an AP-missile which survives the
secondary target. If we denote by E(M;D), the expected
number of penetrators when the attacker is using
policy D, with M missiles left to be launched, the
problem is to find the maximizing policy D* such that
E(M;D*) = Max E(M;D) = E (M) .
DeD
Criterion a) above is usually the appropriate one when the
primary target is a 'point target', and when the only measure
of success is the target being killed or not. Thus, the
natural objective function in that case is the probability that
at least one missile hits the primary target. Criterion b)




'point target', but rather a compound of many small targets.
Examples are: Airfields, industrial facilities, etc. In
such cases, the relevant measure is the number of missiles, aimed
at the primary target, which penetrates through the defense.
The argument behind the adoption of such a criterion in this
case is that the expected damage inflicted upon the target
is perceived to be directly related to the number of penetrating
AP -missiles
.
A third criterion will also be examined in this thesis,
but its treatment is postponed to the next chapter where the
problem with that criterion is presented and solved in a more
general situation, i.e., where the numbers of both primary and
secondary targets are assumed arbitrary. To use this criterion,
the model is slightly changed: Rather than assuming that the
attacker is restricted to a given* number of launches , we assume
that he goes on with the attacks until the primary target is
killed. The objective is to find a policy which minimizes the
expected cost of achieving that kill (there are costs C and
P
CR associated with an AP- and an AS-missile, respectively)
.
This criterion is abbreviated by MEC (Minimum-Expected-Cost)
.
In Section B we solve the problem with MPH criterion.
In Section C the MENP criterion is treated. The problem with
the MEC criterion is solved in a more general context, as
explained above, in Section III.E.
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B. THE ALLOCATION PROBLEM WITH THE MAXIMAL-PROB-OF-HIT
(MPH) CRITERION
1 . The Functional Equation
Let us denote by Q(M) the probability of missing the
primary target, when the attacker starts with M missiles and
makes optimal decisions at each stage. It is also assumed
that the secondary target is still alive. Clearly
Q(M) = 1 - P(M) = 1 - P(M;D*)
where D* is the optimal policy. If the secondary is dead,
the probability of missing the primary target is denoted by
Q~ (M) , and is given simply by




We now write the stochastic functional equation for the func-
tion Q(M). We use the dynamic programming principle of opti-
mality due to R. Bellman [2]. The equation is:
MQ(M+1) = Min{P -q(l-P ) +(1-P q)-Q(M),(l-P -q)-Q(M)} (II. 1)
s p s P
The first term inside the brackets is the probability of not
destroying the primary target, starting from state M+l, if
the offender attacks the secondary target first and then pro-
ceeds optimally. The second term corresponds to a decision
to attack the primary target f irst, and then proceed optimally.
To initiate the solution of the functional equation (II. 1),
we start from M = 1 and proceed forwards. To find Q(l), notice
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that when the offender is left with only one missile, the
optimal decision is clearly to attack the primary target.
Therefore we have:
Q(l) = 1 - P .q
as before. Let D*(M) (M = 1,2,...) be the optimal policy.
Then, D*(l) = AP . Now let M* be the smallest number such
that D*(M*)= AP whereas D*(M*+1) = AS. Thus, M* is a number
with the following property:





The number M* has the meaning that the attacker has to have
at least M*+l missiles in order to afford spending at least
one missile in the indirect action of attacking the secondary
target. This does not exclude a priori the possibility that
the optimal decision at some state M > M*+l would be to act
against the primary target. In other words, it seems intui-
tively possible that for stockpiles of very large size M, and
for at least some combination of the parameters P , P and q,
P s
it would be optimal to allocate the first missile to the pri-
mary target.
This intuition is, however, false. We show that if
M* is finite, then for all values of M greater than M*, the
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optimal decision is AS. However, it is possible that M* = »,
in which case the attacker should spend all his missiles on
attacking the primary target, no matter how many he has (we
show later that this happens when P > P )
.
ctr p — s
This observation can be formulated as follows: In an
optimal policy D*, no switch is possible from attacking the
primary target to attacking the secondary one. One switch
at most is possible from the secondary to the primary target.
We put this observation formally as a lemma.
2 . The Basic Lemma
If D* is optimal, and D* (M) = AP for some M, then
D*(M') = AP for all M» < M.
Proof ; We use a method- of proof very common to prob-
*
lems of optimal sequential processes. Let us assume, by
contradiction, that D* is an optimal policy, and that for some
state M we have:
D*(M) = AP
D*(M-1) = AS




D**(M) = D*(M) for all M < M-l.
*
See, for instance, R. Bellman [2, Ch. 2] for proof of
optimal policy for the "Gold Mining" problem. This method of




D** is almost identical with D* . The two policies disagree
only on states M and M-l. Let us calculate now the values of
the objective functions at state M under policies D* and D**.
We calculate this by conditioning on results of the first
two stages (i.e., the first two missiles to be launched).
We have
:
Q(M;D*) = Q(M) = ( 1-P -q) •
P
g
-q ( 1-P )
M" 2
+ (1-P -q) (1-P
g
.q) -Q(M-2) (II. 2)
M-lQ(M?D**) = P -q(l-P ) +(1-P -a)* (1-P -q)-Q(M-2) (II. 3)
s p s ^ P
Subtracting Eq. (II. 3) from Eq. (II. 2) we get:
Q(M;D*) - Q(M;D**) = P P -q(l-P ) M
" 2 (l-q) > 0.
s p p
Hence,
Q(M;D**) < Q(M;D*) = Q(M)
Thus, D* cannot be an optimal policy as was assumed. This
completes the proof of the lemma!
3. Solution
The basic lemma shows that calculating M* as a function
of P , P and q is sufficient for completely specifying the
P 8
optimal policy D* . From the definition of M* , we see (using
Eq. (II. lfl that:
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Q(M) = (1-P •q)Q(M-l) for M <_ M*
so that
Q(M) = (1-P -q) M for M <_ M*
.
(II. 4)
M* is known to be the smallest M such that the minimum in
Eq. (II. 1) is obtained by the first term, that is, M* is the
smallest M to satisfy the inequality:
P .q(l-P ) M + (1-P .q)Q(M) < (1-P .q)Q(M)
s p s P
or
P .(1-P ) M < (p -p )Q(M) (II.
5
s p s p •
Substituting for Q(M), using Eq. (II. 4), we get
p«-<i-PJ M * (p «-pJ • d-P r,-q) Ms p s p p
or
1-P M P
<i=r?qi « 1 - g* (II - 5a >
p n s
1-P




< 1, so that the^ 1-P »q
P
above inequality is equivalent to
P
la(l-g£)




As implied by its definition, M* is the least integer which
satisfies inequality (II. 5b). Therefore we can now write:










where [x] denotes the greatest integer smaller than or equal
to X. From inequality (II. 5) we observe that if P P , this
inequality cannot be satisfied by any finite value of M*
.
Hence M* = °°, and this confirms a rather intuitively obvious
fact that when the kill probability of the primary target (con-
ditioned on survival of the missile) is equal or greater than
that of the secondary target, it can never be desirable to
I allocate missiles to the secondary target.
Another interesting observation is the following:
suppose we wish to know what should be the relation between









1 - -R > P_





1 + (P -P )q - P < 0.
s p s
Since we have assumed that P > P , we see that this last
s p
inequality cannot be satisfied by any triplet of values
(P ,P ,q) . In other words, the value of M* is at least 2 for
p s
all possible values of the parameters. Since when P < Pr ^
s — p
it is always optimal to launch at the primary target, we con-
clude that if the attacker has two missiles, he always has to
allocate both of them to the primary target—no matter what
are the values of P , P , q! This fact is somewhat surprising
P s
because intuitively one might very well suspect that for some
combinations of values of P , P - , q (for instance, for small
p s
q and P and large P ) it would be better to use the first
missile to attack the secondary target, in order to consider-
ably improve the probability of hitting the primary with the
second one.
Another question of a particular importance to opera-
tional analysis is the following: Given P , P and M, what1 3 p s
values should q assume in order for it to be optimal to assign
at least one missile to the secondary target?
This question can be answered by a straightforward
argument based on inequality (II. 5a) above. If --for particu-
lar values of M, q, P ,P — the optimal decision is AS, then
the four numbers M-l, q, P , P should satisfy inequality











The optimal policy D* (expressed as a function of q for given
M, P , P ) is thus:
P s
AP if q >_ q*
D* =
AS if q < q*
Notice that q* -> 1 as M * °° as expected. When the
attacker has a large number of killing opportunities (and if
P > P ) , we expect that it always is beneficial to start
with the secondary target, unless q = 1, in which case all
missiles surely survive so that there is no need to spend
missiles on the secondary target. Notice also, that if M - 2,
we get q* < 0, and since q is a probability it can never be
smaller than q* in that case, so that the optimal decision
for M = 2 is always AP--as discussed above. We now give an
explicit expression for Q(M) for values of M greater than M*
.







.q) .Q(M-l) (II. 8)
= P -qd-pftl-P -q) . [P .q(l-P ) M~ 2





= ... = P -q J (1-P .q) 3 ".(l-P ) M" ] +(1-P q) M
"M
.Q(M*).
s .~, s p s
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M*Noting that Q(M*) = (1-P .q) (since for M = M* the optimal
decision is AP, and it stays AP for M < M*) , we find:
Q(M) = P -q(l-P )
s p























,, _ .M-M*.. „ .M*
+ (l-P
s
-q) (1-P -q) '
M*
P .q(l-P ) *







- % . q .p P ]d-P s -q)
M-M*
In all the calculations which have been done here, we assumed
P
-q / P . (The case P -q = P does not pose any special
difficulty. It makes the summation in Eq. (II. 9) simpler.)
From the last equation we see that Q(M) can be ex-
pressed as
M-M* M-M*Q(M) = A- (1-P )™ + B- (1-P -q)
p s
(11.10)
where A and B are coefficients which depend on the parameters






P -q(l-P M'M* p_
, B . (1-P .q, - p
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Notice that we could arrive at the expression (II. 8) (and
hence, at Eq. (11.10)), by applying a direct probabilistic
argument: We would condition the probability of miss on the
number of missiles which are spent before a hit at the secon-
dary target is achieved. The first term in the last row of
Eq. (II. 8) accounts for all the cases in which the secondary
target is destroyed by one of the first M-M* missiles. The
second term corresponds to the case in which all first M-M*
missiles fail to hit the target, thus imposing on the attacker
the necessity to switch and attack the primary target with
all the remaining M* missiles.
C. THE ALLOCATION PROBLEM WITH MAXIMAL EXPECTED NO. OF
PENETRATORS (MENP) CRITERION
1. The Functional Equation
Let E (M) be the optimal expected number of penetra-
tors, given that the attacker is allowed to launch M missiles,
and that the secondary target is alive. A penetrator is an
AP missile which survives the defense (i.e., the secondary
target) and thus penetrates into the primary target. If the
secondary target is dead the attacker will of course launch
all his remaining missiles at the primary target, and they
are free to penetrate. The expected number of penetrators will
be equal to the number of remaining missiles.
Suppose the secondary target is alive, and the attacker
has M+l missiles. If he launches the first one at the secon-
dary target and then behaves optimally, the expected number
of penetrators will be:
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M (with prob. P -q]
or
E(M) (with prob. 1-P «q)
so that the unconditional expected number of penetrators will
be
P .q-M + (1-P «q)E(M)
.
s s
If, on the other hand, the attacker uses the first missile to
attack the primary target, and then behaves optimally, the
expected number of penetrators will be
q + E(M) .
The functional equation for E(M) is thus:
Q(M+1) = MaxCP .q-M + (1-P -q) E (M) ,q+E (M) } . (11.11)
If the maximum in Eq. (11.11) is attained by the first term,
the optimal decision is AS, and if it is attained by the
second, the optimal decision is AP.
2 . Solution
It can be shown, by much the same way it was done in
Section II. B. 2 that using the optimal policy, the attacker
cannot switch from attacking the primary target to attacking
the secondary one. Once the attacker directs a missile against
the primary target, he should do so with all the rest.
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Thus, the number M* is defined here in exactly the
same way as it was done before (Section II. B) . For M M*
we get
E(M+1) = q + E(M)
from which we get the relation
E(M) = q.M . (11.12)
To find M* we use the fact that M* should be the least value
of M for which the first term in the functional equation (11.11)
is greater than the second term. Thus, M* is the least value
of M to solve the equation:
P -q-M + (1-P .q)E(M) > q' + E (M)
.
(11.13)
For M <_ M*, E(M) is given by Eq. (11.12), so that inequality
(11.13) becomes, after substitution:
P .q(l-q) -M > q
3
Hence:





It is now possible to express E(M), for M > M* by
conditioning on the number of missiles that will be required
to destroy the secondary target. With probability (1-P «q) *
•P «q, the secondary target will be destroyed by the jth
missile (j = 1, 2 , . . . ,M-M*) . In such a case, the remaining
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M-j missiles will freely penetrate into the primary target
If all the first M-M* missiles miss the secondary target,
the attacker will be left with M* missiles,
and thus will have to switch to the primary target. The
expected number of penetrators in that case is
M-M* . ,
*
E(M) = I (1-P .q) : .P .q(M-j) + ( 1-P .q) • M* •
q
j=l s s s
= M- [1-(1-P .q) M-M*] -P e -q. I j- (1-P-q)
j_1
s s j=1 s
M-M*
+ (1-P .q) m n -M*q .
s
We now use the formula






to simplify the second term of the above equation. After
some algebraic manipulation we finally get:
E(M) = M - =-i- + [_L_ - M*(l-q)] • (1-P -q) M~M* (11.15)
s* q s
" q
We have chosen to express E (M) in the specific form given in
Eq. (11.15) since it is the form which enables us, as we shall
see later (Section III.D) to initiate an inductive proof of
the general form for the expected number of penetrators when




Figures II. 1 through II. 7 refer to the allocation problem
with iMPH criterion (Section II. B). Figures II.1-II.3 can
be considered as "decision charts", which can serve the attacker
in immediately selecting, for each state and set of param-
eters, the optimal action. For any given values of P and
M there corresponds a curve in the P -q plane, which separates
the zone where the optimal decision is AP (the zone "above"
the curve) from the zone where the optimal decision is AS
(that which is below the curve) . The curve itself simply
gives the value of q* as a function of P .
s
Notice also, that the value of M* , for a given set of
values P , P , q can very simply be discovered from the graphs
P ^
given in Figs. II.1-II.3. To do that, one must select first
the appropriate figure to use (according to the specific value
of P ) . Then one should locate the point P -q on the figure
p r s
^ 3
and determine which is the closest curve, from below, to that
point. The M-value of that curve is exactly M* for the com-
bination of P , P , q examined. To clarify the last state-
p s ^ "*






From Fig. II. 1, which is the one corresponding to the above
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located between the curve with M = 4 and M = 5. This means
that if M = 4, the attacker should take the AP decision,
whereas if M = 5 he should take the AS decision. In other
words, M* is equal to 4.
In Figs. II. 4 through II. 7 we present the variation of the
objective function P (M) (i.e., the probability of hitting the
primary target) with M, the number of missiles the attacker
is allowed to launch. In order for the results to be indica-
tive of the quantitative significance of using an optimal
policy, we have chosen not to present the function P (M) itself,
but rather, the "scaled" probability of hit J(M), which is
defined by:
j do = —EWL. i-Q««)M M1-(1-P -q) 1-U-P -M)
P P
The function J(M) is the ratio between the optimal probability
of hit, and the probability of hit which will be achieved if
the attacker uses the simple, "natural" policy of attacking
only the primary target. As long as M is less than or equal
to M* , the optimal strategy itself is an "AP-only" strategy,
and so J (M) = 1 for M <_ M* , as seen in the graphs. For
M > M* , the function J(M) is greater than 1, and has a maximum
on some finite M. Also, notice that J(M) »- 1 as M + « . The
reason that J (M) has that general form, which is seen in
Figs. II.4-II.7, is very transparent: For very large values
of M, the probability of killing the primary target becomes
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Figure II. 6: Optimal (Modified) Objective Function J (M)
for Allocation Problem with MPH Criterion,





















very close to one even when using the non-optimal AP-only
strategy. Therefore, J (M) is very close to 1.
Notice that J(M) directly gives the improvement achieved
by the optimal policy, over what would be achieved in the
non-optimal AP-only strategy. This improvement is seen to
be more significant as the value of q gets greater. By com-
paring the various graphs we can also conclude that when P
gets smaller (q and P fixed) , or when P gets bigger (q
and P fixed), the improvement J(M) is more significant.
Figure II. 8 refers to the allocation problem with MENP
criterion. We present the function H(M) defined by
H(M) = E(M)M-q
for P =0.7 and for q = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6. Notice that the
s
^ '
function H (M) plays here the same role that J(M) plays in
the problem with the MPH criterion. The function E(M) is
given in Eq. (11.15) and is the optimal expected number of
penetrators. The expression M*q in the denominator is the
expected number of missiles which will penetrate if the
attacker chooses to ignore the secondary target and to use
the AP-only strategy. ' Thus H (M) is the natural quantitative
measure of the significance of using the optimal policy.
The function H(M) is monotone increasing. It may easily
be shown that H(M) approaches q as M •*> ®. This can be ex-
plained as follows: as M gets large, the expected number of
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FIGURE II. 8: Optimal (iModified) Objective Function H(M)
for Allocation Problem with MENP Criterion
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III. OPTIMAL ALLOCATION PROBLEMS WITH
SEVERAL DEFENSIVE TARGETS
A. INTRODUCTION
In Chapter II we have worked on a problem in which only
one secondary target was assumed to exist. In many instances,
military targets of high value are defended by more than one
secondary target. The effectiveness and survivability of the
defense increases by adding secondary targets, whereas the
survivability of offensive missiles decreases. In this chap-
ter we analyze the same problem of Chapter II, but generalize
it by allowing an arbitrary number of secondary targets to
exist.
The assumptions we make are the following: We assume that
all secondary targets are identical point targets. They are
located in the vicinity of the primary target, close enough to
the primary so that a detected offensive missile cannot be
decided in advance on its destination (i.e., whether it is the
primary or any of the secondary targets) . The secondary tar-
gets are, however, sufficiently distant from one another so
that a single missile cannot inflict damage to more than one
target. We assume also that the destruction of one secondary
target does not have any impact on the operability of other
targets, that is, the individual targets are absolutely
operationally autonomous.
Three different problems are solved in this chapter,
corresponding to three different criteria of effectiveness:
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(1) Maximizing probability of hitting the primary
target (MPH criterion)
(2) Maximizing the expected number of anti-primary (AP)
missiles which penetrate their target (MENP criterion)
(3) Minimizing expected cost of destruction of the
primary target (MEC criterion)
.
The choice of the "appropriate" criterion to use depends
on the specific military situation in which the models are
to be implemented. We would use the MPH criterion if the pri-
mary target is a point target of high value, which practically
can be assumed to exist in one of two states only: "killed"
or "alive". The second criterion described above (MENP) fits
a situation where the primary target is actually a big complex
composed of many different point and area targets (e.g.: air-
field, industrial facility) . The level of damage to such a
target can be one of a variety of partial, or intermediate
levels (between the extremes of completely "killed" and com-
pletely "alive") . The number of AP missiles which penetrate
such a target is usually quite adequate to represent the level
of damage inflicted upon the target. The MEC criterion would
be used in cases where the attacker is not limited in the num-
ber of missiles he can launch, so that the attack will be
allowed to continue until the primary target is destroyed.
B. THE SURVIVAL FUNCTION
Let N be the number of secondary targets defending the
primary target. We define a function, called the survival
function, and denoted by q(N s ), which is the probability that
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an offensive missile will survive, given that N secondary
targets are present. The function q(N ) is usually complicated
and may be found from both experimental (evaluation tests)




q(N ) <_ 1 (since q(N ) is a probability)
(2) q(N ) <_ q (N -1) (since presumably, more defensive
targets reduce the survivability of
the attacking missile)
(3) q(0) = 1.
The form of the function q(N ) will usually be implied by
the defensive strategy of controlling the operations of the
N units. We give some examples:
(1) Independent Operations: Here we assume that upon any
arrival of an offensive missile, each secondary target makes
an attempt to intercept the missile, independently of all the
others. In this case:
N
q(N ) = q (where q is a parameter)
(2) Coordinated Operations: Here we assume that any
potential direction of arrival of an offensive missile is
protected by n >_ 1 SAM batteries if n < N and by all N
batteries if N < n. Thus,
s —
q n = (constant = q ) if N > nQ v ~~ " w ** ' " s
<* (V " I N
q




(3) When operations are centrally controlled by a single
unit, it is sometimes believed that the following process
underlies the engagement phenomena. The decision taken by
the defender is always to assign one unit to a detected offen-
sive missile. However, there is a probability r that any single
defense unit will be operative at the moment of its call, so
that the defenders have a unit to assign only if not all the
units are inoperative at the time when engagement is required.
The probability of successful interception by any secondary
target, given that it is operative, is assumed to be 1-q.









) = q + (1-q) (1-r) S .
The above are just the simplest types of survival functions
which occur quite frequently. However, we shall not restrict
ourselves to these special forms. Our goal is to investigate
the structure of optimal assignment policy for a general
survival function, with special emphasis on how this structure
depends on general properties (such as convexity-concavity) of
the function q(N )
.
s
C. OPTIMAL ALLOCATION—MAX. PROB. OF HIT (MPH) CRITERION
1 . Formulation
We say that the attack process is in state (N ,M) if
there are N secondary targets present and the attacker has
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M missiles to launch. We denote by Q (N ,M) the probability
of missing the primary target when starting from state (N , M)
and using the optimal policy. The parameters P and P have
the same meaning they had in Chapter II, namely, the probabili-
ties of a surviving missile to kill the secondary and primary
targets, respectively. The survival function is q(N ). The
functional equation for the optimal probability of miss is:
iP




) -P ) •Q(N
s
,M-l)
The first (second) term is the probability of miss
given that the first decision made by the attacker is to
launch an AS (AP) missile, and then he uses the optimal policy
The rest of this section is dedicated to solve this equation
and to analyze the structure of the optimal policy.
2 . The Optimal Policy Structure--A Fundamental Lemma
A basic observation, which can be made without solving
the functional equation, and which actually is the key to the
solution process, is that if the attacker follows the optimal
decision procedure, he can never launch an AS missile after
at least one AP missile have been launched. That is, the
optimal policy will always dictate to spend some missiles (and
possibly none) on secondary targets and then to "switch" to
the primary one, and use all the remaining launch opportuni-
ties to launch AP missiles. We present this statement as a
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lemma and prove it by probabilistic methods. We denote by D*
the optimal allocation policy. Notice that any policy D is
simply a function from the set of all states S = { (N ,M)
:
N , M = 1,2,...} to the set {AP,AS}, where AP (AS) means anti-
s
primary (anti-secondary) decision.
Lemma: Let the survival function q (N ) be strictly de-
s
creasing. If for some state (N ,M) , the optimal
policy D* satisfies
„ !
D*(N ,M) = AP
S *> . i '
then, for all values M 1
,
less than M, we have also,:
D* (N ,M') = AP
a
Proof : We prove the lemma by contradiction. Suppose there
is some state (call it (N ,M) ) , such that at the optimal policy
we have:
D*(N ,M) = AP
s
and
D* (N ,M-1) = AS
s
Let D** be another policy, which we now define by specifying
the action it dictates on all possible states. We require:
D**(N ,M) = AS
s





D**(N ,M) = D*(N ,M)
s s
for all (N ,M) ± (N ,M) or (N ,M-1) . Let Q (N ,M;D) denote
s s s s
the probability of miss achieved by using policy D, when start-
ing from state (N ,M) . Then by definition of D* we have:
i
Q(N ,M) = Q(N ,M;D*)
s s
Repeating the same argument which was used in the proof
of the lemma in Chapter II (page 4 0) , we have
Q(N,M) = Q(N ,M;D*)
= [l-q(NJ .P 1 *qUT ) -P -Q(N -1,M-2;D*) (III. 2)
+ [l-q(Ne ) -P^l • [l-q(N ) P^ ] Q (N ,M-2 ; D*
)
s p s s s
and
Q(N ,M;D**) = q(N ).P • [l-q(N -1)-P ]-Q(N -1,M-2;D**)
s sssps
+ [l-q(Ne ) -Pi • [l-q(N o ) -P^] -Q (NQ ,M-2 ; D**)s s s p s
(III. 3!
We now subtract Eq. (III. 3) from Eq. (III. 2), and use the
following identities (which are implied by the fact that D*
and D** are identical on M < M-l)
:





Q(N -1,M-2;D*) = Q (N -1,M-2;D**)
s s
We then get:
Q(N ,M;D*) -Q(N ,M;D**)
s s
= q(N ).P -P «[q(N -l)-q(N )]-Q(N -1,M-2;D*) >
^ s s p s s s
where the last inequality comes from the assumption that q (N )
is strictly decreasing, and that Q(N ,M;D) is always positive.
Thus,
Q(N ,M;D**) < Q(N ,M;D*)
and this contradicts the assumption that D* is the optimal
policy! The lemma is thus proven.
If q(N ) is not strictly decreasing, as was assumed, but
simply non-increasing (as it must be!) the statement of the
lemma should be slightly modified. From the proof of the
lemma we see that if q(N ) = q(N -1)/ then policies D** and
D* give identical probabilities of miss. Thus, we can only
say that there always exist an optimal policy such that
D*(N ,M) = AP implies D* (N ,M') = AP for all M' < M. By .the
discussion above we see that the only way to change optimal
policies without destroying optimality is to reverse their
dictations on states (M,N ) , where the value N is such that
' s s
q(N ) = q(N -1) (assuming this reverse changes the policy),
s s
We will be interested however only in policies which do not
switch from AP decisions back to AS decisions. It is clear
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that for such optimal policies, there is a value of M (denote
it M* (N ) ) associated with every value of N , such that the
s s
optimal policy (D*) can be written as:
D* (N ,M)
s
AP if M < M* (N )
— s
AS if M > M*(N )
s
The function M* (N ) thus completely characterizes the
optimal policy D*. It depends on the function q (N ) and on
the parameters of the problem. In the next section we prove
a theorem which is of great help in gaining some insight into
the interrelation between the functions q(N ) and M* (N ) .
^ s s
3 . Non-Increasing M*-Sequences—The Monotone Miss
Probability Ratio (MMPR) Concept
Let [\ be the set of natural numbers. We define the
following function r(n) on [\:
1 -P -q(n)
f(n) = , =£1 -P -q(n-l)
P
We call this function the "Miss Probability Ratio" (MPR) . It
gives the ratio of the probability of missing the primary
target when n secondary targets are present to che proba-
bility of missing it when n-1 secondary targets are present.
It can be viewed as a measure of the marginal reduction of the
vulnerability of the primary target caused by the nth secon-
dary target.
We say that the allocation problem has the Monotone
Miss Probability Ratio (MMPR) property on the set {n: 1 n < N},
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if the function r(n) is monotone increasing on that set,
that is, if
r(n) >_ r(n-l)
for every n in the set. We now state and prove a fundamental
theorem which relates the function M*(n) to the survival
function q (n)
.
Theorem 1 : A sufficient condition for the function M* (n)
to be non-increasing on the set {n: 1 n N}
(for some N) is that the problem will have the
MMPR property on that set.
Proof: We begin with some preliminaries. First we observe
that the condition M* (n) < M*(n+1) is equivalent to the
condition
D*(n+l,M*(n)+l) = AP . (III. 4)
To show this, assume first that M*(n) < M*(n+1). Then
M*'(n)+1 <_M*(n+l) so that by definition of M* (n+1) , the opti-
mal decision at state (n+l,M* (n) +1) must be AP. To show that
the converse is also true, assume that Eq. (III. 4) is valid.
It implies the relation M*(n)+1 M*(n+1), so that M* (n)
< M*(n+1) . The above mentioned equivalence is thus proven.
We now seek for an equivalent mathematical expression
for the fact expressed in Eq. (III. 4). To accomplish this
we rewrite Eq. (III.1) with n+1 and M*(n)+1 replacing n and











Since the second term in the brackets corresponds to an
anti-primary first decision, it is clear that Eq. (III. 4)




< P -q(n+l)Q(n,M*(n) ) + (l-P -q (n+1) ) Q (n+1 ,M* (n) )
s s
This implies that the following inequality is equiva-






In state (n,M*(n)) the optimal decision is AP, and it stays
AP through the whole process since no switch from AP to AS
is possible. Hence





Furthermore, since M* (n) < M*(n+1), we deduce that in state
(n+l,M*(n)) the optimal decision is also AP , and stays so.
Thus:






Substituting these expressions of Q(n,M*(n)) and Q(n+l,M*(n))

















Thus we have shown that inequality (III. 7) is equivalent to
M*n) < M* (n+1) . We prefer to emphasize the equivalence of












Notice now that M* (1) was already calculated, and is
given by Eq. (II. 6) . We have:
















. If we put now n = 1 in (III. 8) and then replace M*(l)
in the left-hand side with the smaller quantity given in the
right-hand side of Eq. (III. 9) we arrive at a condition which







1-P - 1-P -q(2)
ln( l-P.q(l) ) ln(r^qTTT )
P P
or:
1-P .q(l) 1-P -q(2)
!_p _ l-p .q(l
P P
that is:
r(l) < r(2) .
Thus, we have shown that a sufficient condition for M*(l) M*(2
is r(l) r(2), which is exactly the assertion of the theorem
for N = 2. We proceed by induction on N. To carry out the
induction step, we need to use one more result which is an
immediate by-product of the analysis made so far. We show
that if it is known that M*(n+1)
_
M* (n) , then M*(n+1) can
be exactly calculated. First notice that if we put an arbi-
trary M in place of M* (n) in Eq. (III. 5) , then by definition
M*(n+1) would be the smallest integer for which the first term
in brackets is smaller than the second. That is, M* (n+1) is
the smallest number to satisfy:
P -q(n+l) -Q(n,M) +(1-P .q (n+1) )Q(n+l,M)
s s
< (l-q(n+l) )P -Q(n+1,M)
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For all M, such that M < M*(n+1) we can write:
Q(n+1,M) [1-P .q(n+l)] M
,
and since M*(n+1) is assumed to be less than or equal to




Thus, by substituting the last two equations into the
inequality above, we find that M* (n+1) must be the first
integer to satisfy
1-P .q(n+l) M










1 n ( p )
'
i _P .q(n+l) ;
(III. 10)
(notice that when n = 0, we have q(0) = 1, and we have
exactly the expression for M*(l) discovered in Chapter II,
Eq. (II. 6)).
We can now proceed to carry out the induction step to
complete the proof of the theorem. We have already proven the
theorem for N = 2 . Let us now show that if the theorem is
valid for some N, then it is valid for N+1. The assumption
that it is valid for N implies, among other things, that




M*(l) > M*(2) > > M*(N)
Now, it was already proven that an equivalent condition to
MMN+1) < M* (N) is (see Eq. (III. 8)):
ln(
M*(N) S £1-P .q(N+l)
ln(




On the other hand, the assumption M*(N) M* (N-l) (which is
included in the induction hypothesis) implies (by the dis-
cussion above, which led to Eq. (III. 10)) that:
M*(N) = 1 +














If now we replace M*(N) by a smaller quantity, given
in the right-hand side of this last inequality, we obviously
retain the sufficiency of condition (III. 11) for M* (N+l) <_ M* (N!











ln( 1-P -q(N) }
1-P -q(N) 1-P .q(N+l)
P






r (N) <_ r(N+l) ,
as a sufficient condition f rM*(N+l) . M* (N) . The proof
of Theorem 1 is thus complete.
The operational significance of this result is very
transparent. As implied by the foregoing analysis, for every
value of N , the number M* (N ) +1 is the minimum number of
s s
missiles the attacker should have in his stockpile in order
for it to be worthwhile spending the first missile (at least)
on a secondary target. The MMPR property indicates that the
marginal growth of the miss probability goes up as the number
of secondary targets increases. Thus it becomes more pressing
for the attacker to reduce the number of secondary targets as
this number increases. The non-increasing property of M*(n)
is just an alternative way in which this last fact is viewed.
It means that if the attacker has a given number of missiles,
then as there are more secondary targets it becomes more com-
pelling to aim (at least one) missile at the secondary targets
In other words, the minimum number of missiles he must have in
order for it to be justifiable to spend at least one on secon-
dary targets, decreases as the number of secondary targets
increases
.
We finish this section by presenting a numerical exam-
ple of non-increasing M*(n) sequence. In designing this exam-




1-P .q(n-l) -(1-p -q(n)) 2
^ (n+1) i P -(1-P .q(n-l))
p p




12 3 4 5
q(N
g )
0.95 0.85 0.7 0.7 0.268
M*(N )
s
17 9 7 6 6
so that M*(n) is non-increasing on the set {n: 1 <_ n <_ 5}.
4 . Increasing M*--Sequences --Solutions
Although situations in which the survival fine tion
possesses the MMPR property quite possibly exist, it was
found by thorough explorations made by the author, that for
most survival functions of practical relevance (see Section
III.B), this property does not exist and the M*-sequences are
actually (strictly) monotone increasing, i.e., M*(n+1) > M*(n)
for all n. Calculation of M*(n) (for all n) in this case
is much more complicated, and we now turn to solve this general
case. For the convenience of the following mathematical
development we define the following function:
R(n,k) = Q(n,M*(n)+k)
where we now use n (not N ) to denote the number of secondary
targets. The value R(n,k) is the probability of not hitting
the primary target, when n defense units defend it and the
attackers stockpile contains k missiles more than the maximum
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level (M*(n)) that would require spending the whole stockpile
on primary targets. From Eq. (11.10) we have:
R(l,k) = A, . (1-P ) k +B., (1-P -q(l)) k (III.li:
1 p Us
where:












( -q(l).P ) P .q(l)-P„
M* (1)
= (l-q(l).P ) K } - Ai (III. lib)
P L
We now prove the following useful lemma:
Lemma : Let q(n) be a strictly decreasing function of n.
Then, for any n,k, the function R(n,k) can be
expressed by:
k 5 k
R(n,k) = A.(1-P) K + I Bn .. [1-P e .q(j") ] (III. 12)n P 1=1 n /D s
where A and (B .: j = 1,2, ...,n} are constants
n n, j J
which can be calculated recursively and are functions
of the parameters of the problem only (that is, of





Proof: We prove the lemma by induction. Its validity for
n = 1 is already proven (see Eqs . (III. 11), (III. 11a), (III. lib)
above) . Assuming that it is true for all values of n up to
some N, we show that it is valid for n = N+l. To do that, we
consider the state (N+1,M* (N+l) +k) . The first shot in this
state should obviously be anti-secondary. We can calculate
R(N+l,k) by conditioning on the number of missiles which would
be expended before achieving the first successful anti-secon-
dary shot. If the first missile to hit a secondary target is
the jth one, where j <_ k., then the attacker will be in state
(N,M* (N+l) +k-j ) from which the probability of not destroying
the primary target is given by:
" R(N,M*(N+l)+k-j-M*(N) ) = Q(N,M*(N+l)+k-j)
since k-j >_ in this case and M*(n+1) > M* (n) , we deduce
that M* (n+l) +k-j-M* (n) > and so we can express this function
using the induction hypothesis for n = N.
If, on the other hand, the first k missiles fail to
destroy even a single secondary target, then the offender
moves to state (N+l, M* (N+l) ) in which the probability of
M* (N+l
)
eventually missing the primary is simply [1-P •q(N+l)J
ir
Now, the probability of first hitting a secondary
target on the jth missile is (1-P 'qfN+l))-1 " -P -q(N+l),
and the probability of not hitting any secondary target with









+ (l-q(N+l)-P ) k - (l-q(N+l) -P ) M *(N+1 >
s p
where we've substituted AM* (N) for M*(N+1) - M*(N).
We now proceed in developing the last expression by
substituting for R(N, AM* (N)+k-j ) the hypothesized expression,
which is taken valid for N by the induction assumption:
R(N+l,k) = I (l-q(N+l)-P ) j
~ 1







^]+ I BN1=1 '
k M* (N+l)
+ [l-q(N+l)-P ] • (l-q(N+l) -P ) KB* X; (III. 13)
s p
A careful inspection of this rather awkward expression shows




'(l-P ) + I R, -(l-qU)*P ) (III. 13a)U P 1 = 1 L ' S


















q(N+l) -P -PM S p
AM* (N)




For l = 1,2 . .., n, we have after similar manipulation and











l-q(N+l) .P e k
1-qU) -P, -) (III. 13b)
and finally:
R1,N+1 (1 - q(N+l) -P )
M*(N+1)
Now substituting the expressions for R Q , R. {i = 1,2,..., n+1























(l-q(N+l) -P ) k [(l-q(N+l) .P ) M* (N+1)
q(N+l)'P
s
(l-P ) AMMN) .AN
q(N+l) -P e -P„^ s p




£=1 q(N+l) - qU)
The proof the lemma is now complete since the last
expression has exactly the required form:
R(N+l,k) = v
N+l
Vr (1"V + J/n+i^-^^-V (III. 14)
= Q(N+l,M*(N+l)+k)
The constants A-. , and BN , , l = 1,2,..., n+l can be calcu-
lated from A^ and BN , l = 1,2,...,N as follows:
q(N+l) -P (1-P ) L
n = S P













-Vl-.i, BN+ l,j f°r l m N+1 -
(III. 14b)
Notice that the constants A, and B, , are known
(Eqs. Ill . lla-llb) . Hence, if the function M*(n) was found,
we could use it, along with the data of the problem, to calcu-
late A and B for all n and l (using formulae (III . 14a-14b)
n n,z *
and thus to have a very convenient expression of the miss
probabilities Q(n,M) for M > M*(n). The function M*(n) it-
self can be calculated recursively as we now show:
Suppose M*(l), M*(2), . .
.
, M*(n) are already known.
Let N = n+l. We wish to find M* (n+l) . Returning to the
functional Equation (III.l), we write for a state (n+l,M+l)
where M >_ M* (n) :
Q(n+1,M+1) = Min{P -q (n+l)
-Q (n ,M) + (1-P -q (n+l) ) -Q (n+l,M)
,
s s
(l-q(n+l) -P ) -Q(n+1,M)
}
P
By its definition, M* (n+l) should be the least value of M
such that the minimum is attained at the first term in brackets
This is so because among all states of the form (n+l,M) , the
first M that makes it optimal to launch a first missile against
a secondary target, is (by definition) M = M*(n+1) + 1. The
first term in brackets corresponds to the decision to launch

an anti-secondary missile. Hence, M*(n+1) should be the
least M such that:
P .q(n+l) •Q(n,M)+(l-P -q (n+1) ) -Q (n+l,M)
s s
< (l-q(n+l).P ).Q(n+l,M). (III. 15)
P
Now, we have to imagine that we check the numbers M*(n)+1,
M*(n)+2, and so on, to see which is the least one to satisfy
this inequality. For any M such that M = M*(n)+k <_ M* (n+1) we
have:
Q(n+1,M) = (1-P -q(n+l)
)
M * (n)+k (III. 15a)
whereas for states (n,M) (where M > M* (n) ) we proved that:
Q(n,M) = R(n,M-M*(n))
»
= A U-P) "-"*<"»+ I B .(1-P -q(j)) M
-M * (n) (III.15b)
n p l^ n, 3 s
Substituting now Eq . (III. 15a) and Eq
.
(III. 15b) in Eq.
(III. 15) and simplifying, we conclude that M*(n+1) is the #
least number M to satisfy the following inequality:
A (1-P ) M
"M * (n)
+ I B .(1-P .q(l))
M -M * (n)
n p t n,: s ^




The results at which we arrived here clearly provide a com-
plete solution to the optimal allocation problem with MPH
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criterion, for which it is known before that the function
M*(n) is (strictly) increasing. For each n, it can be de-
cided whether M* (n+1) > M*(n) or not by checking whether
inequality (III. 7) is satisfied or not. If it is known that
M*(n+1) > M*(n), then M*(n+1) can be found from M*(l), M*(2),
...,M*(n) and the constants A , {B .: j * l,2,...,n} by
n n, j
solving for the least M to satisfy inequality (III. 16).
Then A ,, and {B
,




using Eqs . (III. 14a) and (111.14b), and the whole process is
then repeated, to find M*(n+2) (assuming, again, M*(n+2)
> M*(n+1) )
.
In Fig. III.l we present a block diagram of the compu-
tational algorithm which solves. the allocation problem with
the MPH criterion for strictly increasing M*-sequences . The
diagram assumes that the M*-sequence is already known to be
monotone increasing. The confirmation of this fact is very
simple, as was explained before, and to include that we only
had to add a special loop that checks, for every n, whether
M*(n) still increases. However, since most interesting sur-
vival functions are known already (as mentioned before) to
have the strict monotonicity property, we have preferred to





P /P / (q(n) : n=l,2, ...}p' s ^
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FIGURE III.l Flow Chart of Computational Program to Solve
Optimal Allocation Problem (MPH Criterion)
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D. OPTIMAL ALLOCATION—MAX. EXPECTED NUMBER OF PENETRATORS
(MENP) CRITERION
1 . Formulation
The Max. Expected Number of Penetrators (MENP) cri-
terion may best fit a situation in which the primary target
is not a single point target, but rather a complex consisting
of many point targets. This criterion fits also "area tar-
gets"—targets which have continuously distributed value over
a large area (See Eckler & Burr, [1]) . An airbase is a good
example of such a target. In this case, a very convenient
and sensible measure of effectiveness is the expected number
of anti-primary missiles which penetrate the defense.
We denote by E (N ,M) the maximum expected number of
AP missiles succeeding to penetrate the defense. When at the
initial state the attacker has M launch opportunities and the
defender has N secondary targets, the functional equation
for E(N ,M) is:
s
E(N ,M) = Max{P -q(N )-E(N -1,M-1) + (1-P -q(N ) ) • E (N ,M-1) ,
s sss ss s




It was explained in Chapter II that we can take P = 1
without loss of generality, since the optimal policies do not
depend on P , and the value of the objective function at the
P
optimum is simply proportional to P . The first term inside
the brackets of Eq. (III. 17) expresses, as usual, the value of
the objective when the first decision of the attacker is AS,
and he then proceeds optimally.
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We observe that there exist, as in the allocation
problem with the MPH criterion, optimal policies such that no
switch from an AP decision to an AS decision is allowed. If
q (N ) is strictly decreasing, we can say more, namely, that
no optimal policy exists which allows such a switch. This
property was proved for problems with the MPH criterion. For
the MENP criterion, its existence is even more intuitively
obvious. (The mathematical proof is immediate and we omit
it here.)
Thus we have the notion of the M*-sequence as before.
All we need to do to determine the optimal policy is to calcu-
late the M*-sequence (which for a given set of parameters and
a given survival function may differ of course from the M*-
sequence resulting if we adopt the MPH criterion)
.
2 . Non-increasing M*-Sequence—Relation to Concavity
of the Survival Function
First notice that M*(l) is exactly M* that was
calculated in Chapter II and is given by Eq. (11.14):





Suppose now that for some n we have M*(n) < M*(n+1) . This
was shown earlier (see proof of Theorem 1) to be equivalent
to
D*(n+l,M*(n)+l) = AP (III. 19)
and this property is further equivalent to:
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q(n+l)+E(n+l,M*(n) ) > P -q (n+1) -E (n ,M* (n)
)
+ (1-P -q(n+l) ) -E(n+l,M*(n) ) . (III. 20)
s
Eq. (III. 20) is implied by interpreting Eq. (III. 19) as having
the second term in the functional equation (III. 17) greater
than the first (where N and M are replaced, respectively,
9
by n+1 and M*(n)+1 in that equation). We can simplify Eq.
(III. 20) by rearranging terms and have:
E(n,M*(n)) - E(n+l,M*(n)) < ~- . (III. 21)
s
In state (n,M*(n)) the optimal policy dictates to
use AP missiles only. The probability of penetration of each
missile is q(n) . Hence we can write:
E(n,M* (n) ) = q(n) -M*(n)
.
Since M* (n+1) > M* (n). we have the same situation in state
(n+l,M*(n)), that is, that only AP missiles are used at the
optimal policy, thus:
E(n+l,M*(n)) = q (n+1) -M* (n)
.
Substituting the last two equalities in Eq. (III. 21) and
simplifying we reach the following inequality:
M* (n
> < P <q(n*-q(n+l)) • (III - 22)
9
Thus we showed that M*(n) < M*(n+1) is equivalent to
Eq. (III. 22) . For our needs we prefer to emphasize the
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equivalence of the opposite statements, namely, that
M*(n) M* (n+1) is equivalent to
M* (n
»
- P (q(n}-q(n+ l)) • (III. 23)
s
If M* (n) >_ M* (n+1) we can quite simply calculate
M*(n+1) in the following way. We write the functional equation
for state (n+l,M+l)
:




By definition, M*(n+1) is the smallest M for which
the first term is greater than the second. That is, M*(n+1)
is the smallest M which satisfies:
P [E(n,M) - E(n+1,M) ] > 1.
s
For M < M*(n+1) we clearly have E(n+1,M) = q(n+l)*M, and
since we assume M* (n+1) <_ M* (n) , then M < M*(n+1) implies
also M < M* (n) so that we have also E(n,M) = q(n)«M. Thus,
M*(n+1) is the smallest M to satisfy:









We now present a theorem which gives a sufficient
condition for the function M*(n) to be non-increasing.
We will say that the function q(n) defined on a set
{n: 1 <_ n <_ N} is 'boncave*' on the set iff:
q(n-l) - q(n) <_ q(n) - q(n+l)
for all n <_ N-l . This is analogous to the property
of concave functions defined on an interval [a,b] of the
real line, where the formal definition of concavity is that
for all A e [0,1], the function (call it f) satisfies:
f(Xa + (l-X)b) > A-f (a) + (l-X)f (b) .
Theorem 2 : A sufficient condition for the function
M* (n) to be non-increasing on the region
1 <_ n <_ N is that the survival function q(n)
be (strictly) concave on the region 1 n <_ N.
The theorem is of course analogous to Theorem 1, where
a sufficient condition for the non-increasing property of
M*(n) was given for the optimal allocation problem with the
MPH criterion. We will later discuss the similarities in the
operational interpretations of the two sufficient conditions,
given in the two theorems. Notice that in both conditions,
the parameter P (the hit probability of a secondary target,
given survival of the missile) , does not play any role. We
now prove the above theorem.
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Proof : We will use induction. First we show that if the
survival function is concave on the set {0,1,2}, then
M*(2) <_ M*(l). The concavity means that
q(0) - q(l) q(l) - q(2). (q(0) = 1 by assumption)
We have shown (Eq. III. 18) that:
M*< X
> = 1 + [} s .(l-q (l)7] * P s (l-q(D )
(III - 25)
Eq. (III. 23) states that a necessary and sufficient condition
for M*(2) _M*(1) is that
M * (1) 1 P (q(l}-q(2)) (II - 25a)
s
From (III. 25) it is obvious that a sufficient condi-
tion for Eq. (III. 25a) to be valid is
P (l-q(D) - P (q(l)-q(2) ) '
or
q(0) - q(l) = l-q(l) < q(l) -q(2),
so that the theorem is proven for N = 2. Now suppose it is
true for some N. We show that it is true for N+l also. The
induction hypothesis thus includes the assumption M*(n) M*(n-i;
for all n N. We must show that a sufficient condition for
M*(N+1) ^M*(N) is that:
q(N-l) - q(N) q(N) - q(N+l).
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To show this, notice that the assumption M*(N) <_ M*(N-1)
implies, as was explained by the argument which led to
Eq. (III. 24) , that
M*(N) = 1 +
On the other hand, Eq. (III. 2 3) shows that a condition equiva-





- P (q(N)-q(N+l) )
s
The last two expressions together lead to the sufficiency
of the concavity condition
q(N-D - q(N) < q (N) - q(N+l)
for the relation
M*(N+1) M*(N).
The proof of the theorem is thus complete!
The operational interpretation of the concavity condi-
tion is quite obvious. The meaning of the concavity property
is quite analogous to the meaning of the MMPR property dis-
cussed with relation to the problem with the MPH criterion.
The analogy lies in the fact that both conditions reflect,
each in its own way, a phenomenon of growing marginal effects.
Both conditions indicate that the marginal effect induced by
adding one secondary target is becoming worse as more secondary
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targets are introduced. Here in the case of the MEP criterion,
the marginal effect is simply the decrease in survivability,
and concavity means that this decrease gets sharper as N
increases
.
It is noteworthy that concave survival functions are
not so much expected to occur in the real world. The most
N
• s
common function, q(N ) = q_ (corresponding to independent
operations of the secondary targets) is convex. Other forms
of the survival function with realistic appeal are also non-
concave. This does not prove, however, that M*(N ) is mono-
s
tone increasing, since the concavity of q(N ) was shown to
be sufficient only.
One enlightening example can be given for a concave
survival function. Imagine a group of secondary targets,
located around the primary target, such that each target is
responsible for intercepting missiles arriving from an angular
section of 120° (Fig. III. 2). This example shows that the
survivability should not be very much different if there are
one or two secondary targets, because in both cases the attacker
is able to find an undefended direction of penetration. If,
however, we have N =3, then the survivability drops sharply
S3
since the defender may then locate his units so as to leave
no undefended direction of arrival.
3 . Increasing M* -Sequences—Solutions
We proceed by presenting the computational procedure

























a strictly monotone increasing function. For all states (n,M)
such that M M*(n) f it is implied by the definition of
M*(n) that:
E(n,M) = M-q(n).
In order to find the sequence (M* (n) : n = 1,2,...}
we have to be able to express E(n,M) for values of M such













-M * <1) (III. 26)
where q(l), M*(l) and E(1,M) have replaced q, M* and E(M),
respectively, in Eq. (11.15).
We now state and prove the following lemma:
Lemma : For a state (n,M) such that M > M*(n), the optimal










O A. X ^- -l_
(III. 27)
where {H .: n = 1,2,..., i = 1,2,. ..,n} is a
n,i
family of constants which can be calculated recur-
sively (as will be shown in the course of the proof)
98

Proof : We prove the lemma by induction. First notice that
Eq. (III. 26) itself approves the validity of the lemma for
n = 1, since E(1,M) has exactly the form given in (III. 27)
with:
Hi,i V?TTT- MMD-U-qd)) ,
where M*(l) is given by Eq. (III. 18).
Let us therefore assume that E(n,M) is given by
Eq. (III. 27). We calculate E(n+1,M), for values of M > M*(n+1).










-M*(n+1) -q(n+l) (III. 28)
s
The argument which leads to Eq. (III. 28) is the following:
If the attacker achieves the first hit of a secondary target
with the jth missile, where j is less than or equal to
M-M*(n+1), then he is in state (n,M-j), at which the expected
number of penetrators is simply E(n,M-j). The probability of
•q(n+l) ) j
" 1
a first hit to occur at the jth attempt is (1-P *
•P .q(n+l) . The first term accounts for all the cases in
which a hit is achieved with one of the first M-M*(n+1) mis-
siles. If all the first M-M* (n+1) missiles miss the secondary




, then the attacker finds himself in
s
the state (n+l,M* (n+1) ) , where by definition of M*(n+1), the
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optimal policy is to launch at the primary target only.
The optimal expected number of penetrators in that case is
therefore M*(n+1) -q(n+l)
.
Now notice, that since M*(n) <" M*(n+1) , we have (if
j _ M-M*(n+1) )
:
M-j >_ M* (n+1) > M* (n) ,
and thus E(n,M-j), which appears in the first term on the
right-hand side of Eq. (III. 28), can be substituted by the
expression assumed to be valid for it by the induction hypothe-



















(a very laborious algebraic work, aimed at
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n
+ I H .(l-q(i)-
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. r rrr- for i < n (III. 30a)q(n+l)
-qui -
n+1
F" I qlTT " M
* (n+1) (1 "q (n+1) }
- [ 8il .(1-P .q(j))
MMn+1) -MMJ) (III. 30b)
for i = n+1
The lemma is now completely proven. Notice that the
constants H . can very easily be calculated by the recursive
scheme of computations given in Eqs . (III. 30a) and (III. 30b).





P -all) " M
* (1)
' H-q' 1"- (III. 31)
Notice also, that for calculating H ,, (i = 1, 2 , . . . ,n+l)
,
n+l , l
the value of M*(n+1) must be known already. We now show how
M* (n+1) can also be calculated in a recursive manner. We
assume that M*(n) is already known, and that H . (i = l,2,...,n)
n, l
are also known. We go back to the functional equation (III. 17) .
We examine all states of the form (n+l,M) where M > M*(n).
By definition of M*(n+1), the least value of M such that
E(n+1,M) is attained by the first term under the max. operation
in Eq. (III. 17), should be M*(n+1)+1. Writing this observation




P .(E(n,M) - E(n+1,M)3 > 1 . (III. 32)
s
If we start checking each M, from M = M*(n)+1 and up for
satisfying this equation, it is clear that we can substitute:
E(n+1,M) = M«q(n+1)
.(..« - „ -± .j^.d-^! *.)«-<«





M*(n+1) = Min{M > M*(n): M(l-q(n+l)) - ==-• —iy
+ l H . (l-q(i).P
)«-«*<!>
, 1 ) (III. 32)
1=1 s
We are now ready to summarize the computational pro-
cedure for solving the optimal allocation problem, where an
arbitrary number of secondary targets are present, and for
the MENP criterion. A flow chart of the algorithm is given
in Fig. III. 3. Notice that the two programs, the one with
the MPH criterion, and this last one for the MENP criterion,
are quite similar in flow logic. The difference, of course,
is in the recursive schemes used to calculate the constants
needed, and in the form of the test which is required to














q(D - M*(D d-q(D)
CALCULATE E(n rM)




M = M* (n) +1
CALCULATE H
n,n





















FIGURE III. 3: Flow Chart of Computational Program to Solve
Optimal Allocation Problem with MEM5 Criterion
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E. OPTIMAL ALLOCATION—MINIMUM EXPECTED COST OF DESTROYING
THE PRIMARY TARGET (MEC CRITERION)
1. Theory
This problem differs from the problems treated before
in that the number of stages of the process is not determined
a priori . It is decided at the beginning of the process that
it will be allowed to go on until a number N of primary
targets are destroyed.
This situation may occur when the operational 'worth'
of the N primary targets is very high, and the number of
missiles the attacker can spend on this mission is practically
unlimited. In that case, an attacker can very well decide
that he "won't stop" before the mission is fulfilled. The
problem then remains, how to carry out the mission with mini-
mum expected cost.
We assume that C and C are the unit-costs of an
P s
*
anti-primary and anti-secondary missile, respectively. We
characterize a 'state' by the pair (N ,N ) where, as usual,
N is the number of secondary targets, and N is the number
of primary targets.
As with the other two criteria, here also, no switch
from anti-primary course to anti-secondary one can ever be an
*
One must keep in mind that estimating the costs C and
C for actual implementation of the model we present here, may
be a very hard task. Different estimates may be suggested,
depending upon at what stage of the development the decision
about the missiles mix is taken. This is, however, irrelevant
to the model building process.
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optimal move. Once the attacker starts attacking primary tar-
gets, he should stay on primary targets until the end of the
process. In this model this is a very intuitive and trans-
parent conclusion, so that it doesn't deserve any further
mathematical justification.
When N =0, then the optimal policy is trivial,
S3
since only primary targets exist. We can define:
N (N ) = Min{N : D*(N +1,N ) = AS} ,
s p s s p
where D* is the optimal policy (a function of (N ,N ) ) . The
number N (N ) has the following meaning: For a given number
*
(N ) of primary targets, the number N (N )+l is the least
p s p
number of secondary targets that should be present, in order
for it to be optimal to deal with a secondary target first.
Notice that we did not define N (N ) as:
s p
N (N ) = Max{N : D*(N ,N ) = AP}
,
s p s s p
and that is because nothing in theory excludes the possibility
*
that there exist values of N greater than N (N )+l, such
s 3 s p
that the optimal course in states (N ,N ), for those values,
s p
is again anti-primary. We define:
N (N ) = MiniN >N (N )• D* (N +1,N ) = AP
}
s p s s p' s p
* **
The significance of the functions N (N ) and N (N )' s p s p













N **(N ) Curve
s p
N *(N ) Curve
s p
Anti-Primary Zone
12 3 4 5
N
->
Figure III. 4: The General Structure of Optimal Allo-
cation Policy with MEC Criterion.
structure of optimal policies with MEC criterion. The opera-
*
tional interpretation of the existence of curves N (N ) and
s p
**
N (N ) separating different decision zones in the (N ,N )
s p ' v * P s
plane is quite clear. For a given N , there are the following
different possibilities:
a) It may be that N is small enough, so that the proba-
bility of survival will be high enough to make it
worthwhile just to ignore the presence of the secon-
dary targets, and go directly against the primary ones,
accepting the small rate of attrition. The number
N (N ) is just the function which indicates what
numbers of secondary targets should be regarded as
'small' within that context. (The answer is: 'small'





b) The number N may be so large, so that it would con-
sume too many anti-secondary missiles to make any
significant reduction in the attrition rate. In fact,
so many anti-secondary missiles may be required, that
it is preferable just to give up attacking secondary
targets, and use only anti-primary missiles, accepting
the high rate of attrition. Again, the question is,
what values of N are 'large' so that this argument is
valid. The answer: Those values which are greater
than or equal to N** (N ).
s p
c) For the given Nn, all the values of N , such that
N*(N )< N < N (N ) are neither too small nor too
s p s — s p
large, so that it is preferable to start shooting at
secondary targets for the benefit of later reduced rate
of attrition.
In principle, it is possible to have more values of N (for
a given N ) which are points of transition from anti-primary
optimal decisions to anti-secondary optimal decision. For
***
example, we may have a value N = N (N ) such that:
s s P
N (N ) = Min{N >N (N )+l: D* (N +1,N ) = AS} .
s p s s p s p
* * *
The existence of a finite N (N ) obviously depends on the
survival function q(N ). It was found, however, that for all
real, interesting and sensible survival functions (which are
***
explored later), finite values of N (N ) never exist. Thus,
**
in all the cases examined in this thesis, N (N ) has the
s p
property that:
D*(N ,N ) = AP for all N > N (N )
.
s p s s p
We proceed by looking for a general analytic procedure
of solving the allocation problem. Given a survival function
q (N ) and the parameters P , P , we have to show how to find




the functions N (N ) and N (N ) and the expected cost func-
s p s p
tion. Let C„(N ,N ) be the expected cost of destroying ND s p p
primary targets under policy D, given also that there are N
secondary targets. As usual let D* be the optimal policy,
and D be the family of all allocation policies. We denote: -
C(N,N) = Cn*(N,N) = Min C_(N,N) .s p D* s p De Q D s p
*
Now we make the following observation: as long as N < N (N )
,
s — s p
we have D* (N ,N ) = AP . Only anti-primary missiles are in
use, and the probability of hitting a target is q(N ) *P .
The expected number of anti-primary missiles, to hit a single
primary target, is obviously 1/P *q(N ), and so the expected
p s
cost of destroying N primary targets is
C .N *





) s - s p
*
Now consider the state (N (N )+l,N ) . It is implied
s p p
*
by the definition of N (N ) that the optimal decision at that* s p c
state is anti-secondary. As a result of such a decision, two
transitions are possible, as shown here:
*<(N (N ) ,N ) Next optimal decision
is anti-primary
(N (N )+l,N ) Next optimal decision is
"
" again anti-secondary.
The probability of making the upper transition in a single
*








this transition has been made, it will be optimal to launch
only anti-primary missiles until the mission is completed.
Therefore, we find that
*
C C -N













Since this is the minimal expected cost of destroying all the
*
primary targets, when starting from state (N (N )+l,N ),
s p p
this should be less than the cost that would have resulted
had the attacker decided to use only anti-primary missiles
from the beginning. So, we write:
C C «N C -N
jfS + F-JE < E^ . (in. 33)
P «q(N (N )+l) P .q(N (N )) P -q(N (N )+l)ssp P S P P S P
The fundamental observation is that N (N ) should be, by
s p
definition, the minimal value of N to satisfy Inequality (III. 33)
*
This is the clue to the solution; N (N ) is given by:
*
C C -N










• (III - 34)
p ^ s
*
Note that N (N ) may very well be equal to zero, which is to
say that even with the presence of one secondary target, it
is preferable to destory the secondary target first.
**
The function N (N ) is now derived by an argument very
similar to the one used in -deriving Eq. (III. 33). First notice
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that we can explicitly write C (N , N ) for values N suchc * s p s
that N*(N ) < N N (N )
.
s p s — s p
N
s C N -C
C(N ,N J = J t5 + 12—E (III. 35)S P n=N (N )+l q{n) s q(N (N ) ) 'P
s p s p p
This follows from the fact that the attacker has to hit
N -N (N ) secondary targets before he switches to an anti-
primary course. The first term of Eq. (III. 35) represents
the expected cost of doing this. The second term is then the
expected cost of killing the N primary targets. Notice that
*
q (N (N )) appears in the denominator of the second term, since
s p
at the switching stage, exactly N (N ) secondary targets will
still be alive.
Since Eq. (III. 35) expresses the optimal expected cost
**
only for values of N such that N < N (N ) , it is obvious
"• s s — s p
that that expression should yield values smaller than the
expected cost associated with any other policy. Specifically,
we examine the "Anti-primary only" policy. Its expected cost
**
is C -N /q(N s ) -P , so that for all N < N (N ) we have:p p * p s — s p
C «N
C <N =' NJ < „(kF\ I (III. 36)S p 9^3^ * Pp
In fact, the least N to violate Eq. (III. 36) is N (N )+l
s s p
**
(see definition of N (N ) ) . We therefore conclude that:
s p
** * c *N
N (N ) = Min{N : N > N (N ) and ,„ P. P
s p s s s p q (N +1) -Pc ^ s pV 1 C N .C
J rWnWP + J2—2 } (HI- 37)
n=N (N )+l qw * s q(N (N ))'P




It is possible that N (N ) will be °° . This willr s p
*
mean that for all values N such that N > N (N ) , we have
s s s p
*
to hit N -N (N ) secondary targets first, and then switch
s s p
to the primary target.
2 . Examples
We shall present three examples corresponding to
three different survival functions:
N
a) q(N ) = q n
s (Independent operations).




q = const. if N >H
s
N
c) q(N ) = qQ + (l-q()).(l-r)
S
The operational interpretation of these three functions has





We substitute in Eq. (III. 33) and get:
C C -N C -N
J + __E E < E EL








s ^0 p ^0 p M
or, equivalently
:





We see that the validity of the inequality doesn't depend upon
* *
N at all. Therefore N (N. ) = or N (N ) = <*>, depending upon
s sp sp'^^5 ^
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(B) q n > 1 - „ | P ==> N„(NJ
*





Since q n is a number which has an interpretation of proba-
bility, we have <_ qQ <_ 1, and so, if
C /P
N < ^. (III. 38)
* P P
then 1 - (C -P ) / (C -P «N ) < 0, and condition (B) above is
s p p s p —
*
always the valid one, so that N (N ) = «. This result has
a very clear operational interpretation: If there are only
a few primary targets, it is always preferable to deal only
with them, and ignore the secondary targets. The question is
of course how to interpret quantitatively the term "few".
Eq. (III. 38) gives the answer: The number of primary targets
should be less than the ratio of expected cost to destroy one
secondary target in ideal conditions (C /P ) to the expected
cost to destroy one primary target in ideal conditions (C /P )
This ratio can be viewed as the 'worth' of one secondary tar-
get measured in 'units' of the "worth" of a primary target.
If the number of primary targets is less than the "worth"
of one secondary target, then it is not profitable to deal
with secondary targets at all.
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If. however, N > C *P /C «P , then we may define:
p s p p s J
C -P
s = l -




If q. < s, then N (N ) = so that if there is one
^0 s p
secondary target, it should be attacked first. If q s,
only the primary targets should be attacked. Notice that we
can't say anything yet about the case N = 2, since we have
to calculate N (2) first. We find N (N ) using (III. 37):
s s p
N 4-1 N +1
C s C N -C C l-q n
S
E < y §_ + _P E = _£ 12










Using simple algebraic operations this inequality can be shown
to be equivalent to:
C -P
i s P1 " C -P -N = s 1 ^0
p s p
In this form, the inequality does not depend on N ! There-
fore, if the parameters of the problem satisfy this inequality
(case B above), then from definition (III. 37), and using the
*
fact we have just proven that N (N ) = « in this case, we
s p
**
conclude that N (N ) = * also (and it does not really have
s p
any significance herel). If, on the other hand, the param-
eters of the problem do not satisfy this equation, in which
*
case we have seen that N (N ) =0, then no value of N satis-
s p s
fires the above inequality (or, as can be stated formally, using
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definition (III. 37), N (N ) = «) . This means that no matter
s p
how many secondary targets there are, the attacker should
attack them first until they are all destroyed.
(b) q(N ) - q„ = const for N > 0, q(0) = 1
^ S s
This case, which is very hard to handle analy-
4
tically using other criteria (MPH, MEMP criteria) is of no
great difficulty if the MEC criterion is used. It is an
interesting case for which a simple argument leads to the
*
conclusion that N (N ) must be either or °°. The argument
s p
is that if the attacker decides to attack secondary targets,
he must be determined to attack all of them before switching
to the primary target, because no reduction in attrition will
be gained, unless he so behaves . Mathematically speaking,
the following statement must be true: It is impossible that








D*(N 2 ,N ) - AS
s p
D*(N ,N ) = AP
s' p
*
This simply means that N (N ) is either or *>. We now calcu-r J
s p
late the condition for each case. We just carry out the
formal operation, given in (III. 34) , and discover immediately
that these conditions are identical with those found in the
previous example. That is:
c ,p
*
If N < =—=*- N (N ) = » —j* always shoot anti-primary
p — C«P s p ^ .
,








, then: If q s, then N (N ) =
P p s
S P
If q > s, then N (N ) = °°
where s is the parameter defined before (Eq. (III. 39))
The difference between this example and the
**




N (N ) = °° always. To calculate it for this case we proceed
s p
formally, using (III. 37). We have to find the least N
which satisfies the following inequality:
C »N C -N N -C
J2 £ < _§ !_ _p_ £
^0 p ^0 s p
(III. 40)
Notice that we substitute in (III. 37) the values N (N ) = 0,
s p
**
because only in this case is there a meaning for N (N )
.
Therefore, it is assumed here that q Q s.











where s is defined in Eq. (III. 39) . Since we assume q
we deduce from Eq. (III. 41) that if N (N ) =0, then:
s p
**
N (N ) > 2
s p -
This last result is a very interesting one. It says that
* * *
N (N ) = implies N (N ) > 2 . In other words, if the




parameters of the problem are such that it is optimal to deal
with the secondary target, when there is only one secondary
target, then it must be optimal to deal with secondary targets
first when there are two secondary targets also. This fact
is somewhat strange, since it is hard to base it on some
common sense or intuitive argument. (It recalls a similarly
strange fact we found in Chapter II, namely that M*(l) >_ 2





) = q Q
+ (l-q )r Q
S
This example is presented to prevent the impression
which might have been created by the last two examples, that
*
N (N ) is "usually" zero or °°. ' In fact, this survival function
s p
can be considered a generalization of the functions treated
in (a) and in (b) : By putting q Q = we get case (a) , and
by putting r Q = (with the convention = 1) we get case (b) .
By substituting this survival function into Eq. (III. 33) we
have:
C C -N
§ + P P
P
s
-[q +(l-q )T S ] P
p





If we put s=l-(C*P)/C«P-N as before, it can be shownr
s p p s p




<l-q ).(.-r ) III. 42)
so that N (N ) = Min(N : inequality (III. 42) is satisfied}.
s p s
There are three different cases now:
(1) s < r_ , in which case the right-hand side of Eq. (III. 42)
is negative, and it has no finite solution N , which
* s
is to say that N (N ) = °° (always shoot at the primary!)
(l-S)-q
(2) If t, 1
—
r-r r > 1, then N (N ) = (which means(l-qQ ) • (s-r ) s p
that at least for N =1, the attacker should destroy
s 2





t r < 1 / then
:
(l-q )
• (s-r Q )
-








Here N (N ) is a finite positive number: Let us look at a
s p
numerical example: suppose C = C , and P = P , and let
N = 5, q Q (which has the meaning of survival probability
given that one defense unit is shooting at the attacking




= reliability of each defense unit]











That is, if there are 5 primary targets, then as long as
there are no more than one secondary target to defend them,
the attacker should ignore the secondary. If N = 2 he
should destroy one secondary target first. If N =3,
**
nothing can be concluded yet. We must calculate N (5) first
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IV. OPTIMAL MISSILE DEPLOYMENT GAME MODELS INVOLVING
THE USE OF A 'CAUTIOUS' MODE
OF DEFENSIVE OPERATION
A. INTRODUCTION
In developing the models of Chapters II and III, we have
assumed that in countering an offensive missile the defense
always responds in the same way. That is, it always attempts
to intercept an arriving offensive missile by launching a
defensive missile.
In reality the secondary targets can quite simply immunize
themselves against being hit by anti-secondary missiles, by
operating the units in a special deceptive mode. For example,
if the anti-secondary missile is using an anti-radiation (AR)
guidance head, the defense unit can temporarily shut off the
radar electromagnetic radiation, thus denying the missile the
signal necessary for its proper guidance. If the missile
guidance relies on some sort of electro-optic or infra-red
imaging, then deploying dummy targets, concealment devices and
other deceptive methods may very well provide the secondary
target with an almost perfect protection against the missile.
In this chapter we therefore assume that upon each arrival
of a new offensive missile, the defense may decide to work in
one of two operational modes:
(a) Mode 1—which is the "normal" mode,
(b) Mode 2—which is a special mode of caution against
anti-secondary targets. Usually some decep-
tion method is involved in this mode.
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It would be quite accurate to state that in Mode 2 the
defense target, while being much less vulnerable to an arriving
missile, is also much less effective in intercepting this
missile. For instance, in the example of AR missiles mentioned
above, switching off the radar renders the secondary target
itself almost incapable of detecting the missile and inter-
cepting it. When the defender detects a missile, he thus faces
the dilemma of which mode to select for the system operation.
Had he known that the missile is an anti-secondary one (i.e.,
aimed at the defense unit) he would obviously have selected
Mode 2. But he usually cannot be certain about the missile
destination. Therefore, so long as the defender cannot elimi-
nate the uncertainty about the missile destination, he cannot
avoid the possibility of making the "wrong" decisions. (By
"wrong" we mean here, either operating on Mode 1 when the
missile is anti-secondary, or operating on Mode 2 when the
missile is actually anti-primary) . Assuming that the defender
pursues an optimal course of behavior in that respect, the
attacker also has a dilemma of which type of missile to launch
at every stage of the process. If we adopt the assumption
that both the defender and the offender are aware of the choices
available to each other, and further, that they are strictly
opposed in their objectives, then we are very naturally led
to formulating the situation as a zero-sum game. Since we
are dealing with dynamic processes which progress in stages,
we don't actually have a simple unique two-by-two matrix game,
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but rather a sequence of games, related to each other. Such
sequences of games are called in the literature stochastic
games .
Section B of this chapter gives a very brief review of the
theory and applications of stochastic games, emphasizing mainly
the relation to dynamic programming. In Section C we list
and explain in detail the assumptions which underlie the models
We also introduce the notation. Section D examines and criti-
cizes the applicability and relevance of zero-sum stochastic
models to real tactical decision-making processes. Sections
E-G deal with detailed mathematical solutions of the games
which arise in our case, each section devoted to one of the
three criteria we use in this thesis (MPH, MENP , MEC criteria)
.
We give general theorems about the structure and properties of
optimal policies of both defender and attacker, and then show
the solutions to each case.
B. A BRIEF REVIEW OF STOCHASTIC GAMES THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
The two person zero-sum stochastic game was first intro-
duced in an elegant paper by Shapley [5], where he presents
the basic notion of a stochastic game and the theory which
underlies the computational methods for calculating the value-
vector and the set of optimal strategies for each player.
Following Shapley, a stochastic game is defined as a
sequential process in which the players step from position to
position according to transition probabilities controlled
jointly by the two players. It is assumed that there are a
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finite number, M, of positions, and finite sets of actions
available to each player at each position. Let A,, A_ be
the set of actions available to player 1 and player 2, respec-
tively. If, at position (state) k, player 1 chooses action i
and player 2 chooses action j , then there is an immediate




there is a probability P. . that the game moves to the new
position, i. The process therefore is determined by the initial
2
state and by the following M +M matrices:
P* 5, = (p ^ li=12 la I i =1 2 la I]
for k,i = 1,2,...,M, and
k kA = (a | i = 1,2, . . . , | A.J , j = 1,2, . . . , | A2 | )







M k q k
The number 1 - T P. . =» s. .is the probability that the game
£=1 13 1 '3
will terminate after one step, given that it is in state k
and players 1 and 2 choose actions i and j respectively.
Shapley concentrated on games which terminate, with proba-
bility one, after a finite number of stages. Obviously, a
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sufficient condition for that is
k
s = mm s . > .
i,j,k 1 '3
The stochastic games which we shall treat in this thesis
do not satisfy this condition. They do however terminate
with probability one.
State k is denoted by a symbol r which is to be regarded
as "the sequential game the players start to play when they
are in position k" . The stochastic game is sometimes con-
sidered as a collection of game elements {r : k = 1,2,...,M}
To each game element there corresponds a matrix of payoffs








The entries of the matrics A, (k = l,2,...,n) are therefore
mixtures of real rewards and game elements . Let a be an M-






a M « Shapley denotes
by A. (a) the numerical matrix obtained when the game elements
{r : I = 1,2,...,M} appearing in the entries of the matrix
A, are replaced by the numerical values a.,a.,...,oM . Then
he defines the following transformation T which maps the
M-dimensional Euclidean space into itself:







The vector Ta is the vector of the minimax values of the
matrices {A_(a): k = 1,2,...,M}.
Shapley shows that the condition of certain termination
mentioned above guarantees that the stochastic game has a
unique value-vector, which is the solution of the following
set of equations:
T| - % (IV. 2)
in the vector of unknowns <j> . In fact, the role that the
certain termination condition plays here is just to make T a
contraction transformation so that Banach Theorem on contrac-
tion mapping applies and determines the uniqueness of the
solution to the system (IV. 2)
.
If $ is the solution to Eq. (IV. 1) then <j>, is the value
(in the usual Von -Neumann-Morgenstern sense) of the game ele-
ment r . Shapley further shows that sets of optimal strate-
gies of both players, in state k, are the same sets of optimal
strategies associated with the game for which the payoff
matrix is A, (<J°) ([5], p. 1097, Theorem 2).
Everett [8] and Gillette [9] in 1957 generalized the re-
sults of Shapley by relaxing the condition that termination
occurs with probability one. In the general case there is a
positive probability that the process will run indefinitely,
thus a revision of the definition of the value is necessary
(since a simple summation of rewards on all individual stages
may give infinite results) . In Gillette [9] , two different
approaches to the problem of value definition are considered,
125

namely, discounting and averaging. These two methods are most
commonly used in the literature of infinite dynamic programming
processes and infinite games. They are used to avoid having
infinite values (payoffs) as a result of summation over all
immediate rewards. Gillette's main concern is the existence
of stationary optimal strategies for both players, under each
of the above modified payoff functions (which he calls "effec-
tive" payoffs). Everett's paper deals with various "existence"
questions and mathematical properties of solutions to the most
generalized recursive game.
Hoffman and Karp [10] considered the case of a nonter-
minating game, i.e., a stochastic game in which
M JM
I P.. = 1 for all i,k,j.
1 = 1
Some papers ([11] ,[12] are the prominent ones) were written
about techniques and algorithms to solve the asymptotic value
equations (see (IV. 2) above) , of infinite games. Most of them
elaborate on variations of the basic successive approximations
technqiue (which was suggested by Shapley himself in [5]).
All the stochastic games which we actually solve in this
thesis are known to terminate in a finite number of stages.
In two of our criteria, namely, the MPH and MENP criteria,
the maximum number of stages the process is allowed to con-
tinue is prescribed (that is, we solve truncated stochastic
games). In such processes, the maximum number of stages which
are left in a given state is one of the parameters which
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determine the state. Therefore there is no meaning to sta-
tionarity in these cases, and clearly the optimal strategies
will depend on time.
It is interesting to note that the whole subject of Mar-
kovian decision processes (or stochastic Dynamic Programming)
can be viewed simply as a special case of the stochastic games
theory: If we consider one player as "dummy", that is, a
player who has only one pure action available, then the problem
for the other player will be a Dynamic Programming problem.
To see this, let us consider again Equation (IV. 1)
Ta = (val A., (a), val A- (a) , . .
.
,val A (a)).
If the matrices A, (a) (k = 1 , 2 , : . . ,M) above are 1 x |aJ, as
is the case when player 1 is "dummy" and player 2 has | A-
|
pure actions available, then we can write
k 3 ki
val A (a) = min [a. + J P a J (IV. 3)
l
2
k k ? k k ?
where we've written a
.
(P . ) instead of a, . (P ,'.), since
3 3 1,3 1/3
player 1 has just one possible action. Now we combine Eq.
(IV. 3) with Eq. (IV. 2) and find, that in the infinite Dynamic
Programming process, the equation which we have to solve is
the following:
4>, = min [a* + £ P*V ] (IV. 4)K
j £ A 2
3 feA2 D I
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which is exactly the well-known fundamental equations of the
Markovian decisions processes (see Dreyfus & Law [14, page
175] . The <J>. is then the optimal payoff of the process given
that it starts from state k. If we deal with stochastic dynamic
processes in finite time, then a of Eq. (IV. 3) above should
stand for the optimal payoff for a process of n stages (for
some n) while val A, (a) is the optimal payoff for a process
of n+1 stages. If we denote by 4>, the optimal payoff of a
Markovian decision process which starts at state k, and lasts
n units of time (or, at most n units of time) , then Eq . (IV. 3)
should be interpreted as
:
M
n+1 , k v _k£ n,
<j>. = min [a. + \ P. .* ]K jeA
2
J 1=1- 3 l
which, apart from differences in notation, is the same as the
general recursive equation of Markovian decision processes,
as given, for instance, in Dreyfus & Law [14, p. 174, Eq.
13.4] .
As to applications of stochastic games theory to real
world processes, it seems astonishing that almost no signifi-
cant use has been made of it. The books by Luce and Raiffa
[13] and by Owen [4] mention some interesting problems for
which the stochastic game is a very natural formulation. The
main ones are:
(a) Games of Survival—which are applicable mainly to
gambling theory (see Luce & Raiffa [13, Appendix
A. 4] .
(b) Exhaustion Games—which can serve to model inspection
processes, evasion and search processes (see example
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in Owen [4, Ch. V.2]. In the second part of this
thesis we introduce a very plausible application of
exhaustion games in the evaluation of the effective-
ness of decoys in missile warfare.
(c) Allocation of Military Forces— these problems are
usually titled under the term "Blotto Games", and
were treated quite thoroughly in the literature
(see Dresher [15], and Blackett [16]). It should
be said, however, that Blotto games are not
necessarily sequential games.
Very few articles were written on applications of stochastic
games theory to the analysis of duels. Charnes and Schroeder
[7] claim to analyze tactical antisubmarine duels through the
theory of stochastic games. Their article, however, contains
very little about the antisubmarine warfare application. It
mainly repeats the general theory and analyzes some computa-
tional procedures of the general recursive equations of the
theory.
Sweat ([17], [18]) presents very attractive models for a
duel between an attacker and a defender. The models of Sweat
were probably motivated by undersea warfare problems, but they
contain many elements which make them equally applicable to
other types of warfare. We make use of some of Sweat's ideas
in this chapter as well as in Part II of the thesis, where
we analyze problems involving decoys. In the following, we
discuss briefly the work of Sweat, and its relation to this
thesis.
In [17] Sweat deals with the following problem: A duel
is initiated by an attacker at time t = -T. At some instant
in the interval [-T,0], the attacker has to launch his (single)
weapon. He always knows the current number of weapons the
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defender has. If the defender has k weapons, then his proba-
bility of survival is P, if he responds with one of his k
weapons right at the time the attacker launches his weapon,
and is q, ( <p iJ if ^e responds after the weapon has been
launched (we use here the notation of Sweat) . The defender
may or may not detect the attacker at the time of attack, and
may also detect false targets. The process of false targets
detection is assumed to be a non-homogeneous Poisson process
on the interval [-T,0], with rate function A (t) , known to the
attacker. The defender classifies a detected object as a
'real' or 'false 1 target. Therefore two types of errors are
possible and the probability of each is known to both players.
The1 payoff is the defender's probability of survival at time
t = 0.
From the description of the problem it is clear that the
defender desires to form a policy of response to a detection
and classification of a target in a manner that will provide
high probability of detecting correctly the true target (i.e.,
the attacker's weapon) when it is launched, and at the same
time will keep the chance of being exhausted of weapons prior
to the attack as low as possible. The desire of the attacker
is, of course, just the opposite one. He would try to exploit
the presence of false targets in order to reduce as much as
possible the chances that the defneder would detect his weapon
correctly when he still has weapons in his stockpile. The
way to achieve this is to "wait" and let the defender consume
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his weapons on false targets. He cannot, however, wait too
long if the defender has relatively many missiles, because as
the process runs short of time, the tendency of the defender
will be to shoot at all targets (false and true) . The problem
of choosing the optimal time to launch for the attacker is thus
quite complicated.
Sweat solves this problem using a stochastic game in a
continuous time. There is no conceptual difference between
a stochastic game in continuous time and the games in discrete
time that were reviewed before. In fact, the game with con-
tinuous time is approximated as a game in discrete time by
dividing the time interval [-T,0] into small segments of length
At. Writing then recursive equations for the value of the game
in the approximating problem, and letting At -> 0, Sweat thus
derives an iterative system of first-order differential equa-
tions. The unique solution of that system is a vector
(V
1
(t) , . .
.
,Vk (t) ) , where Vi (t) (i = 1,2, ...,k) is the value
of the game which starts at time t, with the defender having
i weapons left.
In his second paper, Sweat [18] modifies this problem by
allowing the attacker to be one of two different types, with
different probabilities of detection and classification, and
with different probabilities of killing the defender. The
same concepts and methodology are used in solving this prob-




C. THE ANTI-SECONDARY/ANTI -PRIMARY ALLOCATION (ASAPA) GAME
MODELS—GENERAL DESCRIPTION
In this section we present in detail the assumptions and
concepts of our game models which we consider quite adequate
in describing a situation in which secondary targets have
some simple way of protecting themselves from anti-secondary
missiles (other than shooting at them) . This model has the
following advantages over the models that were discussed in
Chapters II and III:
(1) It refers to the defender as a conscious player,
(2) It assumes that the defender is capable, to some
extent, of distinguishing between anti-primary and
anti-secondary missiles.
The way in which distinguishability is reflected in our
models, is to assume existence of the classification proba-
bilities (as Sweat [17] does. See also Gorfinkel [19]).
We introduce the following notation:
a = Probability that a detected anti-primary
missile will be classified as anti-primary.
a = Probability that a detected anti-secondary
missile will be classified as anti-secondary.
Obviously, 1-a (1-a ) is the probability that a detected
anti-primary (anti-secondary) missile will be classified as
an anti-secondary (anti-primary) missile. We assume that the
probability of detection is 1.
We assume that at each stage the attacker can choose to
launch either an anti-primary or anti-secondary missile. The
defender, after classifying the missile, selects his mode of
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operation between Mode 1 ("normal" mode) and Mode 2 ("cautious"
mode) . We assume that:
(a) The probabilities of survival of the attacking
missile when the defender is using mode 1 and
mode 2, are q, and q« , respectively.
(b) In mode 2, the secondary target is absolutely
invulnerable to the anti-secondary missiles.
(That is, the probability of hit, even if the
missile survives, is zero.)
(c) In mode 2 the secondary target is less effective
than in mode 1. The mathematical expression of
that assumption is clearly
l ± < q 2
We assume that the defender selects, at each stage, a response
program , that is, a program which dictates in which mode he
will operate his system at each of the two possible classifi-
cation outcomes.
Four response programs are possible corresponding to the
four different combinations of offensive missile types and
operation mode of the defense. We shall use the following
notation for them:
P,-S, = Use mode 1 regardless of the classification;
that is, use mode 1 regardless of whether the
offensive missile is classified as anti-
primary or as anti-secondary.
P,-S
2
= Use mode 1 if the missile is classified as anti-




~S, = Use mode 2 if the missile is classified as anti-






- Use mode 2 in either case.
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It will always be assumed that both the attacker and the
defender have perfect information about the state of the pro-
cess. As in Chapters II and III we use the notation P (P )c p s
for the single-shot-probability of kill by an anti-primary
(anti-secondary) missile, given that the missile survived the
interception attempt of the defense.
We shall restrict ourselves to the case of one secondary
target only. The case of several secondary targets requires
very heavy and awkward technical, mathematical work, but no
new conceptual difficulties are encountered. Therefore we
concentrate on the investigation of the case where only one
secondary target is present.
Notice that no consideration is made about the size of the
defender's stockpile. We assume that no constraint does really
exist in this aspect, that is, the defender always has enough
defensive weapons so that he can counter the offensive mis-
sile. This assumption is quite realistic, especially when
reloading times are far shorter than the characteristic time
elapsing between launches of the offensive missiles. Even if
the defender did have a limit on the number of missiles he has,
it would not raise any significant difficulties to our models
since we can define the number of missiles he has as the state
variable (dictating the maximum number of stages of the game)
and nothing in our models would be changed (given only that
we used either the MPH or MENP criterion) . In Part II of the
thesis, where decoys are considered, we shall formulate and
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solve problems in which the limit on number of defensive
missiles does play a role in the model.
We are now ready to formulate the games and solve them.
Before doing that, some comments are appropriate on the ade-
quacy of the game methodology to our problem.
D. COMMENTS ON THE ADEQUACY OF GAME MODELS TO MISSILE
ALLOCATION PROBLEMS
A zero-sum game is, by its very nature, a mathematical
idealization of a conflict taking place between two players
of strictly contradictory interests. The degree to which re-
sults based on such models are relevant, either to the des-
cription of real processes involving human decisions or to
prescription of optimal course of behavior for any of the
players, is very controversial. The philosophy of game theory
is very hard to accept in the real decision-making world,
since in the basics of this philosophy lies the assumption
that both players are extremely sophisticated and that both are
aware of game theory itself and believe that so is their rival.
The fact that optimal behavior, as dictated by game models,
very often prescribes randomized strategies, makes it even
harder, technically and mentally, to implement in the real
world. For example: suppose that the optimal defensive policy
in our problem, in some specific case, is to randomize over
P,-S-] and P, -S- response programs. It is very hard to imagine
how does a human, who is responsible for the defense, actually
follow this prescription. The randomization action as a
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procedure to be performed in real processes is something
which is very much rejected by natural instincts. Hence, it
should be clear that the models given hereby should not be
interpreted as either descriptive or prescriptive models.
As Luce & Raiffa [13, page 63] say:
...It is crucial that the social scientist recog-
nize that game theory is not descriptive, but
rather (conditionally) normative. It states
neither how people do behave nor how they should
behave in an absolute sense, but how they should
behave if they wish to achieve certain ends. It
prescribes for given assumptions courses of
action for the attainment of outcomes having
certain formal "optimum" properties...
In addition to the importance of the game model, as pointed
out by Luce & Raiffa, we would emphasize yet another gain
from these models. This is the fact that they provide esti-
mates for the "min max" values of the relevant measure of
effectiveness (or cost) . The value of a zero sum game repre-
sents, as is well known, the "best worst" case for both players
It tells each player what is the minimum benefit (or maximum
loss) which theoretically can be guaranteed. Having the value
is therefore amounts to having a very significant, although
partial only, information to both players.
E. THE ANTI-SECONDARY/ANTI -PRIMARY ALLOCATION (ASAPA) GAME
MODEL WITH MAXIMUM EXPECTED NUMBER OF PENETRATORS
(MENP) PAYOFF
MWe denote by r, the game played when the secondary target
is alive, and there are M missiles yet to be launched by the
M
attacker. The symbol r Q stands for the game starting with
the secondary target already destroyed. We assume that the
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payoff is the maximum expected number of penetrators (MENP




The game r, can.be described by a matrix the entries of which





game elements r Q and
?" (see Section B) . The matrix of
M


































(*) q + r
M-l
+ [l-d-a^-q^P^rf1














(*) See Section C for definitions.
To make things clear we explain in details two of the entries
of the above matrix.
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Consider first the entry P,-S
2
--AP above. It corresponds
to the attacker launching an an ti -primary missile. There is
a probability a that it will be classified as anti-primary.
Hence Mode 1 will be selected by the defender (as the P-j-S-
response program dictates) , and the probability of penetration
of the launched missile will then be q, . If the missile is
classified as anti-secondary, mode 2 will be selected, and
the probability of penetration is then q2 . The unconditional
probability of survival of the missile is thus a q.+(l-a ) q_
.
M-l
In addition, the next game to be played is r, (with proba-
bility one) .
Now we explain entry P, -S~—AS. Here the attacker launches
an anti-secondary missile. If it is classified correctly,
then there is zero probability of killing the secondary target
(by the assumption we made on mode 2) . If it is classified
incorrectly (that is, as anti-primary) , as it will be with
probability 1-a , then it has probability q, -P of killing
the secondary target. The unconditional probability of killing
the secondary target is thus (1-a )q-,-P , and then the next
M-lgame is r n . The probability of not killing the target is
M—
1
l-(l-a ) q, P , and given that, the next game is r. . There-
s 1 s 1
fore, the entry is
•WW 1-"-1 + [i-a-, s )-p s -q 1 ]rf 1




We denote by V the value of the game r. . Following the
general procedure due to Shapley (see Section B) , we obtain
a difference equation for {V : M = 1,2,...,} by the following
method:
M-l
(1) Substitute V . for r
1
wherever it appears in the
matrix of r,
.
Substitute also M for r .
(2) Calculate the value of the resulting matrix. This
value is equal to th
Thus, we have the equation:










q1+ d-ap ) q2+
VM_1 (I-.,,)q^ (M-l) + [1- (l-c^) q^]^
»pV ll"VqlW»-l asqlPs (M"1) + [1^.«lWl
*2 +Vl Vl
Since one player (the attacker) has only two pure actions, it
is known that optimal randomized defensive policies exist
which mix at most two of the four response programs available
to the defender. It has to be emphasized that we are not
interested in investigating all optimal strategies for the
game, since our main interest is in the values of the games.
Also, in order to make optimal strategies more likely to be
ever implemented, we seek for the simplest optimal strategies,
where simplest naturally means randomizing over the minimum




We start solving the above equation by making some pre-
liminary observations on the matrix.
First we notice that
M-l
This is obvious since M-l is the number of missiles the attacker
M-lhas in the game r, , so that the optimal number of pene-
trating missiles cannot exceed what he has, and clearly should
be strictly less.
If we use this relation together with the relation q, < q~
,
we can quite simply observe that no row of the above matrix
dominates any other row. However, we can show that either
row 2 or row 3 (which correspond to response programs P,-S~
and P 2 ~^i ' resPecti ve ly) is dominated by a mixture of rows 1
and 4. Which row is the dominated one depends upon the param-
eters a , a , as we now show.
P s
First, let us compare the mixture a (1) + (1-a ) (4) with
P P
row 2. The first element in the mixture, that is, the payoff
induced by the mixture when the attacker chooses the AP deci-
sion, is:
VWl' + (1"V ( ^2+VM-l» - V q l + <1"V q 2 +VM-l
*
A "mixture" will be referred to as a randomized policy,
mixing two rows. We shall denote by 5(i) + (1-6) (j) a mixture
which chooses row i with probability 5, and row j with proba-
bility 1-6. Later on we shall also abbreviate and write
H^'3 for such a mixture.
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which is identical to the first element of row 2. The second
element of the mixture (attacker chooses AS action) is:
.
p





.q l(M-l) +d-ap .P s .q 1 )VM _ 1
If we compare it to the corresponding element in row 2 (i.e.,
the element in column 2, row 2), we see that in order for the
second element of the mixture to be less than the second ele- • )






a < 1 - a . '• 'i
P " s •
Since we showed that the first element (column 1) of the mix-
ture is equal to the first element of row 2, it turns out that
the above condition guarantees that row 2 is dominated by this
special mixture of rows 1 and 4 (a (1) + (1-a ) (4) ) . Hence,
if a <_ 1-a , we can ignore row 2 without changing the value
of the game.
Similarly one can show that if a > 1-a , row 3 is dominated1 p — s'
by the mixture (1-a ) (1) + a (4) . Therefore, in all cases,
Cr P
it is always possible to reduce the size of the matrix of the
Mgame r, by ignoring either row 2 or row 3.
Worth noticing is the case a = 1-a . In this case, both
p s
row 2 and row 3 are dominated by mixtures of rows 1 and 4
,
and so we can leave inside the game only rows 1 and 4
.
The various domination cases described above have a very
interesting operational interpretation. To see this, notice
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that 1-a is the probability of classifying an anti-secondary
missile as an ti -primary missile. If a = 1-a , then classi-
P s
fication probabilities are the same for both missile types,
or in other words, the two types are indistinguishable. Indis-
tinguishability makes it unnecessary for the defender to classify
He needs only to decide on some mixture of mode 1 and mode 2
,
regardless of the classification. A mixture of reponse programs
P,-S, and P 2
~ S 2 ( rows 1 anc^ 4) is just that kind of mixture,
since both programs dictate a given decision without referring
to the classification. In the cases a < 1-a and a > 1-a
p s p s
it is possible to distinguish between anti-secondary and anti-
primary missiles.
The fact that the two missile types are distinguishable
should be exploited in every optimal strategy. This rather
intuitive perception can be formalized by saying that if
a t* 1-a , no optimal strategy exists which does not associate
P ^
a positive weight with either the P.-S* or the P
?
-S, response





-S-| are the only programs which respond differently
to different classifications. In other words, these programs
are the ones which exploit the distinguishability property.
We present this conclusions as a theorem:
THEOREM 1 ; If a j- 1-a , then no optimal defensive strategy
exists in which P-.-S, and P^-S- are the only
active actions. If a > 1-a , then the P,-S_
p s 12
program should be active in every mixed optimal
strategy, and if a < 1-a , the P 2
" s i program
should be active in every mixed optimal strategy.
142

Proof: We examine the case a > 1-a only. The other case
p s
is similar. From the previous discussion we know that in this
case row 3 (P 2 ~S,) can be ignored. That is, there are optimal
strategies which do not involve the P 2 ~S, response program.




prsi "l +Vl Ps,1(M + (WsqiIVH.1






Now let 5 (P-.-S-,) + (1-6) (P_-S
2
) be a mixture of rows 1 and 3
above, where 6 is the weight of P-j-S, (0 <6 < 1) . We show that
this mixture cannot be an optimal strategy. First we write
down the payoffs of this mixed strategy under each of the
possible actions of the attacker. We shall denote the above
mixture by H.' and write Pay(H^"' 3 |AP) and Pay(H}' 3 |AS) for









5P q [M-l-V ]+V
S 1 M-l M-l (IV. 6)
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We have to distinguish, as we shall see, between two possi-
bilities concerning the value of 5 : (1) 6 > 1-a and
1 2
(2) 5 <_ 1-a . We start from case (1) . Let H ' be the mixture
y(P,-S,) + (1-y) (P,-S 2 ), and let us calculate the two payoffs
of this strategy:
Pay(H^' 2 |AP) = Y q ]_+ (1~y) a q] + (1-y) (1-a ) q2+vM_i (IV. 7)
Pay(H*' 2 |AS) = ^q^U-Y) (l-ag ) q] Pg J [M-1-VM_ 1 ]
I
+ VM_ X . (IV. 8)
1 2
If H ' is to be a preferable strategy for the defender, we
must have:
Pay(Hlf2 |AP) < Pay (H*' 3 I AP) (IV. 9a)
Y o
Pay(H 1 ' 2 |AS) < Pay (H^
'
3
I AS) . (IV. 9b)
Y 5
Using Eqs . (IV.5-IV.8) above, we find that these conditions
are equivalent to:
yqx + (l-Y)a qx + (1-y) (l-o )q2 < 5q 1 +(l-6)q 2 (IV. 9c)
yP
gq 1 +
(1-y) d-agJq^g < S p
3 <*i
(IV. 9d)









and from (IV. 9d) we have






To show that there exists a value of y which satisfies these
two conditions, it is necessary that
6 - a 6 - (1-a )







This last inequality is equivalent to:
[a - (1-a ) ]5 < « - (1-a )
,
p s p s
and this inequality indeed holds true, since we are assuming
that a > 1-a , and obviously, 5 < 1. Thus we can find a value
p s
of y satisfying (IV. 10a) and (IV. 10b) simultaneously, and
hence (IV. 9a) and (IV. 9b). Since we also assume that 5 > 1-a
,
we see from Eq. (IV. 10b) that it is also possible to find such
a value of y which is between and 1. Thus we have proven
1 2that a strategy H^ '




The second case for which 6 < 1-a is resolved in a simi-
— s
2 3lar way by considering a general mixture H ' (instead of
Y
1 2
H ' above) . We have:
Y
Pay(H^' 3 |AP) = Yta
pq1
+d-otp)q2 ] + (1-Y )q2 +VM-1 (IV. 11)






M _ 1 ]
+ V
M_ X . (IV. 12)
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The requirements Pay(H 2 ' 3 |AP) < Pay (H*' 3 | AP) and







Since we are assuming 5 < 1-a in this case, and since
s
a > 1-a , it is again possible to find a value of y , which
p s
is between and 1, and which satisfies both Eqs . (IV. 13a) and
(IV. 13b). Hence H2 ' 3 is preferable to H* ' 3 .
Y 5
We have thus proven that we can always find a defensive
1 3policy better than any policy of the type H ' . The proof
of the theorem is thus complete.
Another interesting observation can be made, regarding
the domination relationship between the two columns of the
matrix of the game. We see that for M = 1, the second column
is zero (since obviously V. = 0) and the first is positive.
This is quite expected, since if only one missile is to be
launched, the optimal decision is clearly to launch an anti-
primary missile. In this case therefore, the optimal strategy
for the defender is a pure one--to use the P-i-S, program
(i.e., to use the more-effective mode).
It is expected that this domination relation will continue
to hold true for some more values of M, that is, for M = 2,3,.
until for some M, domination will no longer hold. At this
146

first M for which the first column (corresponding to the AP
decision) ceases to dominate, both players would resort to
randomized strategies for optimal behavior. We can deduce,
using a remarkably simple heuristic argument, that the great-
est value of M for which the solution of the game consists of
a pair of pure strategies (AP for the attacker and Pi~S, for
the defender) is precisely the number M* which has been calcu-
lated in Chapter II for the one-sided dynamic programming
model.
The argument is the following: Suppose that for some
value, which is less than or equal to the M* given in Chapter
II, the optimal strategy for the defender is randomized, i.e.,
consists of at least one active response program in which there
is positive probability of using mode 2. In the model pre-
sented in Chapter II it was assumed that the defender always
operates on mode 1, and even though the attacker knew it, his
optimal decision (for M M*) was shown to be the AP decision.
Knowing now that with some probability, the defender will use
mode 2 instead of mode 1 should not lead the attacker to change
his course. He still should desire to launch anti-primary
missiles, since in mode 2 there is a greater probability of
survival and there is a zero probability of killing the secon-
dary target anyway. Therefore, if M is the greatest M for
which the game has a saddle point in the P-i-S, —AP entry,




where M* was shown in Chapter II to be given by:
M* = 1 + V 1"^'
(Notice that we should use q. , not q 2 , in place of q in
Eq. (11.14) .)
We now have to show that M can ' t be greater than M*
.
Suppose therefore that M > M* . It would then mean that for
some M > M* , the optimal policy for the attacker is AP and
for the defender is P,-S,. But then, the attacker, knowing
that the defender should use the pure strategy P,-S,, would
tend to aim his missiles at the secondary target, because for
all M > M* this is what's preferable for him, as the one-sided
model of Chapter II indicates. Thus we arrive at a contradic-
tion to a fundamental property of equilibrium of solutions of
zero-sum games. By that property, the knowledge by any player,
of the fact that his opponent does use his optimal strategy,
by no means attracts him to change his own policy. This is
clearly not so in the above case. Thus, for no value of M
greater than M* can there be a pure solution to the game.
Therefore for all M > M* , the optimal strategy for the attacker
is mixed (the two possible decisions, AP and AS, are active).
Obviously there is no M for which the optimal strategy of the
attacker is pure anti-secondary because the optimal strategy
of the defender would then be P
2









We proceed now by solving the equation (which corresponds
to the case a > 1-a ) :
P s
"1 +Vl pA o*-i) + a-pA>Vi
VM
= val Vi+<1"V q2 + Vi (i-«s)q1Ps (M-i) + [i-(ws)q1Ps]vM.1
q2 +VM-1 V.M-l
(IV. 14)






For M > M* we know, from the Theorem 1 proven above, that the
optimal defensive strategy either mixes rows 1 and 2 in the
above matrix, or rows 2 and 3 (but cannot mix rows 1,3)
.
Starting from M = M*+l, we should find for each M, the two
values V', V" defined by:MM
VM = ValM
Wi P^M+ll-P^lv^ \ (ml)












With the assumption that V , is known (for M = M*+l we have
V u. = M*»q, and the V ' s are then calculated recursively) , weM* 1 M
have to find both V' and V", and then take the minimum in
order to get Vw (because the defender, who is the one to chooseM




We now simplify Eqs . (IV. 15a) and (IV. 15b). Define:
V q l + (1"V * q 2 = q
and
M M
We multiply each of the equations (IV. 15a) and (IV. 15b) by
-1 (the value of the matrix is thus also multiplied by -1)
,
then add M to both sides of each equation. We write g' for
M - V', and g" for M - V". We also make use of yet another
M M M
trivial identity: Let b ben any constant, and let B be the
matrix of a zero-sum game. Let also J be a matrix of the
same dimensions as B, with all its entries equal to 1.
Then
:
b + val (B) = val(B + bJ)
Using this and the above definitions, Equation (IV. 15a) becomes
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gM-l " q l
9JL










and Eq. (IV. 15b) becomes:











Equations (IV. 16a) and (IV. 16b) have forms which make it much
more convenient to apply the known explicit formulae for the
value of a 2x2 matrix (see the Appendix for these formulae)
.
Notice also that we have transformed V,, to g„, where g„ simplyMM M *
expresses the difference between the actual achievable number
of penetrating missiles and the ideally desirable number
(which is M) . The function g,„ thus measures the effect of
the defense, and so serves as a very meaningful function for
itself, besides its being a more convenient quantity mathe-
matically, as we shall see.
From (IV. 16a) we get, after applying formula (1) of the
Appendix:
9m " X +
We now define:
(q-qi ) d-q 1P s ) -*s q lP s + a sq lP s gM-l
q-q, +
-x q,P g,, -


















?M = 1 + ^ ^q": >'gM-l • (IV * 17a)M-l
Similarly, from Eq. (IV. 16b) we can explicitly express the



















and so we have
9M " l + (b" + £
,
>
-%-l • (IV - 17b >M-l
Now g« can be written as follows:M
gM = M-VM = M-min[V',V"] = Max[g',g"] .M M n M 3M 3M
Making the comparison between g' and g", using Eqs . (IV. 17a)
and (IV. 17b), we^ find:
a* +gM , a" + gM ,
t \ »\ ^ ^ i M-l. ^M-l.
t9M i «i» <^> < b' + g > i b" <, >
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Notice that q, < q < q~ , and so b' and b" as defined above
are both positive. Since gM i must also be positive, we can
multiply the last inequality by the two denominators of the
two sides being assured that the inequality sign stays oriented







(gM - gM } <^=^> gM-l - (a rt -a') - (b" -b*) (IV. 18)
We have thus found a very convenient way to check whether the
optimal defensive strategy, at state M, comprises the response
programs P-i-S, and P,-S 2 / or rather the programs P ? -S„ and
P,-S
2
: If #q. (IV. 18) is satisfied for that M, then it is
the first case which holds. If not, then it is the second.
Notice from (IV. 18) that we have found a numerical "threshold"
which separates the two possible structures of the optimal
defense strategy. The threshold is
a'b" - a"b'
(a" -a') - (b" -b') = Val
-a' -a"
b' -b"
= A, say. (IV. 18a)
We now prove the following lemma which will be helpful in
gaining some insight into the structure of the optimal defen-
sive and offensive strategies.
Lemma ; The function g„ is an increasing function of M.
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Proof : For M <_ M* , we have V M-q., and hence
g(M) = M -V = M(l-q,) which is, of course, an increasing
function of M. To show that this is also true for M > M*,
let us develop Eq. (IV. 17a) as follows:
«




= 1 + U
" b'V'^V ^M-l
• 9M-1 + X - (b
'-a ' ), b'tq
,
"
gM-l* 1 - (b
'-a ' ) (IV - 19)
M—
1
By definitions of a' and b' we haves
(q-qj qiP s + <» sq?P s q - qi
b» -a' - —±-| 3 l 3 « - + q.
s^l s s
Now notice that 2




" ql " Cl-apXqj-q^
and so:
b . ... = ( _^!£)(q .„ , q
s
Since we work here on a case for which a > 1-a t we find
p. s'
from the last equality that
b' - a' < q
2
and so, returning now to Eq. (IV. 19) above we find
«M * »M-1 + l




% = Max[gM' gA ] " gM * gM-l '
This proves the lemma.
This lemma leads to a very useful conclusion about the
structure of the defense optimal solution. We know from
inequality (IV. 18) that the least M for which the optimal
strategy mixes the P ]_-S 2 and P 2
~S
2
response programs, can be
written as M**+l, where M** is the least integer M (greater
than or equal to M*) which exceeds X:
a' b"-a"b' ,
M** = Min{M: M ^M*,gM > X - (a «_a l j _ (b»-b ') '
(Notice that if gM *
= M*(l-q1 ) > *. then we have
M** = M*7)
Since we have just proven that gM is an increasing
function
of M, then the inequality gM > X will
continue to hold for all
values of M greater than M**. We may therefore conclude that
once the optimal defense strategy switches from P 2
~ S 2~~ P 1~ S 2
mixture type, to a P 1 "S 1~P 1 -S 2 mixture type
(and this happens
exactly at M - M**) , it can never again switch back, at lower
values of M, to a policy in which the P 2 -S 2 response
program
is active.
In the following table we present a description of the






Optimal Strategies In the ASAPA

















and P-i _S9 response pro-
grams.
Randomization over
AP and AS decisions.






AP and AS decisions.
(*) If M** = M*, then the second row of the table is vacuous.
The interpretation of the structure presented in Table
IV. 1 is this: When there are only a few missiles left to be
launched ("few" means less than or equal to M*), the defender's
main concern is the prevention of missile penetration--not
so much his own survival, and so he must use mode 1 only.
If the number of missiles left is large enough (more than
M**) , he must be more concerned about his survival than about
preventing penetration of immediate missiles. This is re-
flected by the relatively frequent use he should make of mode
2, which renders the secondary target less vulnerable, although
also less effective. The "emphasis" on mode 2 is shown by the
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fact that he mixes the Pi-S-, and P 2
" S 2 resPonse programs.
(He never uses mode 1 "blindly".)
There is also an interim zone (if M** > M*) between M*
and M**, where the defender must be cautious. At that zone
he must evaluate the interception of potential anti-primary
missiles as more important than his own protection against




To conclude the analysis of this model, we calculate the
optimal strategies of both the defender and the attacker,
in each of the three zones of M described above.
(a) M M* : Both players use pure strategies. The
attacker launches anti-primary missiles, and the
defender uses P-.-S, response program.
(b) M* * M <_ M**: (If M** = M*, which is possible, this
zone is empty.) We denote by 5 * (M) the probability
of the attacker using an anti-primary missile (at his
optimal strategy) and by 6 D*(M) the defender using the
P,-S, response program at his optimal strategy.
(l-6_* (M) is the probability of using P-i-S^ response
program.) The calculation of 5 * (M) and 6 * (M) is
straightforward, based on the formulae (2) and (3) in
the Appendix. We first write the active sub-matrix
































)q 1P s ]gM_ 1^.fq




q-qi +a s -q 1P g .gM„ 1
[l-(l-a
s










»' + gM --l
l
(IV. 20b)
Notice that g # = M* - V * = M*-M*q, = M*(l-q,) and since
M* >







Since gw is monotone increasingM
1function of M, we have, for all M > M*, g > =—. From this
s
one can easily show that Eqs. (IV. 20a) and (IV. 20b) yield values
of 5_ # {M) and 5_*(M) between and 1, as they should,





P 1"S 2 / gM-l"q [1








P~-S2" 2 \ gM-l"q 2 gM-l
We denote here by 5 D**(M) (<5,**(M)) the weight of the P 2
~S
2
response program in the optimal defensive strategy (weight of
AP action in the optimal attacker's strategy) . We again




6 n**(M) = -7^ , g
x (IV. 21a)D** c5 2
-q+(1 -a
s
)q lP s gM-l
(1 "a
s
)q lP s' gM-l 1







)qlP s* gM-l b +gM-l
It can be seen that g.„ * °° as M > °° (since g.. > g„ - + (l-q_) ,3M 3M 3M—1 2
as was shown in the proof of the lemma) . Thus, we find that:
5 D
**(M) * 1 and S A**(M) - as M + «.
The solution of the ASAPA game model, with MENP payoff is
now completely at hand. For convenience of use we summarize
here the alogrithm for solving the game.
Algorithm—ASAPA Game Model, With MENP Criterion:
(1) Calculate M* (Eq. (14) , Chapter II) . Calculate the








(2) For a 11 values of M less than
or equal to M* put:
V.. = M-q 1M
The optimal strategies are: Pure AP for
the attaoker,








%-l y x = (a" -a') - (b" -b')
If this inequality doesn't hold, calculate gM
from
Eq. (17a) (taking gM = .g£) .
Calculate VM by
v = m -q . Calculate optimal strategies fromVM ** ^M
Eqs. (20a) and (20b). Set M = M+l and repeat
the
step.
If the above inequality does hold true, set
M** = M-l
Set M = M+l.
(5) Calculate gM
= g", given by Eq . (17b). Calculate
optimal strategies using Eqs. (21a) and (21b).
Set
M = M+l and repeat the step.
r THF ANTI-PRIMARY/ANTI-SECONDARY ALLOCATION (ASAPA) GAME
MODEL WItI MAXIMUM PROBABILITY OF HIT (MPH)
CRITERION
This section differs from the previous one by the
function
used to define the payoff of the game. We now define
the
payoff of a game, r* or r* as the probability of eventually
hitting the primary target. For reasons of mathematical
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convenience we use probabilities of miss— rather than hit
probabilities--in all the analyses which follow. This does
not affect in any way the optimal strategies of either the
i
defender or the attacker.
»
First note the obvious fact that the value of the game r
is identical with the probability of missing the target in M
M
attempts, each having probability of hit P . This is true,
M
since by definition of V Q , the secondary target is already
dead at the beginning of this game. Thus we have:
M

























+ (l^ )(l-p ajr^"1











We use the parameters q and q defined by:





As before, let us denote by V,„ the value of the game r,
.
M 1
To find the sequence of values V (M = 1,2,... ), we start
from the obvious relation
V
1
= val r. 1 - P -q,
P 1
and use the recursive equation:
M-l





















The entries in the 4x2 matrix of Eq. (IV. 22) represent
"payments" which the column player (the attacker) pays to the
row player (defender) . Therefore the goal of the defender is
to maximize payments. We can show that if a < 1-a , the
P - s
second row of the above matrix can be ignored and if a > 1-a3 p — s
the third can be ignored. This is done exactly as it was
done in the previous section: We multiply the first row by
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a and the fourth row by 1-a and add. This mixture is directly
P P
seen to be preferable to the second row if a < 1-a . Ifc p — s
a > 1-a we take the mixture (1-a ) (1 row) + a (4 row)
p - s p p
and confirm that it is better than the third row. If a = 1-a
P s
(i.e., probability of classifying a missile as anti-primary
is the same for anti-primary and anti-secondary missile) , then
both the second and third rows can be ignored, and an optimal
policy which uses only the P-i-S, and P 2 ~S 2 resPonse programs
can be found.
We see that in no case do we need to consider all the four
possible response programs. Only three (at most) should be
considered. From here on we solve in detail the case a > 1-a
P s
only. The case a < 1-a is similar and could be carried outJ p s .





As we saw, since a > 1-a , we can ignore the third row.
p s
We now introduce the function hw defined by:M
VMhM
= St • (IV - 23)11 (1-p ) u
p
Notice that h_, measures the ratio between the actual proba-
ta
bility of miss, and the probability of miss that would have
existed had the secondary target already been destroyed.
MClearly, hM > 1. Dividing now Eq. (IV. 22) by (1-P p ) , ignoring
the third row as explained, and using definition (IV. 23), we
reach the following equation:
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We show that no optimal policy can mix the first and third
rows only. This result was proven in Theorem 1 for the ASAPA
model with MENP criterion. As before (Section E) we denote
by H '-^ the randomized defensive policy in which the i row
(of the matrix given in Eq. (IV. 24)) is selected with proba-
bility 6 and j row is selected with probability 1-6
.
1 3Theorem 2: A randomized defensive policy H ' cannot be
optimal, for any 6 such that < 6 < 1.
The method of the proof is identical with that which was
used to prove the same theorem in the previous section.
Different algebraic expressions are involved, however, in
Mthis case, since the matrix of the game r, examined in this
section differs from the matrix which was treated in Section
E.
Proof : We wish to prove that no policy of type H ' can be
optimal. We first write the payoffs associated with the
policy H '
, which correspond to the two possible attacker's
actions. These payoffs are calculated directly from the








+ (1-6 ) q2 ) ] hM_ ]_ (IV. 25a)
Pay(H 1,3 |AS) = hM . - 5q,-P e [hV( , - 1] . (IV. 25b)2 5 ' M-l 1 S M-i
We now examine separately two cases: (1) 6 > 1-ot and
(2) 6 1-a . We show that in case (1) , a policy of the
S
1 2type H ' can always be found which is preferable on the
13 2 3policy H ' , and in case (2) a policy H ' exists which is
Y
preferable.
We begin with the case 6 > 1-a . We explicitly write
1 2the payoffs of a policy H ' for arbitrary y:
Pay(H^' 2 |AP) = [1 -
P
p
(yq 1 + (1-y ) q) ]
h
M_ x (IV. 26a)
Pay(H^' 2 |AS) = h^
-q^Cy+d-Y) d-a g ) ] t^^-l] . (IV. 26b)
12 13
It is obvious that H ' is preferable on H ' if and only
Y 5
if:
Pay(H 1,2 |AP) > Pay(H^ /3 |AP) (IV. 27a)
Y <5
and
Pay(H 1 ' 2 |AS) > Pay (H*
'
3
I AS) . (IV. 27b)
Y 5
By comparing Eqs . (IV. 25a) and (IV. 26a), and then Eqs . (IV. 25b:
and (IV. 26b), we find that conditions (IV. 27a) and (IV. 27b)
are equivalent to the conditions:




Y + (1-y) (l-a g ) < 5 .
We now use the relation q = a q, + (1-a )
q
and find that the





and the second inequality is equivalent to
6 - (1-a )
Y < — . (IV. 29)
a
s
To show that there exists a value of y (between and 1)
which satisfies both inequalities (IV. 28) and (IV. 29) we only
have to show that:
5 -a 5 - (1-a
J
£ < S_ .1-a a
P S
It is straightforward to confirm this last relation, using
the relation a > 1-a , which is assumed to hold in our case.
P s
The other assumption (5 > 1-a ) which has been made, guarantees
that not both expressions in the right hand sides of inequali-
ties (IV. 28) and (IV. 29) are either greater than 1 or less than
0, so that a value of y, which is indeed a probability (i.e.,
between and 1), exists that satisfies Eqs. (IV. 28) and (IV. 29)
We turn to the second case, i.e., 5 < 1-a . We consider
— s
2 3
an H ' policy, for arbitrary y. Tne payoffs are:
Y




Pay(H 2 ' 3 |AS) = hM . -yq. P a (1-u ) (hM , -1) . (IV. 30b)* y ' M-l IS S M-I
We are interested in a value of y which simultaneously satisfies
Pay(H 2 ' 3 |AP) > Pay(H1,3 |AP) (IV. 31a)
Y Y
and
Pay(H 2 ' 3 |AS) > Pay (H*
'
3
| AS) (IV. 31b)
Y 6
Making the appropriate comparisons ((IV. 30a) with (IV. 31a),
(IV. 30b) with (IV.31b)), we deduce that the following inequali-
ties are equivalent to (IV. 31a) and (IV. 31b):
Y q + (1- Y )q 2 < Sq-L + (l-5)q 2
and
Y d-a ) < 6
These conditions are further equivalent to:







Since a > l-o_» and 5 <_ 1-a (in this subcase) it is immedi-
ately verified that there exists some v, between and 1,
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which satisfies inequalities (IV. 32) and (IV. 33), simultane-
ously, hence also (IV. 31a) and (IV. 31b).
We have thus shown that a policy H. ' cannot be optimal,
since whatever the value of 5 might be, there exists a better
policy. The proof of Theorem 2 is thus complete.
Our next step is to find the recursion relations for hw
and to calculate optimal strategies. Here again, as in the
ASAPA model with MENP criterion discussed in the last section,
the optimal strategies are pure for all M less than or equal
to M*, where M* in this case is given by (see Eq. (II. 6)):
M* = 1 +
In ( 1 - *£)
s
1 -P
The argument which supports that statement is exactly that
which was explained before (p. 147 ) . The fact that we use
a different payoff does not affect the validity of that argu-
ment; it only changes the value of M*
.
For M <_ M* , the optimal pure strategy of the attacker is
AP and the optimal pure strategy of the defender is the Pi-S,
M












~rf ] (for M M * )
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Notice that h' is the value of a game in which only the firstM
M
and second rows of the r game matrix (see Eq. (IV.24)),
corresponding to the P-j-S, and P.-S
2
response programs
(respectively) , are active. Similarly, h", the value when
the secondhand third rows (P,-S 2 and P 2 ~ s o response programs
are active. Since we proved that the first and third rows
cannot be the only two active rows in an optimal defensive
strategy, we conclude that:
h
M
= Max[h^, h£] .
M(We take the maximum because the payoffs in r expresses the
probability of miss of the primary target, which the defender
is interested in maximizing. The value h is always propor-
M
tional to V , with a positive constant of proportion, so that
the Maximum operation is preserved.)
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We calculate now h* and h" from Eqs . (IV. 34) and (IV. 35)
,
MM ^
using the formulae given in the Appendix. From Eq. (IV. 34)
we find:





pA [asV (i-y (^2^i }
]
(Vi-i]w fTvi -
- (i=rr<Vi VHi^i'ViViVW11 ) ' ( ,
(where we. have skipped here some algebraic details). From


























































Equations (IV. 34a), (IV. 35a) can be rewritten as
h ' = —n
M (1-P,
P P q.hM , (hM , -1)p si M-l M-l
+ -£
M-l c'hM-1 + d'(hM_f l) (IV. 34b)
h"M (i-Pp)
P P q,h„ , (h._ , -1





Notice that since q~ > q, , the parameters c 1 , c", d 1 are all
positive. Since c" > 0, we find from Eq. (IV. 35b) that:





1-P q 2 1-P q
"T^P— Vl y- Vl (since "TTPPi! > 1
and so (h } is shown to be a monotone increasing sequence
hM = Maxth^.h-] » hj > h^ .
Using Equations (IV. 34b) and (IV. 35b) it is straightforward
now to deduce the general conditions for the P, -S~ and P^-S-
response programs to be the two active decisions in the opti
mal defensive strategy. The condition is
hM < hM •




"Vl + ^'Vr 11 c ' llM-l +d, «hH-l- l)
This is also equivalent to
(c' -c" +d' -d")hM - > d' -d" . (IV. 36)M-l
In order to draw useful conclusions from inequality (IV. 36)
we first prove that
d' - d" >



















Now, since'a > 1-a and q n > q, , we havep s ^2 ^1
a
p
q 2 ~ (V (1 -a s ))q l > ° '
and therefore:
d' > -±-2- = d" d 1 - d" > ,
as was to be shown. Returning now to inequality (IV. 36) we




c' - c" + d' - d" < (IV. 37)
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then inequality (IV. 36) cannot hold true for any value of M.
Since inequality (IV. 37) was shown to be equivalent to h' h",
"» •* ^ MM
we conclude that condition (IV. 37) is sufficient to guarantee
that for all values of M (greater than M* ) , the optimal defen-
sive strategy comprises the P,-S- and P.-S^ response programs.
If, on the other hand, we have
c' - c" + d' - d" > 0,
then, since also d'-d" > we see that inequality (IV. 36)
is equivalent to:
Vl " c> -c-'+d' -d- • (IV - 38)
Inequality (IV. 38) now serves as the sufficient and necessary
condition for h" to be greater than h', or, for the optimalM M
defensive policy to randomize over P-i-S- and P^-S- response
programs
.
The analogy between the ASAPA game model with the MPH
criterion treated here, and the ASAPA game model with the
MENP criterion discussed in Section E now becomes evident.
We define here the value M** of M by:
M** = Min{M: M>.M*,h
M
>
c , f 3 „ ~
*
','
_ d „ }
From the discussion above it is clear that M**+l is the least
value of M such that the optimal defensive strategy of the
Mgame r, consists of the Pi-S- and P
2
~ S 2 response programs.
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By definition of M**, and since h was shown to be increasing
with M, it is clear that for all values of M greater than or
equal to M**, the inequality (IV. 38) is satisfied. But this
inequality itself was shown to be equivalent to an optimal
strategy mixing P,-S~ and P^-S- response programs. We thus
reach a structure of optimal strategies which resembles that
which was discovered for the ASAPA game with MENP criterion
(see Table IV. 1)
:
(1) For M <_ M*, the optimal strategies of both defender
and attacker are pure: p i~s i f°r tne defender and AP
for the attacker.
(2) For M* < M M** (if indeed M** > M*. It is possible
that M** = M* and then this case is not possible)
:
The optimal strategy for the defense is of Pi~S,
—
P l"S 2 fcyP e (defender never uses mode 2 "blindly")
.
The attacker's optimal policy is also randomized (AP-
AS) .
(3) For M > M**, the optimal defensive strategy is of the
P-,-S
2
—P 2~ S 2 tYP e ( never uses mode 1 "blindly") . The
attacker's optimal policy is randomized.
The operational interpretation of this structure is the same
as described in Section E.
We proceed by calculating the optimal strategies for both
the defender and the attacker. As before, we denote by <5-*(M)
(6 D
*(M)) the probability of selecting the AP action at the
attacker's optimal strategy (probability of selecting the P^-S,
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response program at the defender's optimal strategy), for
values of M such that M* < M <_ M**. Similarly, 5 ^* (M)
(5_**(M)) are defined for M > M** (5 A<r (M) is the probability
of selecting the P 2
~S 2 response program by the defender) . We
apply formulae (2) and (3) of the Appendix to the matrices
shown in Eqs . (IV. 34) and (IV. 35), and get the following
expressions
:
(1) For M between M* and M** (in case M** > M*)
:
[P q-(l-a )q P ]h^ + &-«s,qlPB
^ (M)







<5**(M) = s-n— w xu ^-Tu rr (IV. 39b)A* V 1^ (q2"^l)hM-l +08qlPs (Vr1)





)qlPs ]hM-l + (1
"a
s





(q2-qi)hM.1+ a-s ) qips (Vr1)




(q^)h^ + (l-ag ) qlPs (h^-1)
We now summarize the algorithm for solving the ASAPA game
model with the MENP criterion.
Algorithm—ASAPA Game Model with MPH Criterion:
(1) Calculate M* (Eq. (II. 6)). Calculate also c', c",
d', d" (functions of the parameters).







The optimal strategies are: Pure AP for the attacker;
pure P-j-S, for the defender.
(3) Set M = M*+l. Calculate:
VM* 1-p <3l M*






M-l c* -c" +d' -d"
If this inequality doesn't hold, calculate h using
Eq. (IV. 34b) (taking h equal to h ' ) . Calculate VM
Mby V = (1-P ) *hM . Calculate optimal strategies using
Eqs. (IV. 39a) and (IV. 39b). Set M = M+l, and repeat
the step.
If the above inequality does hold true, set M** = M-l.
Set M = M+l.
(5) Calculate hM using Eq. (IV. 35b) (taking h.. = h") .M MM
Calculate optimal strategies using Eqs. (IV. 40a) and
(IV. 40b). Calculate V.. = hM (l-P )
M
. Set M = M+l andM M p
repeat the step.
G. ANTI -SECONDARY/ANTI -PRIMARY ALLOCATION (ASAPA) GAME MODEL
WITH MINIMUM EXPECTED COST (MEC) CRITERION
We now present the ASAPA game model using the criterion of
minimal cost of destroying the primary target (MEC-criterion)
.
In this model the stochastic game is allowed to continue until
the primary target is destroyed. Clearly the probability that
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the primary target will be destroyed in a finite number of
stages is equal to 1. The attacker desires to destroy the
target with minimal expenses. We assume that the defender
aims at exactly the opposite goal, i.e., to maximize this cost,
so that the model fits into the frame of a zero-sum game.
We denote by C the cost of an anti-primary missile and
by C the cost of an anti-secondary missile. We use also all
notations of the last two sections. The cost of destroying
the primary target is the total cost of all missiles which are
consumed in the game. This cost is, of course, a random
variable. The expectation of that random variable is the
payoff of the game. The symbol r stands for the game
played when the secondary target is alive, and r stands for
the game played when the secondary target is not present.
Clearly
Kr°) = «£
because in the absence of the secondary target, the expected
number of missiles (all anti-primary ones, obviously) that will
be consumed before the primary target is hit is 1/P .
In this stochastic game model we therefore have only two
game elements. We now write the full matrix of the game r .
The available actions to both players are the same as before,
so that in general we have a 4 x 2 matrix. (The expressions
given in the entries of the matrix are self-explanatory so
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We shall again assume that a > 1-a . Under this assumption
it can be shown that the third row is dominated by a mixture
of the first and the fourth rows. To see this we substitute
U = val(r°) = C /P , U, = vaKr 1 ) for r° and r 1 in the above
o p p 1
st
matrix. Then we consider the mixture (1-a ) (1 row) +
P
a (4 row) and use the obvious relations U < U, . Thus we
p o 1
ignore the third row, and the equation which must be solved




























P q.U. C -C +P a, (U. -=2.)
p*l 1 p s snl 1 P
= C + U, -val PqU, C -C + (1-a )P q, (U. -=E)pi P 1 p s s s U 1 P_ (IV. 41)
/
Wl P s
where we have made use of the relation q = a a. + (1-a )q_
p 1 p 2
(in the (2,1) entry).
The last equation can be rewritten as
val





C -C + P q, (U, -=2)





= C (IV. 42)
Some useful conclusions about the optimal strategies can be
reached without really solving Eq. (IV. 42). One such conclu-
sion refers to the condition which the parameters of the problem
should satisfy in order for the game to have a pure optimal
pair of strategies (which then should be AP for the attacker,
and P,
-S, for the defender, as is obvious) . It is conceiva-
ble that if the cost of an anti-secondary missile is "very
high", then the attacker will tend to give up using it, and
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thus will adopt a pure anti-primary strategy. Just how much
is a "very high" cost of an anti-secondary missile in order for
that to be true, can be discovered quite simply. We notice
that since q, < q < q~ , the three entries in the first column
of the matrix shovn in Eq. (IV. 42) form an increasing triplet
(from top to bottom) . Also, it can very easily be verified
that the three entries in the second column form a decreasing
triplet. Thus, a necessary and sufficient condition for the
first column to dominate the second is that the (1,1) entry
will be greater than the (1,2) entry, that is:
Vi u i > cP"Vpsqi (ui p1' • (IV - 43)
(Notice that the matrix in Eq. (IV. 42) is a transformation
of the original matrix of the game. This transformation
involves one alternation of sign. Therefore domination of
one column of (IV. 42) on the other means that the entries
of the dominating column are greater than the corresponding
entries of the dominated column. In the original matrix,
domination between columns means just the opposite relation,
since the entries there express costs, which the attacker,
who selects the column, wishes to minimize)
.
Notice now the relation:
> * & • *
To show the validity of this we need only to observe that the
APquantity U, is the expected cost of destruction when the
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attacker pursues a pure AP strategy. The optimal cost of
destruction can only be less than or equal to that quantity.
Satisfaction of (IV. 43) by UV is clearly a necessary condition





< C -C +P q, (U^P -=£)p^l 1 — p s s^l 1 P
p
which is equivalent to
P (1-q )
C <
-^-rr — * C (IV. 44)
s - P
p P
is a sufficient condition for the optimal attacker's strategy
to be a mixture of AP and AS decisions. Inequality (IV. 44)
provides a very simple and practical criterion with which one
may check whether the use of AS-missiles is justified (notice,
however, that (IV. 44) is not a necessary condition for the
beneficiality of AS-missiles)
.
We proceed by showing how to calculate the value U. for
the case in which inequality (IV. 44) holds true. A careful
analysis of the matrix of the game reveals that there is no
optimal (randomized) defensive policy which randomizes over
the first and third rows only (see Eq. (IV.42)). This is the
same property that has been proven for the other ASAPA game
models (Sections E-F) . It means that an optimal defense policy
cannot consist of P,-S and P
2
~S 2 res Ponse programs. The
interpretation of this property is that when a f 1-a , the
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M tyPes of mrssrles are
distinguish, and this di.-
J^iHty must te exploited in tne optical
defensive
.s response program
is a policy which does
not explort
.^drstingurshahility, since hoth ,,-,
and^ program
i0 not refer to
classification of .issile type
We on.it a proof of the
ahove property in thrs
case. The
method of proof is
similar to that presented
rn the parallel
Ire. Presented in Sections . and ,. -
oniy differences
are algebraic.
As a result of this
conclusion we can solve Eg,
(!».«)
by the following method.
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and let U£ be the solution
of:
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By expressing explicitly tn
,
, TU k) we qet two quadratic
• „ in Prre; ( TV . 4 5 ) and ( IV . 4 b ) , *« y cappearing in Eqs. ^xv.t^y
• ui« Ti Taking the maximum of the
two
equations in the variable Ur
K
=+. r hP value of the game, which is:




PART TWO: OPTIMAL ALLOCATION PROBLEMS INVOLVING
REAL MISSILES AND DECOYS
V. OPTIMAL DEPLOYMENT OF DECOYS—GENERAL INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
In Part I of this dissertation we dealt with missile allo-
cation processes, in which the missiles of the anti-secondary
type served as penetration aids. That is, they were tools
used to facilitate the penetration of the main weapons (i.e.,
the anti-primary missiles) . In Part II, a different concept
of penetration support, namely the decoy, is analyzed.
To recognize the coherence of these two parts, one should bear
in mind that anti-secondary missiles and decoys represent
nothing more than just two different technical approaches to
the problem of improving penetration capability of the anti-
primary missiles.
The principle of a decoy is simple. The decoy has the
same physical signature as has the real missile, and thus it
produces similar signals on the detection devices. The defener
is incapable of distinguishing between a real missile and a
decoy, and may be inclined to treat all detected missiles as
if they were real ones. This fact works to the benefit of
the attacker. In principle, there are two different basic
effects through which this benefit may actually be gained:
(1) The Exhaustion Effect . This effect is significant
when the defender has a limited number of defensive
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missiles with which to counter the attacking missiles.
The decoy is a device used to force, or to tempt, the
defender to spend some or all of his missiles before
the stockpile of real (offensive) missiles is exhausted
The attacker thus hopes that some missiles will be left
for the attack after the defender is no longer capable
of intercepting them.
(2) Saturation Effect . This is the effect induced by
launching simultaneously a number of missiles (more
than the number which the defender can simultaneously
handle). The simplest case, which is quite realistic
in many situations, is that in which the defender can
engage only one missile at a time.
Chapter VI is devoted to modeling the exhaustion effects
of decoys in a scenario similar to that which was considered
in Chapters II through IV. In Chapter VII we present and
solve some of the more important models of saturation effect.
Very naturally we expect decoys to cost less than a real
missile, otherwise there is no point whatsoever in using them.
In fact, decoys are devices which in most cases are simply de-
signed to achieve tactical goals at a lower cost. It is true
that whenever a real missile is replaced by a decoy in an
actual combat process, the operational effectiveness is some-
what reduced. It is usually expected, on the other hand,
that that loss of effectiveness will be much less significant
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than the savings earned by that replacement, so that overall,
decoys will prove cost-effective.
It will be shown that the problems in which the exhaustion
effect is involved very naturally call for a stochastic-game
formulation and techniques. The problems in which the satura-
tion effect is the main concern can be formulated as determinis-
tic dynamic programming problems, as we show in Chapter VII.
B. O.R. LITERATURE ON DECOYS
It is a notable fact that the subject of optimal deploy-
ment of decoys in missile warfare is almost completely ignored
in the open literature. Although there are aspects of decoy
deployment, mainly technical ones, which are normally regarded
as classified, and thus are restricted to appear in classified
publications only
,
it is still hardly understandable that so
little has been done openly. It seems that much work remains
to be done that is not restricted to the classified literature.
This is especially true for problems in which basic operational
concepts of decoys deployment and methodologies of their
effectiveness evaluation are involved.
We found only two papers in the O.R. literature in which
the effect of decoys is the main theme. Both papers deal with
problems taken from the area of anti-ballistic-missiles (ABM)
vs. reentry vehicles (RV's), which is a very natural area for
For the same "economic" reasons, decoys are also widely
used in other areas of warfare, as Electronic Warfare, Mine
Warefare, passive Defense, etc.
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the decoy concept to be applied. We give here a brief summary
of these two papers and later on point out the differences
between our approach to the analysis of decoys and the approach
used in these papers.
1. Gorfinkel's Model
Gorfinkel [19] presents the following model: a "cloud":
or reentry vehicles (RV's) approach the atmosphere aimed at
an area defended by a given number of interceptors (that is,
anti-ballistic missiles) . Only one RV has a real warhead and
all the others are decoys. The defense makes a measurement
on each vehicle; this measurement is a random variable, the
distribution of which depends on the type of missile which is
actually being used (real | decoy) . On the basis of this measure-
ment the defense decides how many of its ABM's to divert to
each vehicle. An ABM diverted to any vehicle kills it with
probability P.. It is assumed that the vehicles are suffi-
ciently spread out in time so that a decision must be made on
each one while those remaining are almost totally hidden. The
opposite situation—when all objects are in view at once— is
also discussed in the paper. As soon as a vehicle is considered
and the 'proper' number of ABM's sent toward it, it is no
longer counted as part of the cloud and the ABM's directed at
it are no longer considered as part of the defensive arsenal.
A 'state' in the above process is characterized by the
number i of RV's left to be considered, and the number j of
ABM's still available to the defender. A solution of Gorfinkel's
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problem tells how many ABM's to divert to an RV in state i-j
as a function of the observed measurements on the RV. The
criterion for developing the solution is to minimize the
probability that the real warhead will penetrate.
Gorfinkel arrives at an analytic solution of the above
problem, but the validity of his solution depends on some
restrictive and rather artificial mathematical assumptions.
These assumptions are:
(1) The existence of two distributions, fw (x) and f_(y),
both known to the defender, of random variables X and Y
which represent the intensity of signals coming from
the real warhead and the decoy, respectively.
(2) The monotonicity of the likelihood ratio, which means
that the ratio fw (x)/fD (x) is a monotone increasing
function of X.
In a subsequent unpublished paper, Gorfinkel [20] has
postulated a more general model, by which the defense is
assumed to know that exactly W real weapons are present among
n offensive objects of the attack. He determined the optimum
allocation strategies for two different criteria: minimizing
the probability that at least one of the real weapons will
penetrate, and minimizing the expected number of real weapons
which penetrate.
2
. Layno ' s Model
Layno [21] presents a different ABM allocation model.
In his model the defense is facing a "cloud" of RV s , R of
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them are real and D are decoys. The defense has I interceptors
(IBM's). Each object in the cloud is detected and classified
as either a real weapon or a decoy. Layno assumes also two
types of error: Type 1 (mistaking a decoy for a real) and
Type 2 (mistaking a real for a decoy) . The probabilities P,
and P~ of the two types of errors are given. There is also
a known probability of killing an object by a single inter-
ceptor. Layno ' s problem is to find numbers x (the number of
ABM's assigned to each object classified as real) and y (the
number assigned to each object classified as decoy) so as to
minimize the expected number of real objects penetrating the
defense. The variables x and y are constrained, of course,
by the total number of interceptors available.
Layno solves the above problem using simple optimiza-
tion techniques. His emphasis is on the relation between the
ability to distinguish real missiles from decoys (which is
reflected by P, and P-) and the optimal expected number of
penetrators . Layno compares the case in which discrimination
capability does exist with the no-discrimination-capability
case. His main conclusion is that even a modest discrimination
capability significantly improves the payoff (i.e., the number
of penetrating real missiles) over the non-discrimination
case.
C. MODELS PRESENTED IN THIS THESIS
The whole subject of decoys is viewed, in this thesis,
within a different context, i.e., the context of optimal
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deployment of offensive tactical missiles. Our approach is
offense oriented, as opposed to the defense oriented problems
treated in the literature. The two papers mentioned above
attempt to find the best way for the defender to cope with
the presence of decoys in a "cloud" of threatening objects,
whereas the main concern in this thesis is the explanation of
the best deploying policies by which an attacker can deliber-
ately exploit the fact that a decoy is hard to distinguish
from a real weapon.
A general description of the modeling effort which has








Chapter VT«*-Exhaustion Models^\ i —\ Real-Decoy-Allocation (RDA) Game




Optimal No. of Decoys To Accompany
A Single Real Missile
N Optimal Real-Decoy 'Mixtures'
Fig. V.l: List of Decoy Models
in the Thesis
As we see in the scheme, Chapter VI is devoted to modeling
the exhaustion mechanism through which decoys might help the
attacker to pursue a more cost-effective tactic. Two Real-
Decoy-Allocation (RDA) games are formulated. In each of them
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the attacker chooses, at every stage, to launch either a
real, anti-primary missile or to use a decoy instead. The
defender, being aware of the possibility of decoy deployment
by the attacker, can choose either to fire a defensive missile
(or salvo, whichever is technically relevant to him) , or to
hold his fire (anticipating that the next offensive object
to be launched is a decoy) . Decoys are assumed to be indis-
tinguishable from real missiles. The defender is restricted
by the number of missiles available to him. He cannot use
more than one defensive missile (or salvo) against each offen-
sive missile. In Chapter VI this RDA game is analyzed and
solved for two different payoffs:
(1) The payoff is the cost of destroying the primary target
We assume here that the game is allowed to go on until
the- attacker achieves a hit on the primary target.
The cost is the sum of all costs of the weapons (either
real missiles or decoys) which are used. The attacker
is seeking a policy of deployment which minimizes the
expectation of this cost.
(2) The payoff is a linear function combining the military
"worth" of the primary target and the cost of the
weapons the attacker uses in his attempt to kill the
the primary target. In this case we assume that the
attacker is limited in the number of real missiles (but
not of decoys) he can use. Therefore the success in
destructing the primary target is not certain. Thus,
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the probability of killing the target is entered into
the payoff function along with the cost of the weapons.
Chapter VII is devoted, as seen in the scheme given above
(Fig. V.l) to modeling the saturation effect. The fundamental
problem we raise is what should be the optimal "mixture" of
real missiles and decoys in a "wave" of attacking objects which
are to be launched simultaneously, so as to minimize the ex-
pected cost of destroying the primary target (assuming that
attacking "waves" are to be launched repeatedly until the
primary target is finally hit) ? As a preliminary problem, we
analyze a model in which it is assumed that the attacker is
restricted to launch only one real missile, which he can
accompany by any desired number . of decoys. This restricting
assumption may very well be realistic in case the real missile
is a very costly and scarce weapon, and the decoys for it
are very inexpensive and available in large quantities. The
question in that preliminary problem is to find the optimal
number of decoys to be launched simultaneously with a real
missile. Two effects, associated with launching more decoys,
are competing here with each other:
(1) More decoys means higher cost.
(2) More decoys means high probability of survival
of the real missile.
In solving this problem we distinguish between two cases,
corresponding to two different schemes of operations for the
defense; the first case is one in which all secondary targets
are assumed to operate independently. In the second case,
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coordination is assumed to exist among the defense units, so
that no single offensive object (either real missile or a
decoy) is likely to be engaged by more than one secondary
target.
The saturation models of Chapter VII are treated by methods
of dynamic programming. The dynamic programming arguments
give rise to various functional equations which are then




VI. OPTIMAL DEPLOYMENT OF DECOYS—MODELING
THE EXHAUSTION EFFECT
A. THE REAL-DECOY ALLOCATION (RDA) GAME—MINIMUM EXPECTED
COST (MEC) CRITERION
1 . Formulation
Suppose that a single primary target is defended by a
defense system (which may consist of one SAM battery or more)
,
and suppose that the defense is limited to a given number of
intercepting missiles (or salvos) that may be launched through-
out the process. We make the following assumptions about the
process:
(a) At each stage, the attacker launches one missile,
which is either a real one or a decoy, according to
the attacker's choice.
(b) The defender can react either by firing a defensive
missile (or salvo) on the offensive object, or by
holding his fire. For technical reasons, he cannot
launch more than one defensive missile (salvo) on a
single offensive object.
*
(c) The decoy is indistinguishable from a real missile.
(d) There is perfect information to both sides (as is
assumed everywhere in this thesis)
.
We use the following notation:
C - cost of a real missile
C - cost of a decoy (C_ < C_)
u D R
N - Number of intercepting missiles (salvos)
available to the defender
*
This assumption is implied by the specific type of decoy
that we have in mind. A decoy is thought of as an object
identical with a real one in its physical signatures, but
lacking the sophisticated guidance system, warhead and some
other elements that the real missile does have.
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q - (As before) —Probability that a real missile
survives an interception attempt made by the
defender.
P - Probability that the target is killed by a
real missile, given that it survives an
interception attempt.
It is assumed that the game is allowed to continue until the
primary target is killed. The payoff of the game is the total
cost paid for achieving the destruction of the primary target.
The attacker wishes to minimize the maximum expected cost of
Nkilling the target. Let us denote by r the game element
played when the defender has exactly N intercepting missiles
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The expressions in the four entries of the matrix are
readily verified. We explain two entries as examples:
(a) If the attacker launches a real missile, and the
defender fires at it, an immediate cost C_ is
incurred., by the attacker, and in addition, the
game r N ~ is played at the next stage with
probability 1-Pq, which is the probability of
missing the primary target with the real
missile.
(b) If a decoy is launched, and the defender holds
fire, a cost C_ of the decoy is incurred, and
in addition, the stochastic game stays (with
certainty) at state r N to the next stage.
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2 . General Solution














Using formula (1) of the Appendix we can explicitly write








(i-P) +P(i^ )vN.1]vN - tc^g-Pg) iv^ (VI. 2)
or
i [ P ' N P . N-l = (VI. 3)
It is convenient to work out this problem, using






Notice that V„ is the cost of destruction measured in terms of
the cost of destruction that would be incurred if the attacker
used real missiles only. Thus V is a very natural dimension-
N
less quantity, with which we can evaluate the contribution of
decoys to the cost-effectiveness ratio. Clearly, V is always
less than (or equal to) one . The parameter r is the ratio of
costs of a decoy and a real missile, and its value always




B = q - qr (1-P) , C = q-qr (1-Pq)
Eq. (VI. 3) thus becomes:
V
N "
(B+ Vl'- VN + C>VN-1 " ° • (VI - 4)
This equation is readily solved for V :
B+VN-1 * y(B+VN-l )2 -4CVN-lV = i!-^ il-±- . (VI. 5)
N 2
As Eq. (VI. 5) shows, two solutions exist to Eq. (VI. 1). Only
one of them is significant (The possibility of non-unique
solution to the value-equation always exists when there are
entries with zero probability of stopping, as we have in
this stochastic game. Shapley [5] shows uniqueness only under
the assumption of non-zero probability of stopping. See Section
IV. B.)
We shall prove now that the correct value of the game
N
r corresponds to the plus sign in Eq. (VI. 5) above. Observe
first that for all N we have:
V
N " Vl • (VI " 6)
This relation is obvious since the more intercepting missiles
(salvos) the defender has, the higher is the cost which the
attacker is expected to pay for killing the primary target.
Now notice that, since q < 1 , we have:
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B = q -qr (1-P) > q -qr (1-Pq) = C
Notice also that since V = CR/P, we have V Q = q, and hence
VM > Vn = q > B. Therefore, if the minus sign were the correct
one in Eq. (VI. 5), we would have:
-
B+VN-1- y ' B+VN-l )2
-4CVN-l B+VN-l-'/(B+VN-l
)2 - 4BVlVN " 2 * 2
• i (B + Vi - y(Vi-B)2 » - B < " - 7o
The inequality V < V , which we got here, contradicts the
obvious fact expressed in Eq. (VI. 6) above. Thus, we have
proven that if we assume that the minus sign in Eq. (VI. 5) is
the correct one, we are led to contradict an obvious property
of the process (i.e., that V„ > V ,)• Therefore, the plus
sign should be the significant one:
-
B + VN . 1 ^(B+VN . 1 ) 2 -4CVN. 1 (VI _ 7)
N 2
It should be noticed that Eq. (VI. 7) is meaningful only if
Nthe matrix of the game r doesn't have a saddle point. In
what follows we derive the conditions for that matrix to have
N
a saddle point. We write again the matrix of r as
/c
R
+ (l-Pq)V j_ CD+Vl \
cR+ (i-P)vN cD+ vN
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For convenience, we denote by e. . (i,j = 1,2) the (i,j)




(since V. T > V.. , ) and:N N-l
e21 < e 22 (VI. 8b)
To show this last inequality, assume the contrary for the
moment, i.e., assume that e,,-, >_ e^, i.e.*
or
r + (l-p)V > C +V
CR~CD CRV < — < — = V
N - P P
which contradicts the obvious fact that V > V , hence Eq.
(VI. 8b) is correct. Now, inequalities (VI. 8a) and (VI. 8b)
show that only e, , and e-. can be saddle points. But, we can
exclude the possibility that entry e_, is a saddle point, for
if it were, the value VN would be equal to that entry (see




+ (1 " P)VN VN " -T - V
which contradicts the fact that V > V
n
. Thus, it is impossi-
ble that e-, > e,, (otherwise, together with Eq. (VI. 8b) it
would have implied that e^. is a saddle point) . The only entry
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which may be a saddle point is therefore, e , . The necessary






+ d-PqlV^, < CD + VN _ X
which is equivalent to:
C -Cp n —
N-l Pq ^^ N-l c
It should be noted that the fact that only e. , can be a saddle
point could be quite easily argued by discerning the nature
of the process. It is clear that the only pair of pure defense-
offense strategies which can exist as an equilibrium pair, is
the "Fire"-"Real" pair. All other three pairs are "unstable"
in the sense of game theory. For instance, the pair "Fire"-
"Decoy" is unstable because the defender would incline to alter
his action and avoid firing if he knew that his opponent was
using decoys only. Similarly, for the "Hold Fire"-"Decoy"
pair of strategies, the attacker would prefer using a real
missile if he knew that the defender was holding his fire.
We define now the value N* by
N* = Min{N: V > 1-r } (VI. 10)N c
199

The solution to the problem can now be summarized as
follows: For N <_ N* the sequence of values is given by the
recursive equation (VI. 7), starting from V Q = q . The optimal
strategies are randomized, and can be calculated directly,
using formulae of the Appendix. We denote by n (N) the
probability with which the attacker has to choose to launch
a real missile if he adopts the optimal strategy, and by
tt^ (N) the probability with which the defender has to choose
to fire. Formulae 2 and 3 in the Appendix give:






def PVN+CD~CR • \+qrc'q
'
<N) = P(V -qV ) " - - • <VI - llb »
N N-l' VqVl
For N > N*, the optimal strategies are pure: The attacker
uses a real missile and the defender fires at it—both taking
their decisions with probability one. Notice that N* is a
function of the parameters P, q, r .
At that point it seems appropriate to provide some
intuitive interpretations of the optimal strategy established
above. The main point which deserves elaboration is the exis-
tence of the number N*. The optimal policy (viewed as a func-
tion of N) dictates that if the defender has more than N*
missiles to counter the attacking missiles, the attacker should
use real missiles only. This may seem somewhat contradictory
to the rather simplistic intuitive notion that the more defensive
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missiles there are, the more desirable it becomes to use de-
coys to exhaust them. This is not so in the model we have
discussed here. The reason for that is, that if the defender
is equipped with too many missiles, the option of exhausting
him with decoys (and using real missiles later) becomes more
expensive than the option of penetrating through the defense
with real missiles (although this means accepting a lower
probability of success) . It can be argued that when the
defender has many missiles, the marginal gain expected from
using a decoy (which at most would reduce the number of mis-
siles by one) is very insignificant; the defender would still
have many missiles which would require too many decoys to
exhaust. Using a real missile, instead, would still provide
the attacker with some probability of success (although lower
than the probability he could enjoy if he exhausted the defender)
,
and of course, would save (with some probability) the cost of
all those decoys which are required for exhaustion.
The value of N* is the precise indicator of what should
be considered as "many" (defensive missiles) in the above argu-
ment. We turn now to analyze, by intuitive arguments, the
dependence of N* on the parameter r . First, if r = 1, or
if r is very close to 1 , it means that a decoy is as expensive
(or almost as expensive) as a real missile. Therefore, the
attacker cannot have any motivation to use it in place of a
real missile. The formal statement of this assertion is that
r
c
: 1 implies N* = . Defininition (VI. 10) of N* reveals that
this is indeed the case. To be more precise, notice that the
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definition of N* (VI. 10) implies that a necessary and suffi
cient condition for N* to be equal to zero is:




r > 1-q (VI. 12)
c ^
On the other hand, if r =0 (or r is very close to
c c J
zero) it is conceivable that the attacker would prefer to
exhaust the defender, even if this requires spending many
decoys, as is the case when the defender has many missiles.
This intuitive observation is formally expressed by N* being
very large. In the most extreme case (that is, the case r = 0) ,
N* should be infinite. The practical meaning of this state-
ment is that no matter how many intercepting missiles the
defender has, the attacker will use decoys only until the
defender is exhausted. This is obvious because he pays nothing
for decoys. The equation defining N* indeed approves this
assertion: since when r =0, definition (VI. 10) reduces to:
c
N* = Min{N; V > 1}
,N
and as was shown before, there is no value of N such that
V > 1. Thus, N* = ~.
The value of N* is thus seen to increase from to
°°, as r decreases from 1 to .
02

Inequality (VI. 12) given above provides a very useful
and convenient criterion for the attacker to decide on whether
decoys are at all worth acquiring and deploying. This inequal-
ity simply says that if a decoy is more expensive than 1-q times
the cost of a real missile, which it is designed to imitate, then
it is not worth deploying. It also indicates the fact which
is quite expected, namely, that as the probability of sur-
vival gets higher, the limit on acceptable decoy costs gets
lower (or the need for decoys is lessened)
.
NWe now turn to calculating the value of the game r





+ (1 -P(3 )VN-1 ' (VI - 13)
This equation is a simple linear difference equation.
Assuming that V ^ is already known (after performing the
recursive series of calculations using Eq. (VI. 7), from N = 1







+(1-P^ ) -VN-2 )
= ^ (1-Pq) CR+ (1-Pq) \_2
CR
























which is equivalent to
V
N
= 1 - (l-Pq) N
"N
*(l - VN# ) . (VI. 14)
3. Numerical Examples
The numerical examples presented in this section are
intended to give graphical depiction of the following relations:
(a) The value VN as a function of r (decoy-to-real cost
ratio) , for various values of q (probability of sur-
vival) and N (no. of defensive missiles) . These
functions are shown in Figs. VI . 1 through VI . 4 . Each
figure corresponds to a different value of q (q = 0.2,
0.4, 0.5, 0.6) and shows four curves, corresponding
to N = 1, 2, 3, 4.
(b) The probability that the attacker selects a real missile
for launch ( tt ) , as a function of r . This is done
c
on Figs. VI . 5 (for q = 0.2) and VI . 6 (for q = 0.6).
Here again, each figure shows four curves, correspond-
ing to N = 1, 2 , 3 , 4 .
(c) The probability that the defender chooses to fire a
defdefensive missile (it ) , as a function of r . This
c
is given on Figs. VI . 7 and VI . 8 , for the same combina-
tions of values of q and N as in (b) above.
All the numerical examples shown here were calculated assuming
P = 0.5. The method of calculation we used follows exactly the
logic presented in Section A. 2, and is summarized below. For
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(a) Calculate B and C (the parameters appearing in Eq
.
(VI. 5)) from P (= 0.5), q, r .
c
(b) Set V = q, N = 0.
(c) Calculate V from V , (and the parameters B, C) using
Eq. (VI. 5). N
(d) Calculate 7r° f (N) and irdef (N) using eqs . (VI. 11a)
and (VI. lib)
.
(e) Check whether V > 1-r (see Eq. (VI. 10)). If the
answer is negative, sit N = N+l and go to step (c)
.
If positive, set N* = N.
(f) For all values of N greater than N*, calculate V
using Eq. (VI. 13)
.
Notice that we refer to VXT as the most natural measureN
of the decoys effectiveness as exhausting devices. The value
V gives the cost of destroying the target with decoys (deployed
optimally) relative to what it would cost to do without them.
4 . Analysis of Results
In' Figs. VI . 1 through VI . 4 we note that the graphs
of V jump discontinuously to V = 1 on r = 1-q, for all
values of q and N. This reflects the fact that if r 1-q/
the optimal deployment policy uses only real missiles (as
proven in Section A. 2) . Notice also that for any pair of r
and N, the contribution of decoys becomes more significant as
q gets smaller, i.e., V is decreasing with q, for fixed r ,
and for all N.
It is also interesting to point out, that in practical
terms, V„ proves to be not very sensitive to the cost of aN
decoy (that is, to r ) . If q = 0.2, for instance, and N = 1,




q = 0.6 (see Fig. VI. 4) , and N = 1, V. varies from 0.67 to
0.72 as r varies from 0.1 to 0.4. For the same value of q,
but with N 3, V_ varies from 0.77 to 0.86 when r varies
3 c
over the same region. The conclusion, which is somewhat sur-
prising is that decoy cost does not have a very significant
impact upon the overall cost of destruction. This conclusion
is of course valid only so long as the value of r doesn't* c
exceed 1-q. (For r > 1-q we have V., = 1 for all N.)
^ c N
In contrast with the above conclusion is the fact
which may very easily be observed on Figs. VI.5-VI.8, that the
optimal strategies of both the attacker and the defender are
quite sensitive to r . In all those figures the curves are
c
"cut" at exactly those values of r above which the optimal
strategies are pure (i.e., the attacker should launch only
real missiles and the defender should always fire)
.
From Figs. VI . 5 and VI . 6 we see that tt , the proba-
bility of selecting a real missile to launch at the optimal
strategy, is an increasing function of r (for each N) . In
other words, the probability of using decoys decreases as the
cost of a decoy increases, which is also obvious intuitively.
We observe also that as N increases, the probability of using
real missiles decreases (hence, probability of using decoys
increases)
.
If N = 1, we find that as r approaches 1-q (from below)
,
the optimal defensive policy approaches the pure "fire" policy
def
(-it = 1) , whereas the optimal policy for the attacker is
210

still a randomized policy. For example, if q = 0.6, and N = 1,
def
we see from Fig. VI . 8 that as r * . 4 , n approaches 1,
whereas from Fig. VI . 6 we find that tt approaches 0.66. Thus,
for values of r very close to 1-q (but below it) , a very
peculiar feature of the exhaustion model is revealed. That
feature is, that whereas the attacker's optimal policy still
relies on the use of decoys to quite a significant extent,
the defender's optimal policy dictates an almost pure 'fire'
behavior. The point r = 1-q is of course a point of discon-
tinuity of tt (N = 1) (as well as of VN ) . For r 1-q, we
have tt (N = 1) = 1, whereas for all points at which r < 1-q,
the value of tt is bounded by a value less than one.
An interesting observation is the following: Let u be
ofdefined as the value of tt at N = 1, on points (r ,q) for
which r ='l-q. We show that u is independent of q (hence,
also of r ) , and is a function of P only. (Indeed, we can
see that on Figs. VI . 5 and VI . 6, the value of tt° on N = 1,
q = 0.2, r
c
=0.8 (Fig VI. 5) and the value of Tr° f on N = 1
,
q = 0.6, r
c
= 0.4 (Fig. VI. 6) are both equal to 0.66.)
To prove this asssertion, we make use of Eq. (VI. 7)
.
We substitute N = 1, V = q and calculate B and C, which appear
in that equation, directly from their definition:
B = q-qr (1-P), C = q-qr (i-pq;
Putting r = 1-q we get:
B = q(P+q-Pq), C = q 2 (l+P-Pq)
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and thus we find from Eq. (VI. 7)
f7 =
q(P+q-Pq) + q + Vq (P+q-Pq+1) 2 -4q 2 ( 1+P-Pq;
= q(l + P -Pq) .
Now substituting that last expression for V in the formula
for TT° f (Eq. (Vl.lla)), we get:











2 1+P 'P[q(l+P-Pq)-q*] L *
and so tt , calculated for points (r ,q) such that r = 1-q,
is independent of q (or r ) . Another noteworthy property of
the model described in this section is that
£ r







-(N) *> for all N,q.
r -0
c
In other words, if the cost of a decoy is near zero, then the
defensive optimal policy tends to be a pure "hold fire" policy
and the attacker's optimal policy tends to be a pure decoys
launch policy. At r =0 the situation is—from the formal
mathematical standpoint—one in which the value of the stochas-
tic game exists but optimal policies do not. That this is so
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can be intuitively argued, because a policy for which
tt° (N) = 0, for some N, never leads to termination of the
game. The attacker is supposed to spend an unlimited number
of decoys, which would cost nothing, but would not lead to a
N
target kill either. The values of all the games r (N 1)
do exist however at r =0, and are equal to q, as can be
directly deduced from Eq. (VI. 7)
.
It is true, here, although the proof will not be shown,
that although optimal policies do not exist for r = 0, e-
optimal policies do, for every e > and every N. That is,
for any e > there is a pair of strategies, such that the
min-max cost is less than V + e , and greater than V -e.
In Table VI-1 we present values of N* for various
combinations of r and q. The number N* is the maximal number
c ^
of defensive missiles (or salvos) for which the attacker has
to use decoys in his optimal strategy (see def inition--Eq
.
(VI.10)). The table shows that as q and r become smaller,
c
N* increases and reaches very high values (N* = 135 for q = r
= 0.1). This fact, along with the monotone-increasing property
of the function 1-tt
, is the formal expression of the rather
intuitive fact that as the survivability and decoy cost get






Values of N* for Various Combinations of r (Decoy-to-




0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
0.1 135 55 30 18 11 7 4 2
0.2 60 24 13 8 5 3 2 -
0.3 35 14 8 4 3 1 - -
0.4 22 9 5 3 1 - - -
0.5 15 6 3 1 - - - -
0.6 10 3 2 - - - - -
0.7 6 2 - - - - - -
0.8 3 - - - - - - -
The probability of kill P is assumed equal to 0.5
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B. THE REAL-DECOY ALLOCATION (RDA) GAME WITH LIMITED
NUMBER OF REAL MISSILES
1. Formulation
We assume now, that the attacker has M real missiles,
and in addition, he can spend decoys without any restriction
on the number available to him. We can think of the decoys
as very inexpensive dummy missiles so that it may reasonably
be assumed that the attacker has relatively many of them.
The defender has N intercepting missiles (or salvos)
,
and it is assumed as before that he can launch only one missile
(salvo) at each stage. He may choose to fire or to hold fire.
The process is terminated when the attacker either hits the
target or has all his real missiles spent already, whichever
comes first.
We use here all the parameters used in Section A; P,
q, C_, C_. It is also assumed that the primary target has
an operational value v. This means that if the target is killed,
the attacker gains a value worth v units which must be the
same units in which CR and CD are measured. In other words,
the value v serves to make the worth of the primary target
destruction comparable to the cost of the missiles. This
enables us to combine both the missile cost and target value
in one objective function, as we now show.
Let P, be the probability that the primary target will
eventually be killed. The P is, of course, a function of the
policies of the defender and the attacker. Let C be the total
cost, defined as the sum of all real missiles and decoys
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consumed in the process. The cost is of course a random
variable. Let Z be a random variable defined as:
Z =
/ 1 if the primary target is destroyed
if not.
The function vZ - C_ clearly describes the net gain of the
attacker in any realization of the process. We take the
expectation of this gain as the payoff of the game which is








M NLet us denote by r the game played when the attacker has
M real missiles and the defender has N defensive missiles




















where, as usual, the defender selects the row and the attacker
selects the column; the first row corresponds to the defender's
decision to fire, and the second corresponds to a decision to
hold fire. The first column corresponds to the attacker's
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tdecision to launch a real missile, and the second column
corresponds to a decision to launch a decoy.
2 . General Solution
We can assume, without loss of generality, that v = 1.
We only have to remember that values of CD , CR are then
measured in terms of the target "worth", that is, they are
taken relative to the value of the target. The same is true
for v., „. Thus we can take v = 1 from now on. We will alwaysM,N
assume that C < 1 (since byassuming the opposite we reach an
absurdity; the cost of a single weapon designed to kill some
target cannot be greater than the value of killing that
target)
.
Going back to Eq. (VI. 15), notice that V appears
in both sides, so that by explicitly writing the right hand
k side, using Formula 1 of the Appendix, we will get a quadratic
I
equation in V.. „ with coefficients which are functions of
vx„ i xt i / v», i xt an<3 V™ xt i • The solution of this quadraticM-1,N-1 M-1,N M,N-1 ^
equation gives a (non-linear) difference equation of the form
VM,N f (VM-1,N-1' VM-1,N' VM,N-1 ) '
Thus, in order to calculate V„ „, we have to have the valuesM,N
of V^ , M , (for all N' up to N) and of V„ , XT , (for all M' upM-1,N
'
r M' ,N-1
to M) already calculated. The initial conditions can be
derived as follows:




This is so because if the attacker has no real missiles, no
game actually has to be played. To calculate V Q , we first
note that the optimal attacker's strategy in the case N =
(no defense exists) should consist of real missile launches
only. The probability of killing the primary target by the
j missile launched (j <_ M, where M is the number of missiles
the attacker has) is (1-P)^ «P, and if that happens, the
attacker's gain is
-jCn+l. The probability of not killingR
Mthe target with all the M missiles is (1-P) , and in that











M A , M
„• I j(l-P) j
~ 1
+P- I (1-P) ^-MC- (1-P Mj=l j-1
Each of the two sums appearing in the last expression can
easily be calculated. Carrying out this calculation with





--|r)[l -U-P) M ] (VI. 16)
We proceed by transforming the right hand side of
Eq. (VI. 14) to an explicit expression (see Appendix, Eq . (1))
















= 1 ^~ • (VI. 18)
'
, ^ i ^
P P
We have found that V.. .. (which is dimensionless) is a very
M, N
convenient quantity to work with mathematically. Besides, it
has a veiay transparent and useful interpretation. To see this,
R
notice that 1—— is the expected gain in a process in which
the attacker is unlimited in the number of missiles, and in
which no defense exists. By definition (VI. 18), VM N measures
the difference between the actual expected gain V.. ... and the
expected gain in that hypothetical, ideal case. This differ-
ence is given by V., „ not in absolute terms, but rather in
relative terms. If, for example, V„ „ is equal to -0.3, itc M,N ^
M Nindicates that the expected gain from the game r is 30
percent higher than what would be expected if no defense
existed and no limit was imposed on the number of the attacker's
missiles. The value v.. X1 is thus a very natural choice of a
function with which a very meaningful and efficient dimensional
analysis can be carried out.
Our next step is to write Eq. (VI. 17) in terms of





















These parameters have very clear meanings. Substitution in
the last equation yields:
P
2
r (l-q)f2 Pfr (1-P)
(VrVM,N)[(1-P)Vl, N -\N ] " °lMf) 2 Pi Vl,N
Pfr (1-Pq)
+ —
T=i Vi,N-r (VI - 19)








= (1-P) M . (VI. 18b)
Eq. (VI. 18) can be written as:
-2 -
















+Wa-P)Vl, N * TT (1-Pq) - VM-1,N-1 • (VI - 20b)
and so:
BM M ± ^B M - 4CM M
77 = M,N - M,N M,N , 7 .
M,N 2 lvl,i1 '
It remains yet to decide which of the two representations
given in (VI. 21) is the appropriate one. We first find the
answer by looking at the case M = 1 (N arbitrary) . This case
is especially interesting; it corresonds to a case in which
the attacker has a single, expensive (or espeically scarce)
real weaon'along with many cheap decoys. We shall give the
»
solution V, , for all N, along with optimal strategies for
both the defender and the attacker.
From (VI. 20a) and (VI. 20b) we have (since V , = 1) :
2-2 Pfr Pfr
C1,N " <«>V1,IH1 " ^2*= (1^,+T=f(1-P) -Tt' 1^ 1
Pfr
= (l-P)V










substituting in Eq. (VI. 21) we get:
J _ 2 P2frc d^)[1-P+V, „ ,) ± V (1-P-V, X7 ,) +4.1,N-1' " V ** v l,N-l y .2
V = L™ . (VI. 22)1,N 2
We show now that the correct sign in front of the square root
is the plus sign. Suppose it were the minus sign. Then we





This last inequality contradicts the obvious fact that V, M
1 ,N
(the expected payoff gained by the attacker ) should decrease
with N (the number of defensive missiles available). Thus:





For N = we have V, Q = 1-P. So we can calculate V. ,
P




Notice that Eq. (VI. 23) is valid only so long as there is no
saddle point. We show that for such values of N, the values
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Eq. (VI. 27) provides us with the complete solution to
the exhaustion problem with M = 1. Once the parameters of
the problem are given, it is a matter of straightforward
calculation to find V, „ for any N. and from that, as we
1 ,N
soon show, to calculate optimal strategies for both the
defender and the attacker. We have to use the sequence

























Using Eqs. (VI. 20a), (VI. 20b) and (VI. 21), it is now a
straightforward task to calculate all V . It is impossi-
ble, however, to find analytic expressions for M > 1, since
it seems hopeless to solve a difference equation of the
type of Eq. (VI. 21). Some attempts which we have made to
replace Eq. (VI. 21) by an approximating difference equation,
failed to yield a tractable equation either. It is clear,
however, that this does not pose any practical difficulties
in computing the solution to any given pair of values of M
and N, especially for values at ranges of practical interest,
which are usually small.
Optimal Strategies .
We denote by tt (M,N) the probability—which is
the function of the state (M,N) —with which the attacker
chooses to launch a real missile when he uses his optimal
def
strategy. We also denote by tt (M,N) the probability
with which the defender chooses to fire when he behaves
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optimally. Once all the values V are given, the functions
7T (M,N) and tt (M,N) can be calculated by directly applying
the formulae in the Appendix. We apply those formulae to
M.Nthe matrix of the game r , as appears in Eq. (VI. 15) , and
get:
V - V
tt (M,N) = 57T3^m n„\\7 ~ZTt n pur w (VI. 29a)
-P(l-q)+(l-Pq)V .. , + V - (l-P)V . M -V -,M-1,N-1 M,N M-1,N M,N-1
deffMM, _
VM,N~ CD + CR~ P
~ (1"P)V
M-1,N
,,7T 7Q ,«n (M ' N ' nn^\ j. n tjLwt ZT7 h p*r v (VI. 29b)
-P(l-q) + (l-FQ)V, , .. , + V. ..-(i-PJv.. , .. -V.. .. ,n ^ M-1,N-1 M,N ; M-1,N M,N-1
Equations (VI. 29a) and (VI. 29b) can be rewritten in















-IZf -WVW +VM fN-l ~ VM,N + (1-P)Vl,N
(VI. 30b)
We use these formulae to calculate optimal strategies for the
1 N
r ' games (i.e., M = 1) . The values V, ., and V. XT , which1 ,N 1 ,N-1
appear here are substituted by their expressions given in




































It should be emphasized that Eqs . (VI. 31a) and (VI. 31b), as
well as Eq. (VI. 25), are valid only for games which have no
saddle points. We can quite easily find for which values of N the
1 Ngame r ' does have a saddle point (so that the optimal strate-
gies are pure). We do this by observing Eqs. (VI. 31a) and
(VI. 31b). The right hand side of Eq. (VI. 31a) can always
represent a probability (it gives always values between and










s-i < Jf? - Vt4 (vi - 32







N - ~2- + V (-2- ) +1 > -2- + -2- - KN-1
so that there is a number N defined by
NC = MaxfN: Eq. (VI. 32) is satisfied}. (VI. 33)
c cThe number N has the property that for all N <_ N , the
1 N
optimal strategies of the game r ' are randomized, that is,
decoys should be deployed to gain optimal payoffs. For
N > N only real missiles should be used.
By squaring both sides of Eq . (VI. 32) and solving for
r , we can derive the following condition, which r should
c * c





< (if*)- 1+!Ti - IWV/<Ti > 2+1 ] • (VI - 34)
Saying it informally, Eq . (VI. 34) tells how inexpensive a
decoy should be (relative to the cost of a real missile) , in
order for it to be economical to use. It is also important
to determine under what condition the decoys do not contribute
to the overall effectiveness, at any value of N, or in other
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words, when does N as defined in (VI. 33) equal zero. Since
{K } is a monotone increasing sequence, we see that if r
IN w#
violates Eq. (VI. 32) (hence also Eq. (VI. 34)) for N = 1, it
violates that equation for all N > 1 also. Therefore, putting




> ^ , (VI. 35)
then decoys do not benefit the attacker in any easel Thi£
4
may be a very useful criterion to decide whether a decoy,
as an exhausting device, should be acquired and held in the
attacker's arsenal.
3 . Numerical Example
The following numerical example illustrates the typi-
cal characteristics of the solutions to the model presented
here. We assume:




C = 0.25 (i.e., a real missile costs one quarter of the
target 'worth')
.
We have also f = C_/P = 0.5.
We present here the following results:
(a) The graphs of the values V, , and V. as a
J. / J. 1 , 2
function of r , the ratio between decoy cost and
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real missile cost. These graphs are given in
Fig. VI. 9. As explained before, V (N = 1,2)
is a dimensionless quantity, expressing a relative
measure of the difference between the expected
gain (i.e., the value) in the actual game
(r ' ) and the expected gain in a hypothetical
process in which the attacker attacks an undefended
primary target, with no limit on the number of








(Notice that V may be negative also. Being
negative means that
V, > 1 -1,N P
that is, it indicates that the gain in the game
1 N
r ' is better than that in the hypothetical
process described above.)
(b) The optimal policies for both the attacker and
the defender are given in Fig. VI. 10. They are
characterized by tt and tt
,
the optimal proba-
bilities of selecting, respectively, the real
missile (by the attacker) and the firing decision
(by the defender)
.
In Fig. VI . 9 we notice that at some value of r (which depends




FIGURE VI. 9: Dependence of the Modified Value V, on the
Decoy-To-Real Cost Ratio (RDA Game with
Limited No. of Offensive Missiles)







FIGURE VI. 10 Optimal Strategies as Functions of Decoy-To-




point is exactly the value of r , given in the right hand
side of Ineq. (VI. 34) (and for N = 1, the right hand side of
(VI.35)). At that value of r , the optimal defensive and
offensive policies cease to be randomized, and become pure
policies. The value V, XT thus cannot depend on r forr 1,
N
r c
values greater than the above value.
From Fig. VI. 10 we notice that tt (1,1), tt (1,2),
def def
n (1/1) and tt (1,2) , all approach zero as r -+ . We
again have a situation in which no optimal policy exists
although the value of the game does exist. If r =0, the
attacker has no motivation to stop using decoys—which costs
nothing— since he anticipates that eventually the defender
will consume his missiles. The defender, being aware that
the attacker is bound to that kind of logic, has no reason
to fire missiles. Thus the game is supposed to last forever
with no gains earned by the attacker. It is quite simple to
show however , that e -optimal policies do exist for any e > 0.
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The defense system is said to be in a state of saturation
if the number of missiles arriving simultaneously at the
borders of its killing zone is more than the number of missiles
which the system is technically capable of engaging. Thus,
the defense system has to select which missiles to engage,
while all the other missiles are then able to penetrate the
defense uninterrupted.
The situation we explore here is, again, one in which the
detection of targets is made through a radar monitor only, on
which real missiles and decoys produce signals with the same
characteristics (i.e., intensity, radial velocity etc.). In
other words, it is assumed that there is no way in which the
radar operator can distinguish between a real missile and a
decoy. This fact is exactly the one which the attacker is
willing to exploit. By letting each real missile be accom-
panied by one or more decoys, the real missile is protected
simply by the fact that there is a given prior probability
that it will not be chosen for engagement by the defense.
The more decoys accompanying the real missile, the more likely
it is that it will not be engaged.
In Section B of this chapter we present and solve the
problem of finding the optimal number of decoys to accompany
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a real missile, in order to minimize the expected cost of
destroying the primary target. It is clear that by launching
more decoys the protection of the real missile becomes more
effective. On the other hand, spending more decoys also in-
creases the cost of the operation. We are looking for the
optimal number of decoys, where the optimum represents a
point of "balance" between the degree of protection and the
cost
.
In Section C we consider a similar problem, differing from
that of Section B in that we make the number of real missiles
also unspecified. In that case, the attacker can launch any
mixture of real missiles and decoys, where neither the number
of missiles of each type, nor their proportion are subject to
any constraint.
The main purpose of deploying decoys, in any situation, is
to improve the cost-effectiveness ratio of a given operation.
In both models presented in this chapter we assume that the
attacking processes are to continue until the primary target
is destroyed. The objective is thus the expected cost of
destroying the target.
B. THE OPTIMAL NUMBER OF DECOYS REQUIRED TO PROTECT A
SINGLE REAL MISSILE
Suppose the attacker is restricted to launch only one real
missile at a time. This restriction may originate with some
technical or other type of constraints. However, there is no
limit on the number of decoys the attacker is allowed to launch
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simultaneously with the real missile. We assume that the
attacker launches a "wave" of objects, one of them being the
real missile. He then receives the information on whether the
real missile hit the primary target or not. The primary tar-
get is defended by N secondary targets. We use the following
notation:
mn
- No. of decoys shot simultaneously with a real
missile, at each "wave" of attack
CR
- Cost of a real missile
C_ - Cost of decoy (C < C )
C° - Optimal expected cost of destroying the primary
target
P - Probability that the real missile kills the target,
given that it survives
q - Probability that the real missile survives a given
interception attempt made by any single defense
target
N - No. of secondary targets defending the primary target.
We also make the following assumptions:
(1) One real missile is launched together with m_ decoys.
The attacker controls the launches in such a way as
to let all the objects reach the boundaries of the
defense killing zone at about the same time. Conse-
quently, each secondary target is capable of engaging
exactly one missile.
(2) The operators of the detection radars sitting at the
defense targets are incapable of distinguishing between
a real missile and a decoy.
(3) It is assumed that the attack process will go on until
the primary target is killed. After each attack in
which m +1 missiles (one real and mD decoys) are
used, tne attacker is informed about tne result. He
quits immediately upon achieving a hit of the primary
target.
(4) Two cases concerning the engagement process are considered
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(a) Case 1 ; In this case each one of the N second-
ary targets operates independently of ail the
others. The selection of the missile to be
engaged is made randomly, each one of the rn D+l
missiles has an equal chance of being selected
by each of the secondary targets. Thus it is
possible that some of the missiles will be
engaged by more than one secondary target,
whereas others will be engaged by nonel
(b) Case 2 : In this case the operations of the N
secondary targets are coordinated so that the
resulting engagement pattern is of a one-on-one
type. One way to visualize that is to assume
that there is a central unit equipped with its
own means of target detection and control, and
having command links with all the N secondary
targets. This unit is responsible for distributing
the targets among the subordinate launching units
(i.e., the secondary targets) in such a way that
no more than one secondary target is assigned to
engage any single detected object. For the
saturation effect to exist we have to require that
N_ < mD+l. (Otherwise, if N >_ m-4-1 , each missile(including the real one) will be engaged with
probability one so that no condition of saturation
really exists.) It is further assumed that any







different groups) has an equal chance of being
selected as the group of engaged missiles.
1. Solution to Case 1: Independent Operations of the
Secondary Targets
We first calculate the probability that the real
missile will survive given that it is accompanied by m_ decoys.
To do that, notice that the probability that any given second-
ary target will intercept the real missile is given by:
iThe real missile will i iThe real missile will be.










The probability that the real missile will not kill the
primary target is therefore:
N
1- s
P (missing the primary} = 1 - P» (1 - —
-rr ) (VII. 1)
r m_ + i
We now write the equation for C , the minimal expected
cost of destroying the primary target. As a result of each
ripple launch of the m +1 missile, two outcomes are possible:
(1) The primary target is killed, and so the process
ends with no more cost incurred.
(2) The primary target is not killed, in which case
the' attacker remains at the same state he was
before the launch, i.e., the optimal expected cost
left to be paid is exactly C°
.
Thus, the attacker has to pay the cost of the missiles he
launches at any single stage, plus the expected cost of con-
tinuing the process, which is either (in Case (1) above)
or C (in Case (2) ) . The probability of Case (2) is given in
Eq . (VII. 1). Therefore we have the following equation:





-^-) s ]-C°} . (VTI.2)
ny>_0 u
(integer)
Notice that C , the unknown optimal value of the objective
function, appears on both sides. This equation can be solved
as follows. First, denote by C (m ) the expected cost of
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destruction when there are m_ decoys accompanying each real
missile. Then:




m • C + C
C(m ) = 2_D R__ (VII. 3)
Now calculate the derivative of C(m ) (disregarding,
for the moment, the fact that itu is confined to be an integer)




~ " - "!)•* (1-niip)
dnu 2N
p ( 1 -^ Sv1





It can be seen that as the variable m goes to either +», or
D
-°°, the derivative of C (m ) converges to a positive value
C_/P . Also, there are exactly two points at which this deriva^
tive becomes zero. They are the two roots of the quadratic
equation
:




Let m_ and m_ be the two roots of this equation. If one root
is negative and the other is non-negative, then the function
being possibly zero)
:
C(m^) will have the following (tentative) graphical from (m"
Let m be the positive root of Eq. (VII. 4). It can be seen
from the above discussion that the solution to the actual















(where [•] denotes, as usual, the integral part). We have
also:




























In this case the solution is simply m° = , and C = C(0)
,
since m_ is restricted (in the actual problem) to the non-
negative integers.
A third case which should, theoretically, be considered
1 2is the one where both mD and m^ are non-negative. This case
will soon be shown to be impossible for this problem.
We now give the explicit solution to Eq. (VII. 4)
through which we will be able to derive conditions for each
of the two cases mentioned above to occur.









(1-q) -<l+q) ] *+4 (-^ - q) ] (VII. 8)
where r = CD/CR is the decoy-to-real cost ratio. We now




(a) The condition for one root to be negative and for the









- N +r '
s c
(b) The conditions for both roots to be negative are:
N -1










Since r < 1 we have
c
N N -1
> s~T- , (VII. 9c)N +r N +1 '
s c s
and so, condition (VII. 9a) is redundant, and we have
N
s
q > N + r
s c
as a single condition under which the optimal value of m_
is m = 0.
We now show that it is impossible that both mQ and
2
m of Eq . (VII. 8) will be non-negative. The conditions for








S n - - s
- q
r ^ - "^^ ^ - N +r
c s c
Both of these two conditions cannot be satisfied
since from inequality (VII. 9c), we see that they contradict
each other. Thus, this case is vacuous.
We now summarize the algorithm which solves Case
1 (independent operations of the defense targets):
(a) Calculate iru (Eq. (VII. 8), taking the plus sign in
front of the square root)
.
(b) There are two possibilities regarding the optimal
number of decoys to accompany a real missile: >.
(bl) If q > (N )/(N +r ), the solution is m° = 0.
S S C D
It means that if the probability of survival
of the real missile
—
given that it is engaged
—
is "sufficiently high" (and to be specific,
higher than M /(N +r ), the attacker should
s s c
not resort to decoys, since their contribution
to the survivability is not worth their cost.
(b2) If q N /(N +r ), the solution is [m ] or
[m ]+l, depending on whether C ( [m ] ) is less than
or greater than C([m ]+l). The function C(m )
can be written as (see Eq . (VII. 3)):
N
f (l+mn r ) (l+m_)
s







To make significant quantitative analysis of the improvements
achieved by introducing decoys, we should measure the expected
cost of destruction relative to some standard unit of cost.
The most relevant basis for that purpose is the expected cost
of destruction when using real missiles only, which clearly
N N
is C-VPq s = f/q s . We still subject ourselves to the require-
ment that only one real missile may be launched at each attempt
(We drop this constraint in Section C, where we explore the
problem of optimal real/decoy "mixtures") . We now define the
dimensionless function C (m )
.
c(m ) n q+qmD N
C (m
D
) = _^. q = (1 +mDrc ) (__£) (VII. 10)
It is apparent from the discussion above that the value
c° s
C° = C (m_ =m°) = —3— directly indicates by how much do the
decoys contribute to the reduction of the expected cost of
destruction.
2 . Solution to Case 2: Coordinated Operations of the
Secondary Targets
In this case we assume that the operations of the
individual defense targets are coordinted and that no missile
is engaged by more than one secondary target. We assume so
even when the number of missiles the attacker launches is
less than or equal to the number of secondary targets. There-
fore, if the number of secondary targets is N , then the opti-
mal number of decoys (m_) can be either greater than N -1D 3 s
(so that together with the real missile there will be more
than N missiles) , or it can be zero, so that the real missile
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will be launched alone. The third possibility, namely that
< mn
< N -1, is surely non-optimal since under the coordinated
operations assumptions there will be (with probability one)
a secondary target which will engage the real missile. Thus,
as long as there are not more than N -1 decoys accompanying
the real missile, no protection is provided by the decoys,
although they do add to the cost. Therefore, choosing m =
is always preferable to choosing any number between 1 and
N -1. V 1
If m_+l > N , there are ( ., ) different ways in whichUS N
S
N missiles can be selected to be engaged. We assume that




as the group of engaged missiles. Since there are ( ,)
s
groups of N objects, one of which is the real missile, we
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C° = Min ] (integer) (VI 1. 11)
Pq
The term in the lower row reflects the possibility that the
optimal value of m_ is zero. The upper term corresponds to
all other cases, and as was explained above, if m_. is non-zero,
it must be greater than N -1, so that the minimum in the
upper term is taken over all m_ greater than or equal to N .
As before, we are interested in a dimensionless quan-
tity representing cost, which provides a convenient quanti-
tative measure of the contribution of decoys to cost reduction.







The value C° gives the cost of destruction relative to the
cost that would have been paid if decoys had not been allowed
to be deployed. Using C° instead of C° , Eq. (VII. 11) becomes:
(l-q)N




C = Min ?- s (VII. 12)
1 m integer k
1
We proceed by solving Eq. (VII. 12), following logical steps
similar to those made in solving Eq. (VII. 2). The only differ-
ence is that now we have different forms for the functions
C (mD ) and C(m ), which for the case of independent operations






C(mJ (nu.r +1) (nu+1)
The solution m° to Eq. (VII. 12) should be either zero, or
the one which minimizes C(mD ),if this minimizing value is
greater than N -1 . First we calculate this minimum of C(mD )
,
temporarily ignoring the integer constraint. Differentiating
C(mD ) we find:






























= q [m+1 - (l-q)N PD S
The solution to the equation dCdn-J/dnu = is
1 [(l-q)N -1]± _/[l-q)N -l] 2-(l+-^(l-(l-q)N )+i
2 V s c c
«£ = V 2 £_ (vn. 14)
From definition (VII. 13) it is easily seen that as m + ±°°,
the function C(mD ) approaches a linear increasing curve, wi th
positive slope. Hence the root which corresponds to the minimum
is the larger one (mD , the root with the plus sign) . In
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general, m_ will be non-integer. The following figure shows




In order to find the solution to the actual problem
(i.e., with the integer constraint imposed), we must consider
three different cases:
(a) If mD >_ N , we define, for any m_
C (mi) = Min{l,C([mi]) r C([mi]+l) }mm D D u






[«£] if C . (mi)mm D
[»Ji+i if mm D




(b) If m_ < N„, then the optimum is either m_ = N orD s F D s
m_ = , depending upon whether C(N ) is less than (or equal to;
C(D) = 1, or is greater than 1. This is so because if either
[mD ] or [m ] + 1 is positive and less than (or equal) to
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N -1, it cannot be the optimum by the argument given before
s
(i.e., that no saturation effect is created). If, for
instance, N > 2, and m is such that
1 < mi < N -1
— D s
then neither [m ] nor [m_] +1 can be the optimal value m .
Thus, in this case we have:
o
mD
N if C(N ) <
s s —
if C(N ) >
s
A remark should be made here that it is quite simple
to derive a sufficient condition for decoys to be not worthy
of their cost. From the graph of C(m_) given above, we notice
1 2that if m_ and m_ are both non-positive, then the minimum
of C(m_) on the feasible domain (m = non-negative integer)
should occur at m. = 0. Thus the solution to Eq. (VII. 12) is
necessarily m = 0. From Eq . (VII. 14) , sufficient conditions




(l-q)N -1 <_ ^^ q ^ 1 -~ . (VII. 15b)
s
Since < r < 1, the existence of the first condition
c
guarantees the existence of the second, hence the second is
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redundant and we conclude that a sufficient (although clearly
not necessary) condition for decoys to be uneconomical to use
is :





In order to gain some feeling about the character of
the solutions given in Section B and about actual numbers of
decoys required to operate optimally in some particular cases,
we present a numerical example. Through all the following
numerical cases it is assumed that P = Probability of kill
(given survival) =0.5. We have calculated m (= optimal
number of decoys) and C(m°), the optimal normalized cost,
for various combinations of the parameters r and q.
The results are presented in the format shown in
Figs. VII.1-VII.3. In Fig. VII. 1, optimal values for Case I
(independent operations) are given when N = number of second-
ary targets = 3. The optimal number of decoys m° for any
combination of r and q is readily given by observing the zone
to which the point (r ,q) belongs. The various zones are de-
fined by a set of curves as shown. We have restricted our
calculations to values of r between 0.1 and 0.9 (decoys which
cost less than one tenth of the real missile, or more than
line tenths are rarely realistic anyway) . From a pure theoreti'
:al point of view, however, it is obvious that all curves




Optimal No. of Decoys Required to Protect
a Single Real Missile—Case I (Independent


















Optimal No. of Decoys Required to Protect
a Single Real Missile--Case II (Coordinated
Operations of Secondary Targets, N = 3)
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P = 0.5 N = 1
s
(IND. AND COORDINATED OPERATIONS)
.1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1.0
FIGURE VII. 3: Optimal No. of Decoys Required to Protect




when decoys cost nothing!) any number of decoys is worth
using, and the more we use the less is the expected cost of
destruction. On the other hand, as r + 1, the whole problem
becomes irrelevant to any realistic situation. This is so
mainly because the requirement that only one real missile be
launched at any single stage is absurd: If r is very close
to 1, it is obviously better to use several real missiles than
to launch decoys, which cost almost the same as real missiles
but contribute nothing to the probability of kill.
In Fig. VII. 2 the results correspond to Case II
(coordinated operations), with N = 3, as before, It is note-
worthy that in most of the area of the square Mr ,q:
<_ r 1,0 q 1} optimal number of decoys is either
three (so that decoys are added to create an excess of just
one missile over what the defense can simultaneously handle)
or zero. A comparison between Case I and Case II, for N =3,
S
reveals that there is a large area for which the optimal policy
for Case II does not use decoys (i.e., m_ = 0) whereas the
optimal policy for Case I uses one, two or even three decoys.
We also observe that the maximal survival probabilities which
requires the use of any given number of decoys is always
smaller in Case II than in Case I (for any value of r ) . For1 c
example: If r = 0.5, it requires that the probability of
survival be at most 0.145 in Case II in order that the optimal
behavior will be to launch three decoys along with the real
missile. In Case I, the probability of survival should be at
most 0.295 in order for the same conclusion to hold.
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In Fig. VII. 3 we present the results for N = 1.
Obviously, if only one secondary target is assumed to exist,
there should be no difference between Case I (independent
operations) and Case II (coordinated operations)
.
Figs. VII. 4 and VII. 5 present the optimal cost
C° = C(nC) for Case I (independent operations of secondary
targets) as a function of r for various values of q (q = 0.2,
0.4, 0.6) . Each set of three curves corresponds to either of
the two cases analyzed in Section B and to a given pair of
values of P and N (P = 0.5, N 1,3) . Notice that C(m°) = C°
s s D
is a dimensionless quantity which gives the optimal cost of
destruction when decoys are available, measured in terms of
the optimal cost when decoys are unavailable. C is thus
the natural measure of the overall effectiveness of decoys.
Having C equal 0.2 for example, means that decoys make it
possible to reduce the cost of destruction to only one fifth
of what it would cost to destroy the target by the real missile
only.
Note that the graphs of C as a function of r (for
any given q, values of the parameters q and N ) are piecewise
linear. That this should be so may be derived directly from
Eqs. (VII. 10) and (VII. 13), which give the form of C(m ) for
the two cases analyzed in Section B. From that equation we
see that for a given m
, the quantity C (m_J is a linear func-
tion of r . The points on the graphs where discontinuities
of slope occur, are exactly those where the optimal number of
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C. OPTIMAL MIXTURE OF REAL MISSILES AND DECOYS
1. General Solution
In Section B it was assumed that only one real missile
is launched at each stage. While this may be a very realistic
constraint, especially when the real missile is very expensive
or scarce, it does not always apply. Therefore it is of special
interest to find optimal "mixture" of real missiles and decoys
when the number of real missiles launched at any given stage
is not limited to one. We shall assume that only one second-
ary target is present, and that the objective function is (as
it was in Section B) to minimize the expected cost of destroy-
ing the primary target.
Let mR and mD be the number of real missiles and decoys,
respectively, launched simultaneously by the attacker. The
parameter P is, as before, the single shot probability of kill
of the primary target by a real missile (given that it sur-
vives) . The parameter q is the probability of survival of
the real missile given that it is engaged. We assume that the
defense target is capable of engaging only one missile out of
each "wave", and that each of the mn +m missiles has an equal
chance of being selected for engagement. Thus there are two
possibilities
:
(a) That all the mR missiles are left unengaged. The
probability of this is mn/(m_.+m_) . The probabilityU UK ITlrj
that they will all miss the primary target is (1-P)
(b) That one of the real missiles will be selected by the
defense for engagement. Thus only m -1 real missiles
will be free to penetrate. Each has a probability of
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miss which is equal to 1-P. The engaged real missile
will have a probability of miss equal to 1-Pq. The
probability for that event to occur is m_/(m_+mR ).
We conclude that the probability that a group of mD decoys and
m_ real missiles, launched simultaneously, will miss the pri-
mary target is:
m m m m -1
P . (m_,m_J = —rr— (1-P) + —-^— (1-P) K • (1-Pq)miss R' D y m_+m_ n\_+m_ ^R D D R
m -1 m
= (1-P) K [1-P+— • P • (1-q)] (VII. 17)
m





Let C (m) be the minimal expected cost of destruction when
the attacker is constrained to launch a total of m missiles
at a time. Thus we have:
C°(m)
=








There is no easy closed procedure which solves Equation
(VII. 18). Let us first express the fact, that at the optimal








)n^+(l-P) • [1-P +-~.P(l-q) ]C°(m) . (VII. 19
We now define:
C -m + (C -C )m




1 - (1-P) K • [1-P +-£.P(l-q)]
m
From Eq. (VII. 19) and the definition of the function C(mR ;m)
we notice that at the solution point mR = m (m) we must have
C(mR (m);m) = C°(m) = Min C(mR ;m) .
l<_mR^m
The number m° (m) is the value of m_ (less than or equal to m).K K
which minimizes C(m ;m) . To find m°(m) let us first find the
R K
minimum of C(mR ;m) when mR is not constrained to the integers.
After differentiating C(mR ;m) and setting the derivative equal











R ] (VII. 21)
where a (m) , a., (m) and a. (m) are constants (depending on mi
given by
an (m) = 1-P-r (l-Pq)+r • m (1-P) • In (t^t) . (VII. 21a)
u c c l-p
a (m) = [ (1-r ) (1-P) +r P (1-q) ] ln(~F) . (VII. 21b)l c c 1-P
(1 -r )P(l-q) .




Eq. (VII. 21) can't be solved analytically. We must resort to
some numerical procedure to solve it. For small values of
m this is not, however, necessary. One can check directly
where the minimum of the function C(mD ;m) occurs by computing
this function for all integer values of m_ between 1 and m.
Notice that as m_ * °° , C(mR ;m) tends to be linear with positive







By taking the second derivative we also find that the first
derivative (taken as a function of m R ) has exactly two roots
(which means that Eq. (VII. 21) has exactly two different
solutions). The function C(mR ;m) therefore has the following
tentative form:
Let m
R be the solution to Eq. (VII. 21). From the above









that is, only one real missile should be used
(together with m-1 decoys)
.
(b) m > m. In this caseR —
m (m) = m
i.e., all m missiles should be real.





(d) 1 <_-m* < m and C([mR ];m) > C([mR]+l;m)
Then
m^(m) = [mR ] +1 .
So far we have solved the problem of finding the
optimal mixture of real missiles and decoys when the total
number of missiles to be launched was given (equal to m)
.
For each value of m we can find C (m) given by:
C°(m) = C(mR (m);m)
The solution to the original problem is thus:




Since we cannot express m_ (m) and C(m (m);m) analytically,
the optimization problem given in Eq . (VI I. 22) cannot be
solved by any method other than a numerical search method.
In the example given in the next section we actually carry
out that search procedure.
To carry out a meaningful analysis of the effective-
ness of decoys, we should compare the minimum achievable cost
when decoys are actually available for use with the minimum
achievable cost when only real missiles are available. If
we denote by C this last quantity, we see that we are inter-
ested in the ratio
C°
-=• (P, q, r are given )
C
R oThe value of C can be found in much the same way as C .
RSince C is the minimal expected cost of destruction when only
real missiles are available, the functional equation which
C should satisfy is
C
R
= Min{m.C + (l-P) 111" 1 . (1-Pq)
-C
R
} . (VII. 23)
m>l K
We solve this problem using arguments similar to those
we have given in solving the problem of finding C°(m). First
we define the function C (m) by:
R mC RC*(m) = 2— . (VII. 24)
l-d-P)™" 1 . (1-Pq)





C = C (m )
Thus we have to find the minima of C (m) on the
(positive) integers. To do that, we first find the minima
of C (m) when m is not restricted to be an integer. By
direct differentiation we find that the minima should satisfy
the equation:
(1-Pq) [1 +ln( I^-) -m ] • (l-P)™"
1
= 1 . (VII. 25)
It can be shown by calculus that Eq. (VII. 25) has only one
positive root (call it m ) . If m < 1, then m = 1, and if
1 T U.I- oR r 1, OR , 1, , , , . . .m > 1, then m = [m ] or m = [m ]+l, depending on whether
R 1 R 1
C ( [m ] ) is less than or greater than C ( [m ]+l).R R
Eq. (VII. 25) can be solved either by a search method
or by an iterative method as we show next. This iterative
method is based on the well-known Banach Fixed Point Theorem.
This theorem, when applied to real functions, defined on the
real line, states that if f (x) is a function with the con-
traction property , i.e., if
|f(x
2
) - f (x
1 )




for any pair x ,x_, for some constant K < 1, then the equation
f(x) = x
can be solved by the successive approximation method. In
other words, if we take an arbitrary point x. as an initial
approximation, and then define
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x = f (x , ) for n = 1, 2, 3 ,
n n-1
then it is guaranteed that
lim x = x
n-*-°°
n
where f(x) = x
Now to apply this method to our problem, notice that







so that, if we define




m = f (m) .
To show that the method of successive approximation works,
we need only to show that f (m) has the contraction property
So let m, ,m
2
be any two points on the real line (assume



























using now the inequality log(l+x) <_ x we find that the last




ln(l-P) | (m 1 -m 2 ) ±
ln(l-P) |"l+| ln(l-P) | -m
2
1+| ln(l-P) | ' (mi"m 2 }
so we have proven
f(m,)-f(m
2
)| < K- (m 1 -m 2 )
where
K — ± . < ]_
l+|ln(l-P)
|
so that the contraction property indeed holds. In practice,
we can stop the iterative calculation of the sequence m ,




whenever it seems apparent that the
sequence is "trapped" between two consecutive integers. This
is implied by the" fact that the solution of the actual problem
is either the greatest integer smaller than the solution of
f (m) = m or the smallest integer greater than it.
oRNow let m ' be the solution to the optimization prob-








R (moR ) = 1 . (VII. 26)
oR
-,
1-(1-P)m " 1 (l-Pq)
Let also m and m represent the optimal solution to the
R
problem of optimal real-decoy mixture (m — total number of
missiles (reals and decoys) to be launched, m --number of reals
in the mixture). From Eq. (VII. 20) we get:
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°V {CR CD)1^L fvTT ,-Cfciym ) = C = — ^ , (VII. 27
"ST1 ™r
l-(l-P) K [l-P+-£p (1-q)]
m







~R oR o , _o
l-(l-P) K . [i-p+-g.p(l-q)]
m
2 . Numerical Example
Table VII. 1 presents the results of some numerical
cases of the optimal mixture problem. In carrying out the
calculations we have followed the following steps, for any
given combination of P, q, and r :
oR
(1) First, we calculated the' optimal number m ' of real
missiles to be launched simultaneously (where use of
decoys is not allowed) in order to minimize expected
cost of destruction. The calculation is carried out by
solving Eq. (VII. 25), using the successive approxi-
* oR
mation method. The values of m are presented in
the fourth column of Table VII. 1.
(2) The optimal cost (C ) of destruction (with real
missiles only) is presented in the fifth column of
the table. The cost is measured in units of CR , the
cost of a single real missile. It' was calculated using
Eq. (VII .26)
.
(3) For m = 1,2,3,... , the solution to Eq . (VII. 18) was
found, using the method described in Section C. For
each m, we have calculated m_ (m) , the optimal number
R
The successive approximation algorithm for Eq. (VII. 25
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of missiles that should be real, if a total of m
missiles are to be launched simultaneously (hence,
m-m (m) is the optimal number of decoys) . Using
R.
Eq. (VII. 20) we also calculated the value of
C(m°(m) ;m)/C_ for each m. This is the optimal cost
R R
of destruction (again, in terms of C_) , for any
given m.
(4) By keeping track of the variation of C(mR (m);m) as
m increases, the value m = m for which C(m (m);m)
attains its minimum was detected. The optimal mix-
ture thus contains mD (m°) real missiles and m -m (m°)
decoys. It is presented in column 6 of Table VII.
1
in the form (m ,m_) where m = m -m_
.
(5) The optimal cost of destruction (C ) , measured in terms
of C„, is shown in the seventh column of Table VII. 1.
(6) The ratio of optimal cost with decoys (calculated in
'(5) above) to the optimal cost without decoys (calcu-
lated in step (2)) is presented in column 8. This is
ther natural measure of the effectiveness of decoys in
saturating the defense system.
We have included in the tables the solution to the optimal
mixture problem for all combinations of the following values
of the parameters:
P = 0.2, 0.5
q = 0.1, 0.5
r = 0.1, 0.5
c
Analysis of the results . It is apparent from the results
shown in Table VII-1 that the gain obtained by introducing
decoys is more significant when the parameters P, q, r get
smaller. Notice for instance, that for all cases for which
r = 0.5 the optimal mixture is a pure "real" mixture, whereas
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for all cases for which r =0.1 the optimal mixture contains
c
at least one decoy. This reflects the sensitivity of the
optimal mixture to the cost of decoys. Notice also that the
savings which result from using decoys (optimally 1) becomes
more significant as q, the probability of survival, gets
smaller. If P = 0.2, r =0.1 and q = 0.1, for instance,
the decoys reduce the cost of destruction to only 57 percent
of the cost which would be incurred using only real missiles.
If q is raised to 0.5, the savings is much smaller, the





FORMULAE FOR COMPUTING VALUE AND OPTIMAL
STRATEGIES IN A 2 x 2 MATRIX GAME
The following elementary formulae are used repeatedly in
Chapter IV and Chapter VI . Their derivation can be found in
Owen [4]
.
Let A be a 2 *2 matrix of a zero-sum game:
'
all a 12 ^
A -
a-, a.
\ "21 22 /
We assume that player 1 selects the row, player 2 selects the
column. The payoff a. . is paid by player 1 to player 2, if
they choose actions i and j, respectively. We denote by V
the value of the game. The optimal strategies are completely
1 2determined by the probabilities it , tt , where:
tt = Probability that player 1 selects the first row.
2
tt = Probability that player 2 selects the first column,
The formulae we use are:
V =
aH' a 22 " a 12 >a 21
(1)
all+a22 ' a 12~ a21
1
a
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